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Abstract 
The thesis examines the pollution of water by pesticides in Britain, an issue of public 
and political concern since the late 1980s as the results of extensive water monitoring, 
required under the EC's Drinking Water Directive have highlighted the spread and 
levels of contamination. The study explores the co-evolution of post-war agricultural 
policy and pesticide usage and examines how pesticide pollution of water has been 
constructed as a 'problem' and how this has been contested by different groups. 
Survey material from the Bedford Ouse catchment in Bedfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire is used to explain how farmers use pesticides, for what reasons, and 
with what understandings of the pollution risks their use brings. The questions to be 
addressed are: i) why, since the Second World War, have pesticides become such an 
important element of farming practice in Britain ? ii) how do farmers decide which 
chemicals to use and how to use them ? iii) how has pesticide pollution of water 
emerged as a 'problem' ? and iv) what are the implications for farming practices of 
regulations to tackle pesticide pollution ? 
Pollution is conceptualised as the outcome of a pollution production process' involving 
a network of actors, including farmers, advisors, scientists, pesticide manufacturers 
and regulatory agencies. Through an examination of farmers' actions in this context the 
thesis shows that, far from being the result of some natural technological progression, 
the increasing dependence upon pesticide technologies has been shaped and determined 
by broader social and political factors. 
The first part of the thesis explores the historical context for pesticide use in Britain, 
concentrating on the roles of agricultural policy and science and technology. In the 
second part, the actions of arable farmers are assessed through locally-based fieldwork 
conducted in 1991 in the catchment of the Bedford Ouse. 
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Preface 
The contamination of water by pesticides is one of a long line of environmental 
problems to emerge in Britain associated with contemporary farming practices. It has 
been of particular concern since the late 1980s as more extensive water monitoring has 
highlighted the spread and levels of pollution. Today attention is turning to how 
pesticide pollution might best be tackled, but much still remains to be learned about 
precisely who should be regulated, how this should be done, and what degree of 
resistance can be expected from interested parties. 
This thesis represents a contribution to these issues. The research was conducted on a 
part-time basis between 1989 and 1993 while the author was employed on a series of 
research projects at the Rural Studies Research Centre in the Department of Geography, 
University College London, and was completed at the Centre for Rural Economy in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing at the University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne. The study has grown out of a set of research interests in the 
environmental regulation of agriculture which have focused upon the degree to which 
individual farmers are able to control their own destinies. This 'geography of 
enablement and constraint' has important implications for whether farmers can deliver 
the benefits of environmental policies expected of them by policy makers and the 
public. 
The four decades following the Second World War saw a technological revolution in 
British agriculture stimulated by state intervention in agricultural markets and 
government support for R&D and advisory services. The application of mechanical and 
chemical science and technology transformed agricultural production processes, but 
sometimes with unforseen or disregarded environmental consequences. It is often 
argued that farmers have been 'forced' to adopt new technologies or go out of business 
because policies aimed at expanding national food production have left them on a 
'technological treadmill' with only tightly constrained choices. If this interpretation is 
accepted, then environmental problems, such as water pollution from pesticides, 
implicate national (and European) agricultural policies as much as the husbandry 
decisions of individual farmers. 
The current decade has raised new questions about the future of farming and 
environmental regulation. A fundamental transition is under way as the post-war 
'productivist model' I enters a period of structural crisis. Whilst this crisis manifests 
1 The term productivism implies "a commitment to an intensive, industrially-based and expansionist 
agriculture with state support based primarily on output and increased productivity" (Lowe et al., 1993, 
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itself as predominantly a budgetary problem, there has been a parallel loss of public and 
political support for farming -a crisis of legitimacy - an important aspect of which is 
growing public concern over the state of the rural environment. In consequence, and 
because it is what individual farmers do in their fields and yards that causes pollution, 
there is a pressing need to improve our understanding of how individual farmers act in 
response to the rapidly changing economic, social and political contexts within which 
they manage their land. 
The thesis explores the co-evolution of agricultural policy and pesticide usage in Britain 
in the post-war period. It examines how pesticide pollution of water has been 
constructed as a 'problem' and how this process has been contested by different 
groups. Survey material from the Bedford Ouse catchment is presented to explain how 
farmers use pesticides, for what reasons, and with what understandings of the pollution 
risks associated with their behaviour. The questions which guide the thesis are: i) why 
have pesticides become such an important element of farming practice in Britain since 
the Second World War ? ii) how has pesticide pollution of water emerged as a 
'problem' ? iii) how do farmers decide which chemicals to use and precisely how to 
use them ? and iv) what are the implications for farming practices of regulations to 
tackle pesticide pollution ? 
p. 221). 
12 
INTRODUCTION: 
APPROACHING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
iZ Pesticides, the Environment and the Social World 
The 1980s marked a major turning point for agriculture in Britain and Western Europe 
with the first concerted efforts for several decades to alter the broad direction of 
agricultural development. Following four decades of 'productivist' agricultural policy, 
driven primarily by the need to raise productivity, problems of over-production, falling 
farm incomes and the rising budgetary costs of farm support called into question many 
of the assumptions which lay behind agriculture's post-war development strategy. At 
the same time, and partly in response to certain of the consequences of this strategy, 
pressures for improved environmental regulation have grown, leading to policy 
statements from the European Commission and the British Government which 
emphasise the need to improve environmental protection as part of the current reform of 
agricultural policy (e. g. MAFF, 1991; Commission of the European Communities, 
1988; 1991; UK Government, 1994). 
Environmental problems arising from contemporary farming practices indict the 
technologies employed, and none have proved more contentious than the usage of 
pesticides2. The potential of pesticides to improve crop yields and reduce production 
costs on farms has had profound implications for the way that agricultural production is 
organised. They are an integral feature of productivist agriculture and have come to be 
of central importance to farmers only in the period since the Second World War. It is 
only through an improved understanding of the historical evolution of the role of 
pesticides that the current nature of their use, impacts and regulation can be fully 
comprehended. 
Dominant among the pesticides used in Britain are herbicides. They make up over 48% 
of UK sales of pesticide active ingredient and are applied to a greater proportion of the 
cropped area than other types of pesticide (British Agrochemicals Association, 1992, 
p. 26). They differ from fungicides and insecticides in that the latter two are usually 
only applied after a pest or disease problem has been identified in the crop, whereas, 
because weeds are invariably found in most crops every year, the application of 
2 The term 'pesticide' is used as an umbrella term to cover three main groups of agrochemicals - 
insecticides, herbicides and fungicides. All three groups are biocides, specifically designed to kill 
living organisms, be they insects, weeds or fungi. Together, these three groups account for 88% of the 
total quantity of active ingredient used in British agriculture (British Agrochemicals Association, 1992). 
The remainder is made up by plant growth regulators. 
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herbicides has become routinised (Fryer, 1977). Furthermore, the chemical control of 
weeds has 'revolutionised' cereal production because it is a key element in eliminating 
the need for a fallow in the arable rotation. It is only in recent years, however, that the 
consequences of herbicide use for local water environments have begun to be 
recognised. Today, herbicides are by far the most commonly detected pesticide 
pollutants in surface and groundwaters (see Chapter 3). It is for this reason that 
herbicides will be examined in greatest detail in this thesis. Moreover, one particular 
cereal herbicide, Isoproturon (IPU), is the most widespread and serious cause of 
pesticide contamination of water whose use can be solely attributable to agricultural 
practices. This leaves IPU as a possible target for future regulatory control in Britain, 
and its use will also be a particular focus for analysis. 
When assessing how environmental problems arise from farming practices, it is soon 
evident that the relations between social and economic processes and their 
environmental consequences are rarely straightforward. They are especially difficult to 
predict at the local level and for individual businesses. However, our ability to 
comprehend these relations at those scales is increasingly demanded by recent shifts in 
public policy directed towards the greater targeting of environmental protection. As 
managers of the countryside, farmers are increasingly expected to deliver the goals of 
public policy. This approach has prompted calls for income support for small 
producers and the targeting of environmental measures towards vulnerable localities, 
culminating in demands for farm-based, multi-purpose planning designed to integrate 
farm and environmental management practice (Lowe et al., 1986; Countryside Policy 
Review Panel, 1987). While these developments sit uneasily within a wider policy 
context which is still largely oriented towards voluntarism and minimal controls (Cox et 
al., 1990), they underline the need in research for farm-based enquiry and analysis. 
Equally, it is evident that farm-based analyses cannot be conducted in isolation. 
Research needs to engage with longer-term processes of technological and policy 
change and mounting public and political concern about environmental protection. 
Therefore, it will be argued that pesticide pollution must be conceptualised as a 
'pollution production process' (Lowe et al., 1990a) with technological change, farm 
management and environmental regulation acting as key areas of enquiry. 
The story of how agricultural pesticides have come to be used as they are is a complex 
one. General explanatory models are never more than a simplification and are better 
viewed as a statement of priorities which highlight some phenomena at the expense of 
others. The starting point adopted here is that pesticides, like all technologies, must not 
be seen in purely technological terms (Bijker and Law, 1992). As artifacts, pesticides 
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embody social, political, psychological, economic and professional commitments, 
skills, prejudices, possibilities and constraints. In acknowledging this, it must be 
accepted that under different conditions pesticide technologies and their use might have 
evolved in different ways. According to MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985, p. 4), 
technological determinism, or the notion that technological development is autonomous 
from society, is "the single most influential theory of the relationship between 
technology and society". Technological determinism assumes that while technologies 
shape society, they are not reciprocally influenced, and because social scientific analysis 
has often concentrated on the effects and impacts of technological change, there has 
been a tendency to take technological change as a given, independent factor. This thesis 
takes a markedly different position. The focus here is on the effects of socio-political 
factors on technological change and, while not denying that technologies have social 
impacts, the thesis examines the social shaping of technology itself. 
Technologies can never provide explanations of their own development and adoption, 
and if no internal logic drives innovation then technologically determinist explanations 
are inadequate. Social factors play a crucial role in deciding which technologies are 
adopted (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985). As White (1978, p. 28) puts it, a new 
technology "merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter". This is an important 
point in the case of pesticides where the pretence of a natural technological trajectory 
has been promoted by pesticide protagonists while contingencies have been concealed. 
Pesticides, it is sometimes argued, are symbolic of the scientific domination and control 
of nature by human ingenuity. They are representative of 'natural' or 'technological 
progress'. 
The particular social contextualisation adopted towards technological change affects not 
only the study of environmental problems but also the construction of solutions to 
them. Quite different solutions are proffered by the two scientific 'cultures' - the 
natural and the social sciences. Newby (1991) has complained that the public 
perception is one of natural scientists being best equipped to form authoritative 
judgements, despite the fact that environmental problems arise from human intervention 
in natural systems. The central role of human agency in environmental change means 
that environmental issues cannot be reduced to scientific or technological terms. As he 
argues, 
"advances in the natural sciences will enable us to establish the 
parameters of environmental change, but they will describe the 
symptoms and not explain the causes. The causes lie in human 
societies and their systems of economic development" (Newby, 1991, 
p. 2, original author's emphasis). 
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An over-reliance on natural science approaches to environmental issues has tended to 
foster what Newby calls "old-style technological determinism" (1991, p. 3) with its 
propensity to promote the adoption of 'technical fixes' to environmental problems. He 
goes on to suggest that 
'"solutions to environmental problems are rarely amenable to technical 
fixes alone, no more than they can be handled by an equal and opposite 
'social fix'. It is the interplay between the technical and the human 
which will hold the key" (1991, p. 5, original author's emphasis). 
Pesticides, like all other technologies, are contingent. Their development and use is 
dependent on other sets of influences. They have not always had a momentum of their 
own and cannot be said to have developed along a 'natural' trajectory. Rather, they 
have been shaped and reshaped over time by the social world, with their protagonists - 
such as manufacturers, suppliers, scientists, government departments and so on - 
seeking to maintain sets of technological arrangements and associated sets of social, 
scientific, economic and organisational relations in keeping with their interests. 
Pesticides form part of, and are implicated in, the strategies of their protagonists. Their 
adoption and increasing use since the 1940s has arisen from the network of social 
relations in which they are embedded - together with the various strategies that drive 
and give shape to the network. Understanding the forces that give rise to the use of 
pesticides is an important precursor to understanding why pollution takes place. But 
what form does the network surrounding pesticides take, and how might it best be 
examined in the British context in order to understand pesticide use and resultant water 
pollution ? 
ii The Pesticide 'Pollution Production Process' 
The methodology3 employed to analyse pesticide pollution must be sensitive to the fact 
3 The thesis and its methodology evolved alongside the conduct of other research work (Ward, 1990; 
Ward et al., 1990; 1993; 1994 Ward and Munton, 1992; Lowe et al., 1992a; b). Combining part-time 
research 'study' with full-time contract research 'work' is more common in other European countries, 
but may increase in Britain given the resource constraints which have restricted the funding of post- 
graduate studies, especially in the social sciences. (For example, in 1992 the Economic and Social 
Research Council received applications from 1272 people hoping for funding for their doctoral studies, 
of which it was only able to fund 315. In 1993 the proportion of applications funded fell to just one in 
seven). 
Both thesis and contract research were carried out within a team of social scientists. This 
proved a fruitful environment for study, with regular discussions among researchers about methods, 
concepts and findings. The thesis most closely relates to the PATCH (Pollution, Agriculture and 
Technology Change) Research Programme, the focus of which was technological change, farm 
management and water pollution regulation. Responsibilities were divided according to these three 
themes between three research officers, with the author having responsibility for researching farm 
management issues. It was intended to develop two case studies - effluent pollution from dairying, and 
pesticide pollution from cereal farming - but pressures on time and resources and the relocation of some 
research staff meant that in 1991 it was decided to concentrate on developing the dairy case study where 
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that although it is farming practices that cause pesticide pollution, the outcomes of 
interest here, the phenomenon of pesticide pollution and the construction of solutions to 
it result from much more than just farmers' actions. How then might the process of 
pesticide pollution best be conceptualised ? This is an important question because, as 
Lowe et al. (1990a, p. 62) argue, "the development of a coherent policy and institutional 
framework to deal with agricultural pollution is still a distant prospect" and this is, in 
part, due to a poor understanding of the pollution production process. 
Two levels of analysis can be identified - the field level (Figure I) and the wider system 
of production and regulatory relations (Figure II). At the field level, pesticides pollute 
the environment via a range of different pathways, not all of them directly associated 
with the spraying of crops in fields. Farmers in fields produce goods for the market. 
Their activities result in pollution, although rainfall, topography and soil type also 
influence outcomes. It is important, therefore, to note that any one action may result in 
pesticide pollution in one instance but not in another. However, for contamination to be 
termed 'pollution', it has to be detected and reported, and this involves other actors, 
such as a vigilant public (Ward et al., 1994), the scientists who developed the detection 
methods, and pollution inspectors armed with instruments and knowledge. Thus, 
while the farmer's role is central and the farm is a compulsory location in the story of 
pesticide pollution, the processes that foster pesticide use and lead to pollution involve 
many other actors near and far, in fields, offices, rivers, laboratories, and elsewhere. 
The methodology needs to be sensitive to the farmer's position among this assemblage 
of actors. 
Until the late 1980s, there was only limited concern about the pollution of water by 
agricultural pesticides, and this centred around gross pollution incidents usually 
associated with the careless disposal of surplus pesticides. In recent years, however, it 
has been increasingly accepted that waters can be contaminated by pesticide run-off and 
leaching resulting from 'normal' farming practices (Lawrence and Foster, 1987). This 
realisation has shifted our understanding of the nature of the problem from the question 
of accidental' pesticide spillages to one of potentially unsound production systems 
generating unforeseen and endemic environmental externalities. As a result, where 
pesticide technologies come from, how and why farmers use them, and how their use is 
regulated become central questions. 
Figure II represents this wider pesticide pollution process. Knowledge, products and 
techniques are produced by scientists in both the public and private R&D sectors in the 
the work was most advanced. This thesis develops and extends the work originally begun under the 
farm management component of the PATCH Programme's pesticide case study. 
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Figure I- Pesticides in the Environment: A Schematic Diagram of Pathways 
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Figure II - The Pesticide 'Pollution Production 
Process' 
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non-agricultural 
pollution 
agro-food system. New products enter the technology transfer system where they are 
subject to some regulatory control (including examination of their potential to cause 
pollution) prior to their clearance. Once authorised for the market, they can be used on 
farms. Adoption of particular pesticides will be influenced by the advice farmers 
receive and the marketing strategies of input suppliers, some of whom have sought to 
introduce new technologies in mutually-dependent packages (including seeds, growth 
regulators, pesticides and spraying technologies). 
It is through the use of these technologies, as part of farm management strategies, that 
pollution of the environment occurs. Farm management strategies are subject to three 
main sets of external influences - agricultural policies, technology transfer, and the 
regulatory system (which sets maximum pesticide dose rates and prosecutes farmers for 
pollution incidents). The system of pollution regulation is affected in turn by 
environmental policy objectives such as, for example, the implementation of the polluter 
pays principle or the meeting of European environmental standards. Another important 
influence is the information gathered on environmental change, as observations and 
measurements of pollution in the environment are used to inform regulatory strategy. 
In monitoring the presence of pesticides in water, pollution by pesticides from sources 
other than agriculture also enters the equation. Although the vast majority of pesticides 
applied in Britain are used on farms, two of the most problematic pollutants, the 
herbicides Atrazine and Simazine, are also widely used for weed control by local 
authorities and British Rail. In addition, there is often no consensus about what 
measurements of pesticide pollution tell us about the extent of the problem and the 
causal processes underlying it. 
As Figure II illustrates, agricultural policies influence several elements in the system. 
In the early post-war period when the drive for expansion in agricultural output was at 
its most intense, the state intervened directly in R&D by creating and expanding public 
sector agricultural research establishments. It also provided incentives for the adoption 
of new technologies on farms through grants and subsidies, through the establishment 
of a public agricultural advisory service committed to technological advance, and 
indirectly via a support system based on guaranteed prices. These interventions have 
been described as helping to constitute a 'productivist regime', usually taken to refer to 
"the network of institutions oriented to boosting food production from 
domestic sources ... [including]... not only the Ministry of Agriculture 
and other state agencies but the assemblage of input suppliers, financial 
institutions, R&D centres etc., which facilitated the continued expansion 
of agricultural production" (Lowe et al., 1993, p. 221). 
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As this regime entered a period of crisis in the 1980s, so the relationship between 
agricultural policy and elements of the pesticide pollution system have been subject to 
important changes. For example, the state has gradually withdrawn its support for 
agricultural R&D, and the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) has 
been obliged to charge for most of its services to farmers (but not its 'public good' 
advice on conservation and environmental protection). In response to the budgetary 
crisis in the Common Agricultural Policy, price support has gradually been reduced and 
combined with sets of measures designed to limit production. 
Two points arise from this conceptualisation of the pesticide pollution process. First, 
the role of agricultural policy has to be an important focus for the thesis. Second, the 
historical dynamic to change must be treated as central to the analysis. The relations 
between the boxes in Figure II are not static, but subject to important changes as a result 
of the shifting position of agriculture within national and European economies and 
political systems. For example, in recent years, environmental policy has increasingly 
influenced the whole process. Combined with improved techniques for monitoring 
environmental change, this shift in public policy has strengthened the influence of 
pollution regulation over the technology transfer system and farm management 
strategies. Thus, changes in the nature of the relations portrayed in Figure II require 
investigation as a whole, and these form the primary focus of the first part of the thesis. 
But what of the role of the farmer in this complex ? 
iii Farmers' Actions in Context 
Attempting to understand the role of the farmer in the pesticide pollution process raises 
the question of 'structure' and 'agency' common to much social science enquiry. 
Farmers are obligatory actors, for what they do in their fields (in using pesticides) is 
pivotal to pesticide pollution. However, assuming as many commentators do that 
farmers are 'policy dopes', forced by the state onto the pesticide treadmill, imposes a 
categorical logic which leaves us poorly equipped to make sense of local and farm- 
specific influences on pollution, despite the need to deliver many of the objectives of 
environmental regulation at the farm level (Potter, 1985; 1986). Neither structuralist 
nor behavioural explanations can ever be definitive, and it is a matter of debate whether 
exhaustive cause-and-effect explanatory models can ever be satisfactorily constructed. 
As will be argued in Chapter 1, however, it is possible to address this dilemma through 
the conceptualisation of 'action in context'. This approach has been applied to 
understanding rural change, specifically through the prism of the rural land 
development process (Marsden et al., 1993; Lowe et al., 1993) and allows researchers 
"to take seriously the practices of the key actors while recognising that they are not free 
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to do as they wish" (Marsden et al., 1993, p. 190). Action in context requires the 
examination of not only farmers' values and behaviour, but also the context, especially 
the role of other actors, within which they operate (as illustrated in Figure II) and how 
this changes over time. 
The pesticide pollution process is an emergent and ever-changing phenomenon. 
Although the strategies of its different actors mesh together, outcomes cannot be 
reduced to the strategy of any one actor, in the same way that a game of chess cannot be 
reduced to the strategy of either player alone. In particular, the development and 
diffusion of pesticide technologies is influenced by more than just the strategies of 
pesticide manufacturers or farmers. Rather, it is in the interplay between different 
actors that, for example, pesticides are adopted and pollution is detected. These 
interactions take place in a social context, bringing us to the core dilemma of social 
theory which 'action in context' seeks to address: how is it that actors are both shaped 
by and yet help to shape the context in which they find themselves ? 
The context for pesticide use in Britain has rapidly changed in recent decades. Only 60 
years ago pesticides were hardly used. Now they are the mainstay of crop protection. 
The thesis argues that in order to understand the 'success' of pesticides and how such 
technologies become obdurate, we have to address how technological change is 
influenced by social processes. Here, Bijker and Law (1992) have argued that: 
"strategies for realizing obduracy [of technologies] comprise efficient 
combinations of delegating and policing the delegates. The dialectic of 
action and structure turns on this double requirement. If the strategies 
for delegating and controlling are successfully deployed, an institution 
results, an arrangement is stabilized, a structure emerges" (p. 299). 
This means that what appears from one perspective to be a successful technology may 
be a failing artefact from another. Success depends upon enrolling other actors to adopt 
particular representations (of the world, of actors and of the viability of technologies) in 
networks (Callon, 1986; Callon and Law, 1989). The building of networks cannot be 
detached from the strategies of actors, but neither can it be reduced to these. Thus, 
"from the standpoint of any particular actor, the structure and the actors 
defined within it represent a more or less accurately pictured geography 
of enablement and constraint" (Bijker and Law, 1992, p. 300). 
Some relations are easier to create and maintain than others, but all relations that make 
up 'structure' are an emergent consequence of actors' strategies and other actions and 
events. 
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In thinking about the context in which farmers use pesticides (and water is polluted), 
and if reductionism is to be avoided, what can be said about the geography of 
enablement and constraint that makes up the context ? How does the context affect 
farmers' strategies, and what leads particular groupings of socio-technical elements to 
display particular obduracy in certain contexts ? 
The concepts, techniques and resources used by social actors (in this case, farmers) 
combine explicit theory, tacit knowledge, general engineering practice, cultural values, 
devices, and material networks used in a community. These are simultaneously framed 
in the social and technical. Crucially, actors' meanings and the ways in which they 
understand their positions in their contexts provide the bounds within which they act 
(and, in this case, within which they adopt and use pesticide technologies). Bijker and 
Law (1992) call this the 'technological frame'. These contours help structure relations, 
be they social or technical, and serve as a bridge between structure and agency. Thus, 
the ways in which actors are moulded by and implicated in networks of relations can be 
used to help explain action; networks of relations (and networks of resources) enable 
certain courses of action while constraining others. 
The concept of a 'technological frame' can provide a model of the patterns that arise 
when social groups are constituted and interact with one another and can help point to 
how some sets of socio-technical arrangements become obdurate while others remain 
malleable. Moreover, certain technologies and their carriers may be more 'flexibly' 
used in their early stages but later develop to a point at which they are relatively 
insensitive to, but exercise great influence over, their environments. This has been 
suggested by historians of science who have looked at the motor car and the electricity 
supply system (Hughes, 1983; 1987). In short, technologies seem to take on a life (or 
momentum) of their own as they begin to affect the social world around them. In the 
analogy of the motor car, for example, roads have to be built, materials for road- 
building extracted, traffic flow systems modernised, safety mechanisms developed and 
so on. The processes through which technologies become widely accepted and adopted 
can help us to examine the extent to which actors are shaped by or implicated in 
particular networks of relations, be they economic relations, commitments to expertise 
and skills or so on. They are, however, patterned relations, and they can add to the 
obduracy or momentum of the socio-technical system. 
iv The Structure of the Thesis 
This brief theoretical discussion highlights the focus of analysis to be employed in 
examining the questions about pesticide use and pollution outlined above. The main 
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questions are: i) why since the Second World War have pesticides become such an 
important element of farming practice in Britain ? ii) how has the pesticide pollution of 
water emerged as a 'problem' ? iii) how do farmers decide which chemicals to use and 
precisely how to use them ? and iv) what are the implications for farming practice of 
regulations to tackle pesticide pollution ? The point of departure is that, although much 
of our language and practices encourage us to treat technology and society as if they are 
quite separate from each other, technology is never purely technological. It is also 
social. At the same time, the social is never purely social. It is also technological. 
The thesis seeks to make an original contribution to our knowledge and understanding 
in a number of ways. First, in presenting the first sociologically-derived analysis of the 
problem of pesticide pollution of water in Britain, it highlights the social shaping of 
technological change and associated environmental outcomes. In turn, it points to the 
importance of social science perspectives in explaining the underlying causes of 
environmental problems and to the development of solutions to them. Moreover, from 
the specific case of pesticide pollution, the thesis improves our general understanding of 
how contemporary technological change in agriculture proceeds and is organised. 
Second, in developing an 'action in context' perspective on pesticide use on the farm, 
the thesis seeks to overcome the pitfalls of the structure-agency duality common to 
social science and, in doing so, provides an enhanced understanding of farmers' risk- 
taking strategies in relation to the environment. Furthermore, it represents the first 
attempt to use 'action in context' to address the use of a particular technology. Third, 
the thesis makes a contribution to the social science debates about the role of farmer 
action (Lowe et al., 1992b) in environmental change. Although pesticide pollution is 
often seen as a technical issue requiring technical solutions, it is what individual farmers 
do that affects environments. The thesis attempts to fill a gap in the literature between 
structuralist and behavioural perspectives by focusing on negotiated action, this being 
the outcome of interactions between farmers and other actors in networks. 
In this research, therefore, a wider relevance is sought which goes beyond conceptual 
debates in the study of agriculture and the environment. Most importantly, an improved 
understanding of how and why farmers do what they do ought to inform the 
development of regulatory strategies. Reducing the contamination of water with 
pesticides requires that we understand the causal processes underlying pesticide use and 
the complexity of factors influencing what farmers do. 
Theoretical approaches that might be employed to address the central questions of the 
thesis are reviewed in Chapter 1 and a conceptual framework is developed. Here, the 
farmer has been positioned within a context - the pesticide pollution process. This has 
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an historical dimension which is crucial to any understanding of its current form. In 
Part II (Chapters 2 and 3), an account of the development of the pesticide pollution 
process is presented. Particular attention is paid to the role of, and philosophy behind, 
agricultural policy in fostering pesticide use, and the ways in which water pollution 
problems arising from pesticide use have been constructed and contested by different 
groups. Of specific significance is the current uncertainty surrounding the objectives of 
agricultural policy which in turn is calling into question assumptions about the role of 
pesticides which have prevailed for forty years in Britain and elsewhere4. 
Part III of the thesis contains an empirical examination of the farmer as producer of 
agricultural commodities, pesticide user and polluter. From a survey of cereal 
producers in the catchment of the Bedford Ouse in Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire, 
the thesis explores how pesticide practices result from the interactions between farmers 
and other actors, especially those supplying and providing advice about pesticides. 
Chapter 4 introduces the local context with a description of agricultural and 
environmental changes in the catchment and describes the methodology employed 
during the local fieldwork. In Chapter 5 the restructuring processes being experienced 
by cereal producers and their changing pesticide practices are examined. Chapter 6 
takes a detailed look at the processes of negotiation which surround decisions about 
pesticide use, and assesses the possibilities of devising strategies to reduce herbicide 
usage in particular. Chapter 7 further examines some of these issues, including how 
practices vary in relation to the mix of enterprises on the farm and the family's farming 
strategy. It also explores how farmers represent pollution problems and their roles in 
creating them and how they understand the roles of the relevant regulatory authorities, 
before going on to assess the possible implications of different sets of measures 
designed to address the pollution problem. 
4 At one extreme, in countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, policies are now in place which 
seek to reduce the quantity of pesticides applied by up to 50% by the year 2000 (Baldock and Bennett, 
1991). In Britain, the Government has stated its objective of reducing dependence on pesticides in 
agriculture to the minimum necessary (DoE, 1990, p. 179), although there are as yet no specific 
regulatory mechanisms which seek explicitly to reduce the quantity of pesticides applied (Ward et al., 
1993). 
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CHAPTER 1: 
CONCEPTUALISING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE 
1.1 Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that agriculture's environmental problems are an indictment 
of the products and practices employed in the production process. In order to 
comprehend more fully how farming practices have led to environmental change it is 
necessary to understand how technological change has evolved in the context of 
agrarian development under advanced capitalism. 
Here, the notion of technological determinism is firmly rejected. Technological change 
is not autonomous from society and technologies are not driven by any 'internal logic'. 
Rather, they are moulded by and contingent upon their social context. Newby and 
Utting make the same point in their analysis of the technological transformation of 
British agriculture since the 1940s. They argue that technological change has not been, 
as is often suggested, 
"the product of the 'hidden hand' of the market, but of quite deliberate 
policy decisions, consciously pursued and publicly encouraged" (1984, 
p. 261). 
In order to understand how pesticide technologies have become of such importance to 
arable farming in Britain, leading to problems of water pollution, the evolving context 
for their use has first to be examined. This context was conceptualised in the 
Introduction as a network of relations surrounding the farmer. Pollution occurs 
because of the workings of a socio-technical system (Figure II, p. 19) in which the 
actions of farmers are not wholly under their control. As argued elsewhere; 
"actors take decisions and act upon them, but the decisions and actions 
taken depend on the social context and the activities of other actors 
involved. In this sense, the context has a reality and a dynamic all of its 
own" (Marsden et al., 1993, p. 163). 
In this chapter the relationships between farmers' adoption and use of technologies and 
their wider social context is explored. First, the different ways that social scientists 
have approached technological change in agriculture is examined. Not only has the 
nature of farming technologies been transformed since the 1930s, but so has the way 
that technological change is represented and understood. Where once mechanisation 
and the application of chemical technologies were seen as indicative of 'progress' and 
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'development', subsequent recognition of the social and ecological consequences of the 
use of new technologies has brought such assumptions into question. 
Approaches to the study of technological change in agriculture can be broadly divided 
into 'behavioural' approaches which attribute a significant role to human agency, and 
'structuralist' approaches which tend to attribute a determining role to the political and 
economic 'system' within which farmers manage their land. In the latter part of the 
chapter it will be argued that neither behavioural nor structuralist approaches are alone 
adequate and a 'middle path' employing the concept of 'action in context' will be 
adopted and justified. 
1.2 Behavioural Approaches to Technological Change in Agriculture 
Until the late 1970s, the classical diffusion model dominated social science research into 
technological change. The model sought to explain how farmers adopted new products 
and practices, almost all of which were directed at increasing productivity or farming 
efficiency. The adoption process was conceptualised as a series of stages typified by 
awareness of the innovation, the collection of information, its evaluation, a trial period 
and then adoption. In this linear system, scientists would develop new technologies 
and extension agents would disseminate them to farmers. Research findings indicated 
that adoption was characterised by a logistical growth (or "S") curve, and farmers were 
classified as innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards 
according to the stage on the curve at which they adopted a technology (Rogers, 1962). 
Criticisms of the model first appeared in the late 1960s. 
The principal criticism was that the model's application had been uncritical, if not 
promotional, towards technological change (Stockdale, 1977; Goss, 1979). 
Innovations "were unquestionably viewed as improvements" (Fliegel and van Es, 
1983, p. 14), and as Buttel et al. explained, researchers 
"tended to adopt the language of their agricultural experiment stations by 
referring to the technologies they studied as "improved" or 
"recommended". Most such studies were therefore couched in terms of 
how the new knowledge of diffusion-adoption would enable... 
[increases in]-the rate of adoption of these new, improved, and 
recommended technologies" (1990, p. 47). 
Even among those social scientists who used the approach its shortcomings became a 
cause for concern. One study found that the adoption of environmental innovations, 
such as contour farming, terracing and the use of reduced tillage, followed a quite 
different pattern from 'commercial innovations', and concluded that the classical 
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diffusion model "may have provided within rural sociology a field of knowledge with a 
narrow empirical foundation on which to base its generalisations" (Pampel and van Es, 
1977, p. 69). On the basis of Third World experiences, Goss (1979) reinforced these 
criticisms and noted that the model failed to account for the distributional effects of 
diffusion. Further, "there was scant attention given to sociological theory ... and the 
overriding tendency was towards raw empiricism" (p. 756). Stockdale (1977) 
questioned the impacts of new agricultural technologies on the natural environment, 
warning that the role of technology in transforming American agriculture was widely 
held up to be a model for other nations to follow, although there had been little research 
into the ecological consequences of this energy intensive, high technology model of 
development. 
More recently, Busch et al. have highlighted several conceptual problems with the 
model. Most important was its failure to distinguish between 'scientific' and 
'everyday' rationalities. For example, agricultural science had traditionally been 
concerned with finding the optimal means of achieving the end of greater productivity, 
but the end itself was not called into question. The decision to increase productivity 
was "the proper subject of philosophy or politics but not of science" (Busch et al., 
1991, p. 42). By comparison, the ends and means of farmers in their everyday 
situations are much more varied and complex, and calculations about what might be 
optimal solutions are likely to give way to what appears most appropriate given a range 
of constraints. Unfortunately, the implicit assumption in most studies was that both 
scientists and farmers acted with the same 'rationalities'. Busch et al. list a series of 
other questionable assumptions implicit in the model, including 'ontological monism' 
and the denigration of 'the traditional' as erroneous in the face of 'modernity'2. 
A further strand of work has made its focus the attitudes and actions of individual 
actors. Farmers' attitudes to new technologies and environmental issues have been 
1 Ontological monism is the assumption that there is a single social and physical world. 
2 Neo-classical economic analyses of technological change have also contained assumptions about 
innovation and diffusion. Historically, the economics profession tended to neglect technological change 
as a focus for inquiry, treating it as a 'residual' or 'exogenous' factor. Jewkes et al. (1956) attributed 
this neglect to three factors: an ignorance of science and technology issues among economists; an 
absence of statistics; and a preoccupation with cyclical fluctuations and unemployment within national 
economies. However, among those economists with an interest in innovation, debates in the early 
post-war period centred on the crude dichotomy of 'demand-pull' versus 'technology-push', and linear 
conceptualisations of the innovative process characterised by a top-down 'flow' from science, to R&D, 
design, production and marketing. 
The limits of seeing technological change as characterised by linear processes are now more 
widely recognised within the social sciences, and it is generally acknowledged - even among economists 
- that scientific endeavour, demand and institutional pressures interact in more complex ways to shape 
patterns of technological change (Dosi, 1982; Dosi et al., 1988; Orsenigo, 1989). The nature of these 
interactions and how they can be conceptualised will be explored in more detail in Section 1.7. 
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examined in a series of studies (ADAS, 1976; Worthington, 1979; Social Research 
Consultancy, 1982; MacDonald, 1984), some of which have been little more than 
opinion polls. They often assumed that a basic divide exits between modem (or 
progressive) farmers and traditional (or conservative) ones, and sought to identify and 
measure the different attitudes characteristic of the two groups. Moreover, implicit in 
many attitudinal studies is the assumption that attitudes determine behaviour. 
Two studies of farmers' attitudes in Britain (Tait, 1976; Carr, 1988; Carr and Tait, 
1990) have specifically addressed the question of pesticide use. Tait's analysis of the 
factors affecting the production and usage of pesticides in the UK was conducted at a 
time when the quantity of pesticides being applied to crops in Britain was rising rapidly. 
Rooted in a socio-psychological and empirical tradition, the study aimed to identify the 
major parameters of farmers' 'decision-making frameworks'. Statistical analysis 
revealed that the traditional economic assumption, that farmers seek to maximise 
profits, could not be supported. Instead, farmers' attitudes towards risk exerted "a 
considerable effect" on pesticide usage (p. 155), with more risk-averse farmers being 
more reliant on routinised chemical crop protection. Furthermore, many farmers 
expressed regret at the extent of their dependence on chemicals for crop protection. 
Carr's study (1988) employed similar techniques to examine farmers' attitudes to a 
range of environmental issues including pesticide use. Statistical analysis revealed a 
poor correlation between attitudes to using pesticides and actual pesticide use. Farmers' 
attitudes to pesticide use were, however, found to correlate with their subjective 
assessments of their own pesticide usage compared to other farmers. Carr, therefore, 
suggested that farmers might be encouraged to reduce pesticide usage if they were 
presented with comparisons of their own use with that of other farmers. This 
disjuncture between farmers' attitudes and what they do is echoed in other attitudinal 
studies, particularly those concerning conservation (Newby et al., 1977). In particular, 
many farmers regretted the environmental impact of their practices but felt they had little 
alternative. This has helped shift attention among researchers away from individual 
behaviour to structural factors such as the influence of agricultural policy. 
To conclude, behavioural analyses frequently suffer from conceptual problems. Most 
important is the lack of critical attention paid to where agricultural technologies come 
from, and how and by whom they are produced and promoted. Behavioural studies 
use a classic science-based notion of rational action and often fail to explicitly address 
the social, political and economic context within which farmers operate. Action is 
assessed outside its context. Farmers are assumed to be free agents, able to pick and 
choose technologies as they wish and according to their own needs. Little attention is 
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paid to the constraints and pressures that might compel farmers to adopt, as embodied, 
for example, in the theory of the technological treadmill. 
1.3 The Theory of the Treadmill 
The notion of the 'treadmill' was first introduced by Cochrane, an American agricultural 
economist, in 1958. He drew on findings from research into the diffusion and adoption 
of agricultural innovations undertaken by rural sociologists which suggested that it was 
the more entrepreneurial and non-risk-averse farmers who tended to be the first to adopt 
new technologies. He argued that these early adopters then benefitted from lower than 
average unit costs of production, often associated with an increase in output, and 
increased net returns. In the period when any new technique has only been adopted by 
a few farmers, total output is not noticeably increased and the price of the commodity 
does not fall (Cochrane, 1958; 1979). 
The net incomes of the few early adopters rise and more farmers are then attracted to the 
technique. However, once adoption has become widespread, the situation is 
transformed. Total output of the commodity increases markedly and so its price tends 
to fall. Increases in net returns, such as they are, are often largely capitalised into the 
value of fixed assets, such as land. Land prices, and sometimes rents, may then rise, 
raising the unit cost of production. This, combined with the falling commodity price, 
means that the financial benefits of adopting the new technique vanish. Thus early 
adopters take up the technology to increase returns, while it is those that Cochrane 
describes as 'Mr Average Farmer' who find themselves on the treadmill. More and 
more are obliged to adopt the new technology because the price of the commodity is 
declining. They are forced to adopt in order to reduce costs and stay in business. 
Cochrane's theory has been important in conceptualising the role of technological 
change in agrarian development. According to Buttel et al. (1990, p. 130), one reason 
why the theory has been so widely accepted as an "orienting perspective" is because it 
draws upon linked knowledge from a range of research areas. The theory has enjoyed 
particular favour among exponents of what Friedland et al. (1991) have called the 'new 
political economy of agriculture' which developed in North America and Europe in the 
1980s (Marsden et al., 1986; Goodman et al., 1987; Kloppenburg, 1988; Friedmann 
and McMichael, 1989). The treadmill theory is seen as providing insights into the 
transformation of agriculture by off-farm capitals. The idea that farmers may be forced 
to adopt new products and practices, thus becoming locked into new systems of 
production, found resonance with those keen to point to the concentration of economic 
power among a small number of agri-business industries. 
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The technological treadmill requires critical re-evaluation because the international 
political and economic conditions shaping the modern agro-food system are very 
different from those of the 1950s when Cochrane's theory was devised (Ward, 1993). 
The main concern of the immediate post-war period was the uneven uptake of new 
agricultural technologies, with those farmers not adopting being seen as part of the 
'problem' of rural development. Cochrane, on the other hand, used the term to criticise 
the direction of agricultural development because of his concerns for its social 
consequences. He suggests the treadmill "fostered a cannibalistic process in which the 
large aggressive, innovative farmers gobbled up the productive assets of the smaller, 
less efficient less aggressive farmers" (Cochrane, 1979, p. 405). 
A major weakness of Cochrane's theory is his failure to address how agricultural 
technology is produced and diffused (Buttel et al., 1990). Research by Friedland et al. 
(1981) showed that the social organisation of different agricultural commodity systems 
varies and so, therefore, does the structural context for technological change. The 
introduction of new agricultural technologies benefit different groups within commodity 
complexes in different ways. For example, dramatic, transformational technological 
change in the US tomato industry followed changes in the availability of cheap labour in 
the 1960s, yet similar shifts in the labour supply resulted only in incremental 
technological changes in the lettuce industry. Friedland et al. demonstrated how this 
was because the rate and nature of technological change was influenced by the supply 
and control of labour and the economic structure of the commodity system. Therefore, 
the specific social and historical contexts are important in understanding the production 
and consumption of new agricultural technologies. In the light of these insights, any 
conceptualisation of the use of technologies in the 1990s needs to be sensitive to the 
socio-political and economic context within which agricultural technologies are 
produced. 
Further problems with Cochrane's theory arise from the specific historical context in 
which the theory is set. One problem concerns the assumption that farmers are solely 
food producers. This renders the theory much less applicable to those numerous parts 
of the advanced capitalist world where pluriactivity as a household survival strategy has 
become commonplace, and farm households have developed extensive links with the 
non-agricultural economy. For example, in the United States the proportion of farm 
family income derived from non-farm sources rose from 26% in 1940 to 40% in 1960, 
and to over 60% by the mid-1980s (Ahearn et al., 1985). Gasson (1990) has found 
evidence of broadly comparable increases in Canada, Sweden and Japan. Where the 
farm business contributes only part of the farm household finances because of the role 
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of non-agricultural income, patterns of adoption of new agricultural technologies may 
differ. Businesses may not be run simply to maximise economic returns. Pluriactive 
farm households may seek to maintain a cherished agricultural life-style and survival or 
accumulation may be sought through a combination of agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. Such pluriactive strategies often emphasise flexibility and the minimisation of 
borrowing rather than maximising farm business profitability (Marsden et al., 1992a). 
Finally, the treadmill theory implies passivity on the part of farmers. Uptake of new 
technologies is readily recorded (often from agricultural statistics, such as the number 
of machines etc. ) but resistance to change is not. Absence of adoption is deemed to be 
'sloth' or 'laggardly', although differences in farm-level responses may be shaped as 
much by the variability of farmers' values, or 'logics of production' (van der Ploeg, 
1990). In effect, Cochrane's model tends to assume mechanistic 'responses' by 
individual farmers to external market and technological conditions, a position denied by 
Hawkins' (1991) research into dairy and potato production in Cheshire. Little 
allowance is made for independent judgement - even by the actor most involved. 
1.4 Political Economy and Technology 
Political economists in the Marxist tradition have viewed technological change as a 
process which takes place in response to the needs of industrial capital. Innovations are 
seen as produced within social and economic structures which, themselves, drive 
technological change through the incentive to accumulate. The producers of agricultural 
technologies seek to appropriate surplus value from the farm production process by 
promoting the adoption of manufactured industrial inputs. Accumulation becomes 
concentrated in the oligopolistic agricultural supply industries and farm production is 
transformed along an industrial trajectory. Political economists have, therefore, 
frequently asked why, under these conditions of technological change, agriculture 
remains dominated by small family businesses. 
Three lines of argument can be identified. Firstly, Friedmann (1986) argues that it is 
the social relations of agricultural production specific to the farm family that are the key 
to the persistence of family farming. Secondly, Mann and Dickinson (1978) suggest 
that the most important barrier to the capitalist development of agriculture is the 
disjuncture between 'production time' and 'labour time' which prevent the routinisation 
of the agricultural labour process and makes agriculture less profitable for capital than 
other industries. Thirdly, Goodman et al. (1987) suggest the key to agriculture's 
uniqueness lies in the biological basis of the production process. Nature's constraints 
to capitalism, represented by the biological conversion of energy, have meant that the 
32 
transformation of agricultural production under capitalism has been characterised by 
two processes which Goodman et al. call appropriation ism and substitutionism. 
Technological change is a critical feature of both processes. They define 
appropriationism as the 
"discontinuous but persistent undermining of discrete elements of the 
agricultural production process, their transformation into industrial 
activities, and their re-incorporation into agriculture as inputs" (1987, 
p. 2). 
The replacement of broadcast sowing by the seed drill, the horse by the tractor, and 
manure by synthetic chemical fertilizers are examples of appropriationism. At the same 
time, substitutionism takes place as a parallel process. Substitutionism is defined as a 
similarly discontinuous but permanent process by which 
"industrial activity account[s] for a steadily rising proportion of value 
added [and] the agricultural product, after first being reduced to an 
industrial input, increasingly suffers replacement by non-agricultural 
components" (1987, p. 2). 
This conceptualisation places technological change in a central position in the 
transformation of capitalist agriculture. Industrial capital seeks progressively to 
appropriate the agricultural production process in order to create sectors of accumulation 
through technological change. 
While Goodman et al. 's theory has become a widely accepted account of agro-industrial 
development within neo-Marxist agrarian political economy, and has provided a 
particularly useful conceptualisation of the role of emerging biotechnologies in the food 
system, it has been the subject of post-structuralist critiques which have centred on its 
inability to deal with empirical diversity in agriculture (Whatmore, 1991, p. 18; van der 
Ploeg, 1990). 
The theme of differentiation amongst farm businesses was explored by researchers 
studying the restructuring of contemporary English agriculture in the mid-1980s. A 
theoretically based typology was developed by Whatmore et al., (1987a; b) in order to 
help to understand the effects on farm businesses of external pressures from wider off- 
farm circuits of capital. It was argued that the technological treadmill reflected "the 
central mechanism" by which formal subsumption of production relations takes place 
(1987a, p. 28), but at the same time it widened the terms of reference beyond 
technology to include credit and financial relations and the labour process. 
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1.5 Technology and the Environment: The Treadmill as Metaphor 
With increasing concern since the 1970s about the environmental consequences of 
technological change in agriculture, the notion of a treadmill has been used, particularly 
by environmental groups, to explain agricultural intensification and associated 
environmental change. Two important critiques of agricultural policy in the early 1990s 
used the term as a metaphor to illustrate the idea that farmers are being forced to adopt 
more new technologies because of the pressures of the system within which they 
operate3. 
In 1991, Friends of the Earth published their environmental review of agricultural 
policy entitled Off the Treadmill. It began with the statement; 
"It is over a decade since the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution noted that some farmers "feel themselves to be on a treadmill 
with regard to pesticide usage - compelled by circumstances to depend 
on chemicals which they as countrymen, ultimately find disturbing". 
Yet in the intervening years, the farming 'treadmill' has grown bigger, 
faster, and even more unbalanced" (Friends of the Earth, 1991, p. 1). 
The treadmill term is used here to refer to farmers' increasing dependency on pesticides 
and chemical fertilizers. Central to this conceptualisation is the notion that through the 
use of pesticides farmers disrupt ecosystems and consequently need to use ever more 
chemicals to maintain effective pest control. Either pests develop resistance to 
pesticides or new types of pests are unintentionally created. In this context, the 
treadmill concept has a strong ecological dynamic. 
This idea has also been used recently in a study which explains how farmers are 
pushed onto' and become 'caught on' the treadmill (Clunies-Ross and Hildyard, 
1992). Although the study takes fertilizer and pesticide use as the main illustration of 
the operation of the treadmill, the idea is also applied in a much broader form. With 
little regard to farmers being at all in control of their own actions, they argue that 
"Squeezed by prices, encouraged by advice and training, controlled by 
regulation, limited by research, and trapped by peer pressure, farmers 
have had little choice but to adopt more and more intensive systems" 
(Clunies-Ross and Hildyard, 1992, p. 59). 
3 The term 'treadmill' has also been used in a wider context to explain the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental change. Schnaiberg (1980), in seeking to examine which 
institutional traits of modem society can be held responsible for environmental problems, describes a 
'treadmill of production', explained in terms of the capitalistic character of production organisation. He 
argues that "the basic social force driving the treadmill is the inherent nature of competition and 
concentration of capital... [and that]... increasing the speed of this treadmill involves increased 
environmental withdrawals" (Schnaiberg, 1980, p. 230). 
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Under these circumstances, the political and economic conditions for agriculture are 
brought into the equation, with the key processes being loss of control over farm 
inputs, increasing debt, increasing concentration of land holdings, increasing corporate 
control over the food industry, and declining bargaining power for farmers in the 
market place. Therefore, to the ecological dynamic can be added political and economic 
dimensions4. 
Clunies-Ross and Hildyard explain how they see 'the chemical treadmill' at work 
(1992, p. 61). They argue that since the 1950s there has been a dramatic increase in 
both the quantity of agrochemicals used in the developed world, and the number of 
different pesticides available. For example, in the US, the use of manufactured 
nitrogen quadrupled between 1961 and 1981, and the amount of pesticide active 
ingredients increased by 170 per cent over the same period, whilst the acreage under 
cultivation remained relatively constant. These changes have arisen because 
manufactured fertilizers have raised yields, and made it no longer necessary to rotate 
crops and livestock to maintain soil fertility. Pesticides have made monocropping first 
possible, and then the accepted norm. 
As production has increased, so agricultural commodity prices have come down. 
Those who did not adopt new seeds, fertilizers and pesticides tended to be squeezed out 
of business, while those that did "stepped onto the chemical treadmill" (p. 61). 
However, 
"Getting off the chemical treadmill has never been easy. The cost-price 
squeeze which encouraged farmers onto the treadmill has increased 
rather than decreased in intensity. Farm gate prices have tended to fall in 
real terms, whilst the cost of inputs has gone up, with the result that 
farmers have to strive for higher and higher yields in order to make a 
profit" (1992, p. 61). 
In addition to the economic necessities of adopting intensive practices, Clunies-Ross 
and Hildyard also argue that farmers have become locked into particular production 
practices in physical terms. The replacement of manure by manufactured fertilizers 
means that levels of organic matter in the soil are reduced, along with the availability of 
4 The term 'treadmill' is also regularly used in the work of social scientists looking at agricultural 
change. For example, Pile uses the term 'treadmill' in a range of contexts to explain the adoption of 
different survival strategies on farms. He suggests that "the treadmill metaphor is useful because 
farmers themselves believe that they are struggling within a labour treadmill, involving both work and 
technology" (Pile, 1991, p. 264). He goes on to discuss the labour treadmill, the technological 
treadmill, the treadmill of farm management and the financial treadmill. To this list can be added "the 
vicious treadmill of cut-throat competition" (Woods, 1992, p. 14) and "the treadmill of competitive 
innovation" (Goodman and Redclift, 1991, p. 102). 
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essential trace elements such as magnesium, zinc and copper. Farmers have had to 
apply more and more manufactured fertilizers to compensate, but with the decreasing 
likelihood that yields will increases. 
In the case of pesticides, the treadmill effect arises because of pest resistance, whereby 
pesticides lead to more pest infestations by killing a pest's natural enemies. Also, 
pesticides can disrupt the metabolism of plants, causing proteins to break down and 
making them increasingly susceptible to attack by pests. Because spraying programmes 
rarely totally eradicate a whole population of pests at once, some will inevitably 
survive, passing on their immunity to the next generation. The problem of increasing 
immunity then fosters an even greater dependence on newer chemical technologies. 
Clunies-Ross and Hildyard's report concentrates on issues of pest resistance and soil 
properties and so privileges physical dependencies in soils and ecosystems over the 
economic and social processes locking farmers into particular development trajectories. 
Their account can also be criticised because of its oversimplified treatment of the use 
and impacts of agrochemicals. Thus, their notion of a pesticide treadmill, whilst 
evocative of the farmer's dilemma in adopting chemical technologies, is too narrow in 
its scope. The term 'treadmill' makes a good metaphor for the combined sets of 
pressures which have encouraged agricultural intensification, particularly as a tool in 
environmental campaigning, for it helps draw attention to the role of public policy in 
shaping agricultural change. However, sets of different economic, political and 
ecological processes and influences are all conflated under the banner of the 'treadmill' 
leaving the concept analytically weak. It infers an element of compulsion in that 
farmers are deemed to be forced to continually adopt new technologies, but adds little to 
our understanding of the differentiation and variability of these processes evident in the 
empirical literature on diffusion and adoption. 
1.6 Technology and Regulation Theory 
Macro changes driving the restructuring of agriculture have become one of the central 
concerns of a group of commentators who have used the ideas of the French 
'regulation' (or regulationist) school (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987). Regulation theory 
provides a useful ordering device for understanding the evolving context for 
technological change in agriculture. Its focus of analysis is the institutions and 
structures through which society is organised, produced and reproduced, and its central 
5 According to Clunies-Ross and Hildyard (1992, p. 62), "twenty years ago, farmers in the US corn belt 
could have expected a tonne of fertilizer to add 15 to 20 tonnes to their grain harvest. Today the same 
tonne can only increase production by about 5 to 10 tonnes". 
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tenet is that capitalism develops in the form of a succession of periods, each with 
specific institutional frameworks and social norms. These frameworks are 
conceptualised as 'regimes of accumulation' -a notion developed in response to 
emerging evidence of radical changes in labour processes, consumer habits, 
geographical and geopolitical configurations, and in state powers and practices, 
particularly since the 1970s6. 
The extensive regime (Figure 1.1) dominated from the late nineteenth century until the 
First World War and was characterised by incremental growth, rapidly growing 
demand, and the concentration of accumulation and technological change in heavy 
producer goods industries. The corresponding mode of social regulation (MSR) for 
this regime has been termed the mode of competitive regulation (Tickell and Peck, 
1992), an economically liberal and non-interventionist MSR at the level of the nation 
state. Wages were negotiated by individual firms and were subject to market 
fluctuations. Internationally, this MSR was characterised by British hegemony and the 
gold standard. The structure of the extensive regime of accumulation altered after 1918, 
particularly as a result of technological change in industries producing consumer goods. 
Demand, however, was not sufficient to maintain the pattern of accumulation, a 
deficiency that led to the economic crisis of the 1930s. 
The 1920s and 1930s saw a transition between the extensive regime and the intensive 
('Fordist') regime which succeeded it. After the Second World War, labour 
productivity in both capital and consumer goods industries increased significantly, 
leading to massive increases in real wages and triggering the formation of mass markets 
for standardised consumer goods. Accumulation under the extensive regime had been 
prone to cyclical recessions, but intensive accumulation represented a more robust 
growth model, and cyclical downturns between 1950 and 1973 brought only a 
slowdown in rates of growth (de Vroey, 1984). Accumulation under this regime is 
6 The regulationist school's basic argument can be briefly summarised (from Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 
1986; 1987) as follows. The stabilisation, over a long period, of the allocation of the net product 
between consumption and accumulation can be characterised as a regime of accumulation. This implies 
some correspondence between the transformation of the conditions of production and the conditions of 
reproduction of wage earners. If the schema of reproduction are coherent, then a particular system of 
accumulation can exist and be sustained. However, for this to be so, and for the regime to be 
maintained, the actions of a range of individuals and agencies, such as capitalists, workers, financiers, 
civil servants and so on, have to be brought into some kind of configuration. According to Lipietz there 
must exist, "a materialisation of the regime of accumulation taking the form of norms, habits, laws, 
regulating networks and so on that ensure the unity of the process, i. e. the appropriate consistency of 
individual behaviours with the schema of reproduction. This body of interiorised rules and social 
processes is called the mode of regulation" (Lipietz, 1986, p. 19). Modes of regulation, therefore, can be 
seen as the means of institutionalising struggles and containing them within parameters compatible 
with maintaining accumulation. Two regimes of accumulation are identified in the twentieth century: 
the extensive regime and the intensive (or Fordist) regime, separated by intervening periods of structural 
crisis. 
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Fire 1.1 - Phases of Regulation and Accumulation in the Twentieth Century 
Source: Tickell and Peck, 1992, p. 194. 
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termed 'intensive' because surplus is not extracted from the production processes in an 
absolute sense, through lengthening the working day or the number of workers, but 
rather through intensifying the production process. Relative surplus value is then 
radically increased through the use of assembly lines and capital equipment to increase 
the amount of production per worker. It is this emphasis on assembly line type 
production processes that has spawned the term 'Fordism'7. 
The intensive regime began to destabilise during the late 1960s following a reduction in 
the rate of productivity growth in the US and northern Europe. Leading industrial 
sectors had reached their technical limits, while real wages and capital intensification 
rose and investment in consumer goods industries slowed down. The structural crisis 
presented by Fordism became apparent by the mid- 1970s, exacerbated by the oil price 
rises of 1973 and the subsequent debt burden. 
Regulation theory has been used to describe the post-war capitalist development of 
western agriculture (Kenney et al., 1989; Friedman and McMichael, 1989; Goodman 
and Redclift, 1991; Marsden et al., 1993), and writers have drawn rural parallels 
between the evolution of the post-war modern agro-food system and industrial 
'Fordism'. For example, Goodman and Redclift (1991) argue that two key processes 
have shaped the structure and development of the post-war agro-food system. First, 
during the Fordist regime of accumulation, agriculture provided cheap food to an urban 
industrial workforce, in turn enabling a higher proportion of household income to be 
spent on non-food consumption, and further integrating the industrial working class 
into the market for mass produced goods. Set within this context of capital 
accumulation, their second theme is one of accumulation inside the ago-food sector 
itself. The pattern of accumulation, they argue, is shaped by the biological constraints 
of the agricultural production process and human food consumption requirements. 
Two processes were crucial during the post-war period. The first was the need of 
capital to develop new markets for commodities and labour in the western world. The 
second was the mutual interests of a scientific community and agro-industrial capital to 
adopt a high technology model of agricultural production and development. It was the 
establishment of a particular technology/policy model in the aftermath of the Second 
World War in the US and Europe, that facilitated this development trajectory and the 
role of chemical technologies within it (see Chapter 2). Goodman and Redclift refer to 
7 'Fordism', the regulationists argue, is a particular regime of accumulation based upon the expansion 
of domestic markets for mass-produced goods in advanced capitalist states. It necessitates the 
progressive adoption of mass consumption by the industrial working class. The corresponding 
institutional context for Fordism was one of Keynesian policies of full employment and corporatist 
politics. 
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the model as a "treadmill of competitive innovation" (1991, p. 102), arguing that its 
defining characteristic is the "symbiosis" between the state, agro-industrial capital and 
agricultural science, which "is at the root of the transformation and current economic 
and environmental crisis of modern agriculture" (1991, p. 103). 
The regulationist approach to the evolution of capitalism does not provide a single, 
consistent theory, but is an umbrella term for an ongoing research agenda within 
contemporary political economy (Jessop, 1990)8. It has been criticised for its failure to 
provide a clear definition of regulation itself (Jessop, 1990, p. 176, but see Marden, 
1992), and there is not much agreement about the object of regulation, reflected in "the 
lack of unanimity among regulation theorists when they answer the question: what is to 
be regulated ?" (Jessop, 1990, p. 177). Furthermore, regulation theory has been 
criticised for being too concerned with systems of accumulation, with insufficient 
attention being paid to the associated modes of social regulation (Peck and Tickell, 
1992; Tickell and Peck, 1992). 
The point of greatest contention has been over what follows Fordism. Has capitalism 
entered a new phase of development that can be characterised as a regime of flexible 
(post-Fordist) accumulation (see Harvey, 1989) or are we in a period where the 
structural crisis of Fordism is still being played out (Hyman, 1988; Dunford, 1990) ? 
That this debate remains unresolved need not, however, undermine regulation theory's 
explanatory power in helping to understand historical changes in the nature of capitalist 
development. In support of the approach, Harvey argues that its strength lies in its 
focus on the 
"the complex interrelations, habits, political practices, and cultural forms 
that allow a highly dynamic, and, consequently unstable, capitalist 
system to acquire sufficient semblance of order to function coherently at 
least for a certain period of time" (1989, p. 122). 
Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to improve upon regulation theory's account of the 
transformation of capitalism, the key question that is of concern here is how applicable 
is the approach to understanding patterns of change in the agricultural sectors of 
advanced capitalist economies ? 
8 Identifying seven different schools within the regulation approach, Jessop has described its distinctive 
features. Regulation theory, he asserts; "works with a realist ontology and epistemology; adopts the 
method of 'articulation' in theory construction; operates within a general Marxist tradition of historical 
materialism with its interest in the political economy of capitalism and the anatomy of bourgeois 
society; and is especially concerned with the changing forms and mechanisms (institutions, networks, 
procedures, modes of calculation and norms) in and through which the expanded reproduction of capital 
as a social relation is secured" (Jessop, 1990, p. 204). 
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It is only recently that agricultural development under capitalism has been scrutinised 
using regulationist concepts (Kenney et al., 1989; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; 
Sauer, 1990; Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Marsden et al., 1993). These studies 
highlight the resonance between the nature of the development of the modern ago-food 
system and of capitalist development more generally. Put briefly, extensive capitalist 
accumulation is a model of development in which increases in output are achieved 
through quantitative increases in the volume of inputs, while intensive accumulation 
achieves increases in output through improvements in the efficiency with which inputs 
are used9. 
Similar shifts from an extensive to an intensive form of accumulation have been 
discerned in the agro-food system. For example, Friedmann and McMichael (1989) 
use the concept of food regimes to link international relations of food production and 
consumption to broader regimes of accumulation identified by the regulationist school 
(see also Friedmann, 1993)10. Such a framework highlights three main points. First, 
the direction of agricultural development is largely determined by the non-agricultural 
economy. Second, the current crisis in agriculture parallels the crisis in capitalism, the 
roots of both lying in the New Deal and immediate post-war eras. Third, the political 
economy of the agro-food system now depends upon inseparable links between 
agriculture and non-agricultural industries. The framework also helps underscore the 
most important processes shaping agricultural change: the integration of farm 
businesses and households into wider circuits of production and consumption; the 
effects on agriculture of external economic processes such as the development of new 
technologies and markets; and the role of the state and agro-industrial interests (Kenney 
et al., 1989). 
During the inter-war period, agriculture's role was to continue to provide cheap food. 
This role acquired a new significance during the intensive regime because industrial 
wages became linked to productivity gains through the process of collective bargaining, 
a key characteristic of the Fordist mode of social regulation. Cheap food policies 
9 In truth, both strategies usually co-exist, although one may be dominant. Thus, as Dunford (1990, 
p. 310) puts it, "an age of intensive accumulation is one in which intensive methods predominate". 
10 The first food regime was centred on European imports of wheat and meat from the settler states 
between 1870 and 1914. In turn, settler states imported manufactured goods, labour and capital from 
Europe. This regime became the key to the creation and development of a system of capitalist 
economies governed by independent nation states, and was also instrumental in shaping relations 
between agriculture and industry. The second food regime, which spanned more than three decades after 
the Second World War, was characterised by strong state protection for agriculture and the organisation 
of the world economy under US hegemony. The state system was extended to former colonies in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, whilst at the same time agricultural sectors in the advanced capitalist 
world experienced transnational restructuring by agro-food capitals. 
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increased household purchasing power among the urban industrial workforce. As 
Goodman and Redclift point out, 
"The maintenance of inter-sectoral terms of trade favourable to the urban 
sectors remained important throughout the inter-war period, and 
constituted the principal aim of state agricultural policy in supporting the 
accumulation process" (1991, p. 87). 
It is in this context that Goodman and Redclift's 'minor' theme of accumulation within 
the agri-food system is played out. The pattern of accumulation has been critically 
influenced by the 'dual biological constraints' inherent in food production associated 
with the nature of agricultural production and human food consumption requirements. 
These constraints also set the limits to the development of a Fordist' agriculture in the 
strict sense 11. 
Goodman et al. 's (1987) conceptualisation of appropriationsim and substitutionism 
under these conditions recognises that accumulation in the agro-food system has 
required that industrialization take a markedly different path from other production 
sectors. The biological production-consumption cycle has meant that the transformation 
of the agricultural production process by industrial capitals (appropriationism) has been 
partial and historically discontinuous. Most innovations have been introduced by 
capitals located outside the production process, with agricultural input sectors becoming 
autonomous sources of innovation. According to Goodman and Redclift, 
"The key point to recognize is that biological constraints 
(photosynthesis, gestation, species diversity, land as space, etc. ) have 
led to the fragmentation of the innovation process, whose origins and 
dynamic lie outside direct agricultural production" (1991, p. 91, 
emphasis in original). 
II Labelling the intensive regime of accumulation as the 'Fordist' era has prompted debate over whether 
agricultural production in the post-war period can be characterised as Fordist in nature (Kenney et al., 
1989; Sauer, 1990; Goodman and Redclift, 1991). The relationship between the mode of consumption 
and production was underpinned by corporatist politics and similar features can be discerned in the 
agricultural sphere. However, while writers have conceptualised the technology/policy model of 
agricultural development as the rural complement to industrial Fordism, Goodman and Redclift (1991) 
have sounded a note of caution. They argue that "the attempt to equate agriculture and industry is 
misguided" (p. 100). Because of the individualistic and entrepreneurial nature of the agricultural labour 
process, there has continued to be scope for practising 'the art of farming'. Also, the biological 
constraints to agricultural production have prevented capital from directly subsuming the production 
process. In effect, agriculture has resisted Fordist principles of productive organisation. Fordism is, 
however, useful when thinking of the food system as a whole. For the downstream food processing and 
manufacturing sectors, agricultural commodities have tended to become reduced to interchangeable 
inputs, and the catering and fast-food sectors have become characterised by mass-produced, standardised 
products and unskilled labour. So, taking on board Goodman and Redclift's reservations, it is better to 
think in terms of either a Fordist 'food' system, or agriculture under the Fordist regime of capitalist 
accumulation, rather than a Fordist agriculture per se. 
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Technological change has, however, left what Goodman and Redclift call the 
fundamental technical base of agricultural production more or less the same, and farm 
production remains largely tied to the technological and organisational capacity of 
family producers. Changes have, of course, occurred. Average farm size has 
increased since the 1930s, and technological change has developed rapidly, mainly as a 
result of the system of government support and intervention. Moreover, Goodman and 
Redclift go on to acknowledge how 
"the social transformation. of agriculture is due less to the revolutionary 
nature of innovation per se than the institutional incentives to early 
adoption and technological competition introduced by the state .... In large part, social differentiation and restructuring have been politically 
engineered rather than the result of ineluctable technological advances of 
scale in production" (1991, p. 93). 
Regulationist approaches provide useful insights into the processes driving aggregate 
agricultural changes in advanced economies. Crucially, regulation theory helps link the 
processes encouraging technological change in agriculture to the efforts of states to 
sustain accumulation in the wider capitalist economy. In emphasising the role of the 
state, it also highlights the social contextualisation of technological change in agriculture 
and provides helpful conceptual tools and frameworks for exploring the changing 
context within which individual farmers manage their businesses. However, regulation 
theory is of less use in assessing change on individual farms. It has been used to 
impose a categorical logic upon local action, representing restructuring processes as 
coherent and determined by the structural requirements of capital accumulation 
(Munton, 1992; Whatmore, 1994). This leaves a difficulty in dealing with the empirical 
diversity that remains characteristic of advanced capitalist agriculture (van der Ploeg, 
1990) and raises the familiar dilemma of demarking structural change from human 
agency. 
1.7 Bridging the Structure-Agency Dual tty 
The conceptual problems of the structure/agency duality are common in social science. 
In agrarian political economy, interest in macro processes was reflected in a shift in 
focus from the household, to wider political and economic structures, to the capitalist 
transformation of family farming. Much of the concern during the 1980s centred on 
processes of externalisation and the commoditization of farm-based production (van der 
Ploeg, 1985; Long et al., 1986) and focused on the ways in which family households 
and farm businesses become tied into the wider market economy. Concern about the 
variability of individual responses suggests the need for micro-sociological 
perspectives, but without losing a sense of context. Early attempts to integrate structure 
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and agency have mostly tended to allow one to dominate over the other, but more 
recently theorists have attempted to chart a middle course, with Giddens's (1984) 
'structuration' theory, for example, recombining the mutually dependent structure and 
agency. 
Political economy approaches to understanding change on farms can be criticised for 
their undue concern with structure and the limited attention they pay to agency. 
Moreover, they are prone to making unwarranted assumptions about people's material 
interests and how these determine behaviour (Callon, 1986; Hindess, 1986; Schwarz 
and Thompson, 1990). Attention needs to be drawn to what actors know, how they 
come to know it, and what they do on the basis of their knowledge (Schwarz and 
Thompson, 1990). Such a 'socio-cultural' approach, the origins of which lie in the 
sociology of knowledge, need not deny the insights of political economy. It suggests 
instead that its constructs, such as subsumption (Whatmore et al., 1987a) or 
appropriationism and substitutionism (Goodman et al., 1987), should be treated as 
frameworks providing the context for action which are, in turn, mediated by action. 
They are not rigid determinants. Changes on farms result from choices and constraints, 
which a more 'actor-oriented' approach can help explicate. 
The use of more 'actor-oriented' approaches does, however, beg other important 
methodological questions. Of particular interest is the accretion of knowledge and 
information, and its mediation and use on farms. The evidence we have suggests that 
farmers are bombarded by, and seek, advice from off the farm (Tait, 1978; 1985; 
Eldon, 1988), but they continually reinterpret such advice in the light of their experience 
and the objectives of the farm household. Two related concepts are especially useful in 
linking together knowledge systems and the notion of interests contained in political 
economy. These are 'negotiation' and 'strategy'. The former seeks to capture the 
process of mediation, or the manner in which farmers interpret and endeavour to 
fashion the external advice they seek and receive. As Long argues, negotiation takes 
place at the 'interface' between "social actors with conflicting or diverging interests and 
values, " and it "sensitizes the researcher to the importance of exploring how 
discrepancies of social interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power are 
mediated and perpetuated or transformed at critical points of linkage or confrontation" 
(Long, 1989, p. 221). As a concept, negotiation challenges the distinction between 
structure and agency and the one-way relationship between them sometimes assumed in 
political economy. It accommodates individual choice without disregarding structural 
influences, making the process of mediation the focus of enquiry without pre-judging 
what the 'real' interests of farming households may be. 
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Nonetheless, negotiation is not a random or unstructured process. It would be wrong 
to assume that some notion of 'strategy', (i. e. a set of farm household aspirations and 
objectives), is absent even if negotiated outcomes cannot always be anticipated from the 
strategy outlined. Thus, negotiation incorporates aspects of conscious reflection, 
rationality and constrained choice, all of which are embedded in the concept of strategy 
(Redclift, 1986; Crow, 1989). 
Strategy has been used as a means of bridging the structure/agency dichotomy in social 
science (Giddens, 1979; Crow, 1989), and in analyses of farming change the concept 
has been frequently but loosely employed to incorporate the notion of individual or 
family-based responses to external constraints (Redclift, 1986; Gasson, 1986; Marsden 
et al., 1989; Pile, 1991). That the term is so widely used indicates, according to Crow, 
(1989, p. 19), its perceived utility in understanding social action. However, 
consideration must be given to what constitutes a strategy. Crow suggests that 
"normally it is taken to imply the presence of conscious and rational decisions involving 
a long-term perspective" (p. 19). But confusion can arise from the labels attached to 
strategies (such as 'coping' or 'survival' strategies), particularly when social scientists 
"impute objectives which the actors to whom they are imputed would not necessarily 
recognise" (p. 20). There is also a danger that 'strategy' can be used to emphasise 
choice and play down constraint. 
One recent attempt to utilise the concept of strategy in understanding agricultural change 
is that of Pile (1990a; b; 1991; 1992). He argues that farmers' survival strategies 
develop from their individual motivations and their attitudes towards social processes 
(i. e. the way they read history). Given that strategies are constrained by structural 
relationships, Pile (1991) suggests that what is important is how farmers understand 
and give meaning to their structural relationships. He argues that "farmers'... survival 
strategies [are] conditioned by their individual readings of the general circumstances 
which they all face" (p. 272). Such a conceptualisation brings to the fore the issue of 
how farmers 'see the world' 12. 
The concepts of strategy and negotiation can be used as a path through the 
structure/agency dualism, but this still leaves open the question of what structure 
amounts to and how 'constraint' is exercised. An examination of power helps shed 
12 Pile's study is preoccuppied with farmers' survival strategies although there is a question of whose 
strategy is the focus for analysis. Much has been made of the link between farm family household and 
farm business (Gasson et al., 1988; Gasson and Errington, 1993), and it has been shown that the 
family's aspirations are important in determining the direction of farm business development. 
Strategies could be expected to be negotiated within farm families and may involve actions intended to 
achieve more than just survival. Therefore, the term family's farming strategy is preferred here. 
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light on this question and also helps clarify the concepts of strategy and negotiation. 
According to Latour (1986; 1987), who is keen to overturn some of the common 
assumptions about the roles of 'power' and 'society' in social science, power ought not 
to be seen as something that is possessed. It must instead be treated as a consequence, 
not a cause, of action. By comparing a diffusion model of power, where actors derive 
power from some central source, with a translation model, where "power is composed 
here and now by enrolling many actors in a given political and social scheme" (1986, 
p. 264), Latour argues that power is an outcome of action. "No matter how much 
power one appears to accumulate, it is always necessary to obtain it from the others 
who are doing the action" (p. 276). Representations and enrollment, therefore, become 
central to the analysis and 
"a constant debate will rage about who obeys and who is obeyed. In 
these continuous struggles there will be as many definitions of "the 
whole picture" as their are actors striving to enrol and/or be enrolled" 
(1986, p. 274). 
Such a stance is contentious because it means that society and social science come into 
question, primarily because of the tendency to treat effects as causes. As Latour 
argues, social science, as a science of society, has tended to 
"use notions of 'power' and 'capital' when these have to be locally 
composed; it will talk of 'classes', 'ranks' and 'values' when these are 
the outcome of a continuous debate on how to classify, to rank and to 
evaluate; it will try to make society hang together with 'hierarchies', 
'professions', 'institutions' or 'organisations' whereas the practical 
details that make it possible for these entities to last for more than a 
minute will escape attention" (1986, p. 277, emphasis in original). 
Such a perspective on social action and power relations has been incorporated in the 
'action in context' approach. This is discussed in the next section and the notion of 
farmers as embedded in a dynamic network of relations that were characterised in the 
introduction as a 'pollution production process' is developed in this light. The network 
of relations provides the (evolving) context within which farmers pesticide practices 
must be set. 
1.8 Action in Context 
Pesticide pollution occurs in specific places as a result of the actions of individual 
actors. Concepts are, therefore, required to understand what individual farmers are 
doing and why, that can be accounted for through a 'bottom up' approach. 
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Action in context (AIC) is an approach developed as part of a recent research 
programme investigating the social and economic restructuring of rural Britain through 
analyses of the rural land development process (Marsden et al., 1993). Research at 
local, national and transnational levels demonstrated how economic actors, the 
regulatory planning system and local political configurations, all play roles in shaping 
specific development processes, and although outcomes were locally-rooted, the 
processes governing them need not always be so. For the researchers, complex 
conceptual questions followed from this, including 
"what kinds of relationships might we expect to find between economic 
and political actors operating at the national and transnational levels, and 
such actors operating locally ? How do the forces of economic change 
interact with regulatory powers to condition local outcomes ? What 
scope do locally based actors have to resist or significantly alter such 
outcomes ?" (Marsden et al., 1993, p. 129). 
Given the theoretical gap between locally-based analyses and structural processes, the 
AIC approach tries to handle a range of economic, political and cultural processes 
which underlie social action in particular places (Marsden et al., 1993; Murdoch et al., 
1992; Murdoch and Marsden, 1994). AIC was also born out of a concern that much of 
the so-called restructuring debate in human geography and other social sciences had, 
during the 1980s, erred on the side of structuralism. 
One important influence on the development of the AIC approach was that of the 
sociology of translation, a body of work by a mainly French school of sociologists of 
science. Callon et al. (1985, p. 10) describe the aim of such studies as being to analyse 
the creation of "categories and linkages and ... the way 
in which some are successfully 
imposed while others are not". One of the most widely cited examples of this approach 
is a case study of the controversy amongst scientists and the scallop fishermen of St. 
Brieuc Bay in northern France (Callon, 1986; Callon and Law, 1989). It focuses on 
how one group of actors is able to get others to comply with its position, how its 
position is sustained, and how various consequences arise. During any period of 
contestation about change, a network of relationships is constructed. Four different 
stages (or what Callon calls 'moments of translation') are identified during which the 
different actors seek to define each other's identities and establish the possibilities of 
interaction and the margins of manoeuvre. In Callon's case study, three scientists 
present new knowledge acquired from a visit to Japan, as the best way in which the 
problem of St. Brieuc's depleting scallop stocks can be solved, and then seek to 
construct a network of actors to achieve this. 
47 
The first moment of translation ('problematisation') occurs when the scientists seek to 
define the nature of the problem and bring other actors into play on their terms. The 
second moment ('interessement') is when the scientists try to consolidate the network 
they have created by convincing others of their views and so enlisting allies. The third 
moment ('enrollment') represents the point at which the network is operationalised 
following negotiations about how the different identities within the network are to be 
fixed. Fourth comes 'mobilisation', when the representations of interest made by the 
lead actors are fixed throughout the network and legitimised. Through each of these 
phases of building and stabilizing the network, the issue of representation (i. e. the 
definition of the nature of the problem) is crucial. The strength of the network depends 
not only on the relationships between actors but also on the legitimacy of their 
representations. 
Approaching social action in this way allows identities and interests to be viewed not as 
pre-given but as emerging out of the interactions between different actors. In particular, 
power becomes an outcome of action rather than a cause (Latour, 1986). As Callon 
(1986, p. 224) explains 
"understanding what sociologists generally call power relationships 
means describing the way in which actors are defined, associated and 
simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances. The 
repertoire of translation... permits an exploration of how a few obtain the 
right to express and to represent the many silent actors of the social and 
natural worlds they have mobilised". 
Callon's study and his 'moments of translation' can be treated as an exemplar13, whilst 
recognising that it "provides a useful corrective to the earlier concentration on 
structuralist analysis" (Marsden et al., 1993, p. 145). This is especially because the 
focus for analysis becomes the means by which interests and objectives are constructed, 
represented and come into effect. Drawing on Massey's (1984) geological metaphor, 
describing the way that localities are constructed through successive rounds of 
investment over time, Marsden et al. argue that past practices within networks "provide 
the 'standing conditions' for present and future actions". These conditions usually take 
the form of rules and resources. Rules need not be fixed and absolute in their effects, 
and there can be discretion in their interpretation and implementation. Furthermore, the 
distribution of resources is not fixed. Although it will be conditioned by past practices, 
alliances have to be continually "forged and maintained [and]... representations have to 
be legitimized and acted upon" (1993, p. 152). 
13 That is to say, these moments of translation provide a model or scheme, although not all are 
necessary or necessarily occur in the above order. 
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Adopting the AIC perspective for the research presented here requires that local 
pesticide practices be considered as the outcomes of power relations meeting in places. 
It allows the focus of analysis to be the methods adopted by actors (in context) in 
formulating and seeking to achieve their objectives. The implications for this 
methodological approach are explored in more detail below. 
a) 'Context' and Technology. 
Marsden et al. 's work looked at the socio-political relationships surrounding rural land 
development processes, but left the role of technology unexamined. Here, the adoption 
and use of agricultural technologies are central to the enquiry. How, therefore, can AIC 
be best employed to help understand the use of pesticides and the emergence of a 
pesticide pollution 'problem'? 
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the social relations surrounding the 
adoption and use of technologies among those working in the sociology of translation 
and actor-network traditions (Bijker et al., 1987; Bijker and Law, 1992; Law, 1991; 
Callon, 1991; Latour, 1991). This work provides a valuable perspective on the social 
shaping of technology, but first, it is useful to define technology more explicitly. 
Technology itself is a 'slippery' term. Here, following MacKenzie and Wajcman 
(1985), technology will be taken to cover three components. First, technology 
comprises physical objects or artefacts such as, for example, pesticides, spraying 
machinery, tractors and so on. Second, 'technology' may refer to activities or 
processes, such as, for example, crop spraying, cultivation and harvesting. Third, 
'technology' can refer to what people know as well as what they do, in that 
technologies are meaningless without the 'know-how' to use them. Given the firm 
rejection of technological determinism, with its assumptions about technological 
'progress' being an autonomous process operating outside of society, the questions that 
follow are: what shapes technology and technological change ? And what are the 
various pathways and mechanisms through which society influences technologies and 
technological change ? 
If we first turn to the 'context' side of the action in context approach, work in the 
sociology of science and technology has stressed the importance of the different but 
interlocking elements of physical artefacts, institutions and their environment (Hughes, 
1983; 1987; 1988; Dosi, 1982). In doing so, it draws together technical, social, 
economic and political aspects, all within a 'technological system'. According to 
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Hughes (1987, p. 52), "because components of a technological system interact, their 
characteristics derive from the system". Thus management of a system often chooses 
technical components that support the structure, or organisational form, of 
management. He goes on: 
"technological systems solve problems or fulfill goals using whatever 
means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do mostly 
with reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or 
desirable, at least by those designing or employing the technological 
system" (Hughes, 1987, p. 53). 
Systems are built, maintained and consolidated by protagonists. Crucially, however, 
Hughes, whose work has examined the evolution of national electricity supply 
industries, identifies 'momentum' as a key characteristic such systems can acquire. As 
he explains: 
"Technological systems, even after prolonged growth and consolidation, 
do not become autonomous; they acquire momentum. They have a mass 
of technical and organisational components; they possess direction, or 
goals; and they display a rate of growth suggesting velocity. A high 
level of momentum often causes observers to assume that a 
technological system has become autonomous" (1987, p. 76). 
Thus mature technological systems "have a quality that is analogous.. . to 
inertia of 
motion" (p. 76) and this arises from the various groups of actors who may have vested 
interests in the growth and durability of the system, including managers, owners, 
politicians, manufacturing corporations, research laboratories, sections of scientific and 
technical societies, educational institutions and regulatory bodies. In turn, communities 
of practitioners can maintain traditions of technological practice, adding to the 
momentum of a technological system. 
Momentum also suggests the notion of a technological 'trajectory'. Such ideas have 
been the concern of a group of neo-Schumpeterian economists who have examined 
technological change from an evolutionary perspective (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Orsenigo, 1989; van den Belt and Rip, 1987). Rejecting neo-classical 
approaches to technological change with their assumptions about 'perfect rationality' 
and 'profit maximisation', the evolutionary approach sees firms as loosely structured 
clusters of routines, with the outcomes of routines being determined by either 
competitive markets or, more usually, by the influence of government policy or 
institutional arrangements. Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that technological 
development is often patterned in the form of a technological regime, or what Dosi 
(1982) calls a technological paradigm. This concept is cognitive and relates to 
"technicians' beliefs about what is feasible and at least worth attempting" (Nelson and 
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Winter, 1982, p. 258)14. A paradigm contains a dominant definition of the relevant 
problem that must be tackled, the tasks to be fulfilled, a pattern of inquiry, the material 
technology to be used, and types of basic artefacts to be developed and improved. 
These help structure or channel innovation and so give rise to technological trajectories. 
This implies that existing technologies provide an important set of preconditions for 
new technologies, although not, of course, that existing technology wholly determines 
innovation. 
There is a danger of seeing technologists taking one innovation and simply developing 
new versions of it as part of a mechanistic trajectory. However, rather than simply 
being a rule to be followed mechanically, paradigms were always argued by Kuhn to be 
resources to be used and drawn upon (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985, p. 11). Thus, 
trajectories are never 'natural' or predetermined, but subject to social shaping. 
The fact that, as Callon (1991, p. 132) puts it, "technology both creates systems which 
close off other options and generates novel, unpredictable and indeed previously 
unthinkable options" leads us to ask how systems are created and how options are 
closed off. These questions will guide the 'context' side of the action in context 
approach adopted in this thesis (Chapters 2-4). Pesticide pollution occurs because of 
the way that pesticides are employed in agriculture. Can the development and adoption 
of pesticides be characterised as a technological system within a particular paradigm 
with a trajectory or even momentum of its own ? And if so, how does this momentum 
manifest itself within the networks of actors involved ? 
'Action' and T 
Turning to the 'action' side of the action in context approach, and how technology 
might be brought into the equation, Callon argues that while economics suggests that 
consumers and producers enter (market) relationships via the product, and sociology 
suggests that actors can only be defined in terms of their inter-relationships, these can 
be brought together as two parts of the same puzzle. He concludes that "actors define 
one another in interaction - in the intermediaries that they put into circulation" (1991, 
p. 135), with intermediaries being texts (reports, notes, files etc. ), technical artefacts 
(instruments, machines, pesticides, consumer goods), humans (including their skills 
and knowledge), and money. Intermediaries help compose networks by giving them 
14 Dosi's technological paradigm concept (1982) is an extension of Kuhn's notion of scientific 
paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). In one sense, a paradigm is an exemplar, but in another sense, it forms an 
"entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given 
[scientific] community" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). 
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form. Thus, a technical object such as a pesticide "may be treated as a programme of 
action co-ordinating a network of roles" (p. 136). 
As the artefact moves from actor to actor, so not only does it give form to the network, 
but also contributes to the network's definition and the definition of the actors. Because 
networks are defined both by the actors and by the circulation of intermediaries, implicit 
in their definition is translation, that is, intermediaries (artefacts) ascribe roles to those 
who receive them. The circulation of pesticides helps to define farmers as pesticide 
users. As Callon (1991, p. 143) puts it, "A translates B. To say this is to say that A 
defines B". But are translations reversible or irreversible ? 
Callon suggests that the degree of irreversibility of a translation depends on two things: 
the extent to which it is subsequently possible to go back to a point where a particular 
translation was only one amongst others, and the extent to which it shapes and 
determines subsequent translations (1991, p. 150). Here we begin to see the link with 
technological paradigms and trajectories. Moreover, the irreversibility of a translation is 
accompanied and measured by normalisation. As Callon explains: 
"Normalisation makes a series of links predictable, limits fluctuations, 
aligns actors and intermediaries, and cuts down the number of 
translations and the amount of information put into circulation. It 
operates by standardising interfaces - that is, by standardising and 
constraining actors and intermediaries" (1991, p. 151). 
Normalisation implies that the use of technologies becomes standardised and routinised. 
In Bijker and Law's (1992) words, technologies become 'obdurate'. Definitions of 
what the 'problem' is and its optimal technical solution become stabilised and 
unquestioned. Thus, with normalisation, standardisation and irreversibility in techno- 
economic networks comes constraint, as networks become "heavy with norms" 
(Callon, 1991, p. 151). 
Adopting the action in context approach to the study of farmers and pesticide pollution 
would, therefore, involve a search for linkages between actors, and between actors and 
technical artefacts, within networks. The important questions thus become how are 
networks constructed ? and what representations and translations prevail within them ? 
This perspective does not mean that individual human agency reigns supreme. Rather, 
the identification of different 'norms' and 'visions of the world' ought to help highlight 
the irreversibility or otherwise of networks and the ways in which the context is 
reproduced through action. 
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L2 Conclusions 
The questions which guide the thesis concern the historical causes of increasing 
pesticide use in Britain, the emergence of a water pollution problem, and the ways that 
farmers' current understandings and practices are constructed. In addressing these 
questions, the action in context approach offers several conceptual advantages over the 
earlier approaches to technological change discussed in the chapter. It enables local 
action to be situated in its historical and structural context and in the light of prevailing 
technological paradigms. Current technological arrangements and pesticide practices 
are seen, in part, as the outcomes of past rounds of technological choices. In turn, the 
influences upon these past choices are brought into the analysis. Farmers become not 
wholly constrained actors, as they are in the theory of the treadmill; nor wholly free 
agents, but actors faced with choices and constraints. In this sense, while farm families 
may pursue their strategic objectives, and in doing so make decisions about how 
technology should best be employed on farms, their actions and objectives will 
continually have to be mediated and negotiated with other actors and in the light of 
changing structural conditions. Mapping this 'geography of enablement and constraint' 
also raises questions about what farmers know and how they come to know it. 
In describing the evolving context for technological change and pesticide use in British 
agriculture, regulationist concepts provide a helpful ordering framework. This is 
especially so because the regulationist perspective allows agricultural development and 
the role of technological change to be set within the context of the evolution of wider 
capitalist processes. 
The perspective also highlights the role of the state in 'regulating' the relations between 
production and consumption in order to sustain capitalist accumulation. In doing so, we 
are able to point to the (social) influences shaping the direction of technological change 
and, in this case, the role of the state in stimulating the production of new technologies. 
This marks an important improvement upon earlier models of technological change in 
agriculture such as the diffusion-adoption model and the theory of the treadmill, both of 
which paid scant attention to how and why new agricultural technologies were 
produced. 
Regulationist perspectives alone leave us poorly equipped to deal with local diversity, 
however. Local and farm-level change cannot be simply 'read off from changes in the 
regime of accumulation, although as Whatmore (1994) points out, there has been a 
tendency in the recent literature to use regulation theory in this way to impose 
'categorical logics' on action. Rather, the ways in which actors understand their 
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positions in their contexts provide the bounds within which they act and their links and 
relations with other actors are crucial. 
Finally, in examining how the use of pesticide technologies has led to contamination of 
the water environment, we enter several realms which have previously tended to be 
studied separately. Issues of scientific research and the development of technical 
artefacts are brought together with questions about how and why farmers act as they do 
in the social world. In turn, the concern is to understand local social action but in the 
context of macro-processes of change. Employing an action in context approach ought 
to provide a means of establishing the reciprocity of the technical and the social as well 
as of action and context. The technical shapes the social and vice versa, while action 
shapes and is shaped by context. 
What are the methodological implications of this discussion for looking at the 
development and adoption of pesticide technologies in British agriculture and the 
emergence of a water pollution 'problem' ? An AIC approach requires that the context 
and its historical evolution be examined first. The notion of a technology/policy model 
of agricultural development was introduced by Goodman and Redclift (1991) to explain 
the technological changes of the post-war period. This model will be examined in the 
British context in Chapters 2 and 3, with particular attention paid to the development, 
promotion and use of pesticides. Of crucial importance will be the formation of a 
particular technological system (or paradigm), its evolution along a trajectory and the 
development of momentum. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
TIE TECHNOLOGY/POLICY MODEL IN BRITIAN 
2: j Introduction: The Evolution of Agricultural Policy 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that technological change in agriculture has not been an 
autonomous process, with its roots in the realm of objective scientific endeavour and its 
functions operating outside of social control processes. Rather, British agricultural 
development since the 1940s has been shaped by government effecting a particular 
development model. But how was this 'model' constructed ? And how was the 
adoption of new farming technologies, such as pesticides, encouraged ? 
According to Goodman and Redclift, the roots of the modem agro-food system lie in 
the US during the New Deal period, with the establishment of a technology/policy 
model that was "central to the food system's development" and the "motor" for change 
(1991, p. 86). They argue that two main themes interact "like major and minor chords" 
(p. 87) to establish the structure of the food system and the direction of its development. 
The major theme concerns the role of agriculture in the resurrection of industrial 
capitalism in a period of recession. The minor theme concerns the pattern of 
accumulation within the agro-food system. 
The technological transformation that took place in British agriculture arose slightly later 
than, but in parallel to, the New Deal, created by its own, albeit different institutional 
incentives. The state engineered the move to chemical crop protection as part of its 
broader strategy. In order to understand this process, this chapter examines the actions 
and policies of the state in regulating agriculture's role in the expansion of industrial 
capitalism in Britain. While the focus of analysis is the development of chemical crop 
protection, particular attention will be paid to herbicides over other types of pesticide 
because they have been most important in the water pollution problems of the 1980s. 
2.2 British Agricultural Development. 1860-1944 
The economic experiences of the preceding decades were crucial in shaping the 
direction of agricultural development in Britain after the Second World War. Marsden 
et al. (1993) identify two phases in Britain's economic relations which broadly equate 
with the regulationist schools' two regimes of accumulation - the Imperial food order, 
dominated by Britain from the 1860s to the 1930s; and the post-war 'Atlanticist' food 
order, dominated by the US. During the former regime, the mode of consumption was 
characterised by the reproduction of the labour force, underpinned by the role of staple 
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foodstuffs and non-commoditized domestic labour, including food preparation. 
Before 1914, accumulation in industrial capitalism depended on the expansion of the 
colonial powers' overseas markets. Agricultural production grew largely by extending 
its frontiers, helped by technological change in transport and communications. 
Globally, the area of cropland rose by 250 million acres between 1840 and 1888, with 
about half of this increase located in the US (Hobsbawm, 1979). This expansion 
redefined the relations between agriculture and industry, primarily because Europe's 
industrial base was no longer dependent on domestic agriculture, and local harvest 
crises had less and less impact on economic activity. As necessary, more food was 
imported from elsewhere. 
After 1870, the full impact of this agricultural expansion was felt. World grain prices 
declined markedly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century as world output rose 
rapidly. Responses to the problem varied. In Britain, an ideological commitment in 
government to free-trade let many farmers fail, while France and Germany erected 
protectionist barriers. By the end of the nineteenth century, this had left Britain heavily 
dependent on overseas supplies of food, with three-quarters of its consumption of 
wheat and cheese and half its meat imported. Britain's trade relations had developed 
initially from traditional colonial relations, based on the import of primary goods and 
the export of infrastructural and capital goods. Gradually, protected colonial markets 
were opened up to free world trade, hinged around Britain's global economic 
hegemony. With its naval and economic power, diplomacy, and financial infrastructure 
with sterling as the international currency, Britain was instrumental in establishing the 
first unified, price-regulated world market (McMichael, 1985). However, at home the 
free trade philosophy left British agriculture vulnerable to world market price trends. 
Low grain prices meant that wheat producers in the UK suffered most from increasing 
world trade as imports from Argentina, India, Canada and Australia rapidly increased. 
In the late 1850s, Britain had imported 1 million tons of grain per year but this had 
increased to 5. million tons by 1914, three times the amount produced at home (Sayer, 
1967, p. 108)1. 
The state left agriculture's fate to be determined by the market, and as a result, the 
proportion of the working population employed in agriculture dropped from 18% in 
1861 to 8% in 1911 (Tracy, 1982, p. 53). State support for agriculture was only 
1 During this period changes in trade and agricultural policies were accompanied by technological 
changes in agricultural production, including the emergence of industrialised agricultural input sectors 
producing machinery and manufactured fertilizers. The diffusion of tractors and combine harvesters in 
the US increased labour productivity, such that the man-hours per acre required for wheat cultivation 
declined from 56 in 1800, to 35 in 1840 and to 15 by 1900 (Rasmussen, 1962). 
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introduced during the war in 1916 following bad weather and increased activity by 
German submarines. A system of county committees was established to direct 
agricultural production, along with modest price guarantees. Prices continued to rise 
after the end of the war, and were 25% higher than their 1918 levels by April 1920. 
Intervention brought security to agriculture but inflation meant that financial liability to 
the Exchequer was not great. However, the world market collapsed in 1920 and as the 
demands on the state to guarantee prices increased, the Corn Production Acts (Repeal) 
Act was introduced in August 1921 cancelling all price guarantees, an episode which 
has gone down in farming history as the 'Great Betrayal' (Self and Storing, 1962, 
p. 18). 
The state's role remained limited throughout the 1920s. It held to the policy of laissez- 
faire and it was not until the economic slump of 1929-32 that agricultural policy 
changed significantly. British farmers were vulnerable to falling farm prices at the end 
of the 1920s, and to increasing imports, which had risen to 35% above normal 1920s 
levels by the end of 1931 (Tracy, 1982, p. 159). The politics of the free trade versus 
tariff reform debate also shifted during the depression in favour of the latter. 
Protectionist countries had experienced more favourable economic fortunes while 
recovery was slow and difficult in Britain. Most western industrialised nations had 
introduced measures to stabilise domestic agricultural markets. In Britain, intervention 
during the early 1930s took four main forms: marketing reorganisation and the 
regulation of home produced supplies; regulation of imports; subsidies and price 
insurance; and measures to increase efficiency and reduce costs of production (Murray, 
1955, p. 28). According to Marsden et al., this move from a laissez-faire agricultural 
policy in Britain during the early 1930s 
"was part of a more general change in the management of national 
economies in response to the Great Depression and its undermining of 
the classical liberal orthodoxies of public finance" (1993, p. 50). 
Following the Wheat Act of 1932, deficiency payments were agreed for wheat 
producers2, and between 1932 and 1938 the area under wheat in the UK expanded 
from 1.3 million to 1.9 million acres (Tracy, 1982, p. 168). The system was extended 
to producers of barley and oats under the 1937 Agriculture Act. The result of these 
subsidy schemes was a slow but uneven improvement in prices for agricultural produce 
after 1935 (see Table 2.1) and, by 1939, almost all the main commodities produced by 
British agriculture were benefiting from guaranteed pricing schemes. Seventeen 
2 Deficiency payments are a payment to the producer equivalent to the difference between the average 
price received in the market and a standard rate set by the Government. The Wheat Act of 1932 set this 
standard rate for wheat at 10 shillings per hundred weight. 
57 
Table 2.1 - Agricultural Price Indices for England and Wales, 1930-1938 
Source: Tracy, 1982, p. 169. 
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marketing boards and producer associations had also been established, such that the 
state had become heavily involved in regulating and guiding agricultural production. 
However, technological change proceeded relatively slowly. For example, although 
tractors had been available for some years, in 1939, there were still 650,000 horses 
used on British farms (Sayer, 1967, p. 120). 
The 'drift' into intervention in agriculture became much more marked with the outbreak 
of the Second World War. In October 1939, the Minister of Agriculture announced that 
the Government would purchase farm products at fixed prices and so provided farmers 
with a guaranteed market and prices for their principal products (Hansard, October 
1939, Vol. 352, Col. 7). A range of further measures were taken. A Ministry of Food 
was established, which became the sole buyer and importer of all principal foodstuffs. 
Food rationing was introduced, and a 'dig for victory' campaign launched, whereby 
grants of £2 per acre were paid to encourage farmers to plough up permanent pasture 
for cropping. Only a third of farmland was ploughed in 1939 with two thirds under 
permanent grass. By 1945, these proportions were reversed. 
A local committee structure was established to direct farm production at the local level. 
This, coupled with the system of subsidies, also helped to increase grass output by 
two-thirds between 1938-39 and 1941-42 (Bowers, 1985, p. 66). Farming prospered 
under the new system of state subsidies, and, as Marsden et al. point out, 
"this experience of a state-managed expansion of output proved a 
formative one for farmers and government alike. With Britain's unique 
dependence on imported food once more exposed by a world war, the 
seal was set on this new partnership" (1993, p. 51). 
The success of the package of policies prompted an extension of the system of 
guaranteed prices in 1944, initially for four years after the end of the war, despite the 
increasing financial commitment to agriculture which this involved. Between 1938-39 
and 1944-45, state expenditure on agricultural support rose from £ 11.5 million to £61.4 
million (Murray, 1955, p. 323). 
The experience of the 1930s' depression and the war economy fundamentally altered 
public and political attitudes towards the relationship between state, economy and 
society, and led to a new conception of the role of government in managing the 
economy including agriculture. Intervention and planned production to achieve public, 
welfarist goals became more generally accepted, and there was little disagreement 
between the main political parties over the need to intervene to support agriculture 
(Flynn, 1986). This interventionist ideology had also dominated the report of the Scott 
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Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas (Scott Committee, 1942). It concluded 
that a prosperous rural economy depended upon a prosperous agriculture and advocated 
support for farming as a means of preserving the countryside and maintaining rural 
services. 
By 1944, the key actors involved in formulating agricultural policy were looking as to 
how policy might best develop after the end of the war. A declaration on 'Post War 
Agricultural Policy' was issued by, among others, the NFU, the Royal Agricultural 
Society of England, the Country Landowners Association, the National Union of 
Agricultural Workers, the Transport and General Workers Union, the Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors and the Councils of Agriculture for England and Wales. The 
declaration, which provided the basis for the 1947 Agriculture Act, called for 
guaranteed prices and protection for farmers after the war. It stated that, 
"It is essential on national grounds that British agriculture should be 
maintained in a healthy condition, sufficiently prosperous to ensure a 
stable level of prices which will yield a reasonable return to the producer 
and on the capital employed in the industry, and a scale of wages 
sufficient to ensure a standard of living comparable to that of urban 
workers ... [Furthermore] ... There should be a definite relation between the price level and the costs of production.... In return for a 
guaranteed price level, all owners and occupiers of rural land must 
accept an obligation to maintain a reasonable standard of good 
husbandry and good estate management and submit to the necessary 
measure of direction and guidance subject to provision for appeal to an 
important tribunal" (quoted in NFU, 1945, Appendix A). 
A broad consensus over the future direction of agricultural policy after the end of the 
war emerged and widespread public support was expressed for protecting agriculture 
following its wartime role and the threat of world food shortages in the immediate post- 
war years. 
At the same time, Britain's economic relations with the US became a major factor in the 
post-war global economic order3. Britain experienced a shortage of both food and 
dollars immediately after the war, and was unable to buy all its food requirements on 
the world's markets. To save dollars and to help address the massive balance of 
payments deficit, extra monies were provided to encourage increased agricultural 
3 The US sought more liberal trading conditions and Britain's trading arrangements became the main 
target for reform. This was achieved during negotiations over post-war commercial and monetary 
policy and over the terms of Britain's dollar loan to fund the Labour Government's welfare reforms. 
From the US point of view, "the loan was meant to prise open the sterling area and curb the Labour 
Government's enthusiasm for intervention" (Booth, 1990, p. 147). The loan, agreed in December 1945, 
was smaller than had been hoped for in Britain. It was also interest bearing and was dependent on 
sterling convertibility, sterling balances, import policy and the ratification of the Bretton Woods 
agreement. 
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production whilst demand for food continued to be controlled through rationing. An 
official in the Treasury wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture observing that 
"the prospect of a dollar shortage has created the greatest opportunity for 
British agriculture that has occurred in a time of peace for a hundred 
years.... [W]e are now in the position where agriculture will be under 
fire for not expanding enough.... In these circumstances the time may 
come when certain advances which have hitherto been regarded as 
visionary may become practical politics" (quoted in Smith, 1989). 
2.3 The Production of Agricultural Technologies. 1860-1944 
As part of the British state's 'drift' towards a more interventionist agricultural policy, 
greater efforts were made to promote agricultural research and development (R&D). 
From the late 1500s to the agricultural revolution, technological change in agriculture 
had depended on individual enterprise and capital. The upper and middle classes with 
interests in land, as land owners, and science, as a 'gentlemanly' pursuit, were on 
occasion combined in the pragmatic pursuit of profit. In the first half of the nineteenth 
century, agricultural science became more strongly associated with the wider farming 
community, primarily through the application of findings from agricultural science to 
farms. Farmers began to look more to agricultural science for solutions to their 
problems. In public policy, educating agriculturalists remained separate from the search 
for new knowledge, the former funded by state money, the latter still relying almost 
exclusively on private sponsorship (Hawkins, 1991). However, in 1909 a 
Development Commission was established in the belief that the application of 
agricultural science could help the process of rural development more generally. A 
series of twelve research institutes were established, each specialising in a particular 
field of agriculture (Brassley, 1991). 
British concern for self-sufficiency in temperate food products during the two World 
Wars provided a further important spur to the development of agricultural science. In 
1914 the first advisory system, the Provincial Advisory System, was set up. 
Throughout the interwar years a permissive rather than a statutory advisory service was 
offered providing farmers with limited and uneven access to the fruits of scientific 
research. The adoption of new technology depended primarily on individual farmers 
and their access to land and capital as well as education. As Munton et al. argue 
"Effectively, the system had little to offer the numerous small, under 
capitalised farms, which made up the majority of farming businesses at 
the time, and which were managed on the basis of minimising 
expenditure of all kinds" (1990, p. 115). 
By the end of the Second World War, however, this system was ripe for overhaul, 
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particularly because there existed a new commitment to a dynamic agricultural R&D 
sector which would promote the adoption of new products and practices. Agricultural 
science and the production of new technologies were placed at the heart of the new 
development model. Important among the new technologies were farming chemicals, 
although advances in this field - spasmodic and unco-ordinated as they were - had a 
longer history. 
The first modern chemical treatments in crop husbandry, primarily insecticides and 
fungicides, can be traced to France in the 1880s, although the development of 
herbicides originated in the UK and US in the 1930s. Chemical methods of crop 
protection developed in close association with wider developments in the biological and 
chemical sciences. Before 1850, the rate of scientific advance in crop protection was 
"almost imperceptible" (Lever, 1990, p. 44), and it was not until the century following 
1850 that the foundations of modem crop protection chemistry were laid. 
The first fungicide was developed in the late 1840s following observations that sulphur 
could control vine powdery mildew. A routine dusting programme evolved in France 
during the 1850s where fine, dry sulphur was applied to vines. In 1885 Pierre 
Milldardet discovered that the Bordeaux mixture (copper sulphate and lime) was 
effective in reducing vine downy mildew (Plasmopora viticola) and its application 
became standard practice in vineyards for a century. The success of the Bordeaux 
mixture prompted worldwide trials on a range of crops. In particular, strong links were 
forged between scientists in the US and France and in 1886 a section devoted to 
vegetable pathology was established as part of the Botany Division in the United States 
Department of Agriculture. US trials concentrated on minimising spraying costs and 
the timing of applications of the French fungicide. The 1888 Hatch Act set up State 
Agricultural Experiment Stations and Land Grant Colleges in each state, facilitating 
expansion of Federal Government sponsored research into crop protection. A year 
later, in the UK, the establishment of the Board of Agriculture provided a similar 
foundation for crop protection research. 
By the 1880s insecticides began to have significant impacts on agricultural production 
practices, initially in horticulture, although the use of chemicals such as sulphur to 
control insect pests can be traced back centuries (Green, 1976). Fruit growers in the 
US began using spray oils made from kerosene, soap and water which killed insect 
pests by suffocation. This became standard practice in the US during the 1890s and the 
sprays were first employed in the UK in 1885. 
62 
Up until the 1930s, most of the pesticides introduced were fungicides, with the 
dithiocarbamates produced by Rohm & Haas and DuPont being the most important. 
DuPont had begun R&D in dithiocarbamates in the late 1920s, but their derivatives 
proved very expensive and it took DuPont and Rohm & Haas six years to develop a 
commercially viable manufacturing process. During the 1930s around 80% of new 
products introduced were fungicides (Achilladelis et al., 1987). By the early 1930s, 
many of the American and European chemical companies had become more research 
orientated, partly because of the encouragement given by governments to agricultural 
R&D and the establishment of state agricultural institutes with which companies 
developed close links. Academic researchers interested in linking chemical structure to 
biological activity were soon attracted to these new, well-financed institutions. 
The systematic search for pesticides began in earnest during the 1930s (Archilladelis et 
al., 1987). Much of this research involved the haphazard testing of chemicals to see if 
they held any pesticidal attributes. ICI, which had established the world's first 
commercial agricultural research station devoted to crop production and protection at 
Jealott's Hill, Berkshire in 1928, began testing chemicals almost at random in 1934 
(Peacock, 1978). A member of the ICI team which developed Lindane described the 
process as follows, 
"We investigated several thousand organic and other chemicals prepared 
in our various laboratories ... investigating the toxicity of chemicals by determining the concentration necessary to obtain a 50% kill of a series 
of standard insects" (Slade, 1945, p. 314). 
The first breakthrough in the development of synthetic insecticides did not come until 
the late 1930s with the discovery of the organochlorine compounds, the most famous of 
which is DDT. First synthesised in 1873, DDT's insecticidal attributes were discovered 
by Paul Muller, a Swiss entomologist, in 1939. 
The development of herbicides came relatively late in crop protection history. In 1897 it 
had been discovered in France that a 2% solution of copper sulphate killed charlock 
(Sinapis alba) in wheat without damaging the crop, but the most important 
breakthrough came in the 1930s with the development of 'hormone' weedkillers 
(Lever, 1990). Herbicide development had been closely linked to research into plant 
growth substances and the first growth hormone was isolated in 1926. The idea that 
plant growth could be modified by controlling biochemical processes excited the young 
but growing chemical industry and particularly those companies which were developing 
artificial fertilizers. In the UK, ICI started to test numerous chemicals as potential 
growth regulators but met with little initial success. 
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The Second World War provided a major impetus to research into agrochemicals with 
the main aims being to increase domestic self-sufficiency in food production and to find 
ways of destroying the enemy's crops. ICI produced 1-napthyl acetic acid (NAA) and 
in experiments in 1940 attempted to kill wheat and oats. Findings led instead to an 
exploration of the selective weed control properties of NAA, an area of research also 
taking place at Rothamsted Experimental Station in Hertfordshire. ICI and 
Rothamsted's efforts were co-ordinated through the Agricultural Research Council 
under tight wartime security with the aim of developing a crop destruction weapon 
against sugar beet. After field trials in 1944, the NAA derivative MCPA was launched 
in the UK in 1945 as the first 'scientifically produced' selective herbicide (Achilladelis 
et al., 1987; Lever, 1990). 
Research also progressed in the United States. The National Academy of Sciences' 
War Research Committee was interested in using plant hormones as crop destruction 
weapons, foreshadowing the use of 'agent orange' in Vietnam in the 1960s. NAA's 
chemical relative, 2,4-D was of particular interest because of its selective weedkilling 
properties, and the US chemical company, AmChem, patented the methods and 
compositions for killing weeds covering halogenated phenoxy monocarboxylic aliphatic 
acids in 1944 and marketed 2,4-D as 'Weedone' in 1945. 
It is significant that MCPA and 2,4-D first became available in Britain in the immediate 
post-war period. Both helped revolutionise weed control in cereal cropping, in 
particular. They allowed farmers to abandon the use of wide rows and horse hoeing, 
which until then had been the only means of keeping weeds in cereals under control, 
and led to important improvements in yields. But for the chemical revolution to take 
place, much more was required than simply the development of new chemicals. 
Farmers had to be actively encouraged to adopt new practices, and to achieve this a new 
long-term policy framework was required for British agriculture. 
2.4 The Technology/Policy Model and the Use of Pesticides, 1945-1980s 
The direction agricultural policy was to take in Britain at the end of the Second World 
War was crucially influenced by the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s. Farming 
interests were anxious not to see a repeat of the 'Great Betrayal' of 1921, and the war- 
time Government had drawn up details of possible legislation for post-war agriculture. 
The incoming Labour Government of 1945 therefore had a ready-made policy that was 
likely to receive widespread public and political support. 
64 
In 1946 the new Minister of Agriculture made the Government's position clear. He 
said, 
"The adjustment of commodity prices is the only satisfactory method 
which can be generally applied to effect changes in the level of farming 
profitability, in spite of the admitted inequalities between farmer and 
farmer which it produces" (Hansard, 21 November 1946, Vol. 430, 
Col. 1027). 
Commodity prices were to be fixed in the light of changing farm incomes compared to 
other sectors, at an Annual Price Review, and the war-time system of guaranteed prices 
was to be continued at least for the time being. However, during the preparation of the 
post-war legislation, international considerations became more and more important. A 
world grain shortage acutely affected Britain, a nation already obliged to supply food to 
India and to the British zone in Germany, and bread rationing had to be introduced. By 
late 1946, it became apparent that the US loan would only last half as long as had been 
expected and the requirement to make sterling freely convertible into dollars would 
compound the food and financial crisis. Domestic food supplies needed to be increased 
as rapidly as possible, particularly to save dollars. Agricultural policy became 
inextricably linked with the dollar crisis. The Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, said in 
the House of Commons debate on the King's Speech in 1946 
"it is vitally important that we protect our balance of payments 
position... [one measure aimed at this]... is the efficient organisation of 
agriculture. We must make full use of our land. We must have a 
prosperous agriculture" (Hansard, 12th November 1946, Vol. 430, 
Cols. 35-36). 
Subsequently, the objectives of the 1947 Agriculture Act were outlined in its preamble 
as 
"promoting and maintaining by the provision of guaranteed prices and 
assured markets ... a stable and efficient agricultural 
industry capable of 
producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce 
as it is desirable to produce in the UK and of producing it at minimum 
prices consistently with proper renumeration and living conditions for 
farmers and workers in agriculture and an adequate return on capital 
invested in the industry" (quoted in Kirk, 1979, p. 47). 
While it was agreed that nothing short of guaranteed markets and prices would ensure 
stability in agriculture, the only quid pro quo required from farmers was that they strive 
to maximise efficiency and thus maximise value for (taxpayers') money. In addition to 
providing farmers with guaranteed prices and markets for all that they could produce, 
the 1947 Act required that they abide by 'rules of good husbandry'. Failure to comply 
rendered them liable to supervision orders and, if they failed to improve, notices to quit. 
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Between 1947 and 1952,5000 farmers were placed under supervision orders and 400 
were dispossessed (Lowe et al., 1986, p. 41)4. It was the reconstituted county 
committees who carried out these measures, acting as the Ministry of Agriculture's local 
agent. One amendment to the Act, suggested by the House of Lords, was that farmers 
under supervision of the county agricultural war executive committees should not be 
advised to "alter the character of the holding" (Hansard 4th August 1947, Vol. 441, 
Col. 1108-59), but this was rejected on the grounds that it would then be impossible for 
these farmers to adopt new practices in agriculture. During all the Parliamentary 
discussions surrounding the Bill, only one MP, Mr Vane, raised the point that there 
might be "some conflict between the interests of food production and those of good 
estate management" (Hansard, 4th August 1947, Vol. 441, Col. 1136). 
The multi-faceted state intervention in agriculture embodied in the 1947 Act was 
unprecedented and transformed farming "into a sort of ward of the state, much like a 
nationalised industry was contemplated" (Kirk, 1979, p. 47). The emphasis on 
stimulating production and the adoption of new farming practices effectively set what 
Cochrane (1958) describes as the 'treadmill' in motion (see Chapter 1). Although by 
the late 1940s the widespread application of agrochemicals in general, and herbicides in 
particular, were still practices of the future, the principles of weed and pest control were 
becoming integral to notions of good husbandry. These notions were outlined in the 
1947 Act as follows 
"(a) permanent pasture should be properly mown or grazed and 
maintained in a good state of cultivation and fertility and in 
good condition; 
(b) the manner in which arable land is cropped should be such as to 
maintain that land clean and in a good state of cultivation and 
fertility and in good condition; 
4 The removal of 'bad' farmers from the land saw state intervention in agriculture at its most extreme 
and was a measure that attracted much controversy in the House of Commons in the late 1940s. One 
MP, Sir Walden Smithers, referred to dispossession as "this tyrannical treatment of British subjects" 
(Hansard 28th April 1947, Vol. 436, Col. 1527). In a written answer, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Thomas Williams, explained; "The procedure is that county war executive committees make every 
effort to induce inefficient farmers to improve their work and methods, and they offer all possible 
guidance and assistance before resorting to drastic action. When, however, they conclude that there is 
no alternative to the taking of possession or the termination of the tenancy of a holding in the interests 
of food production, and when the Land Commissioner, acting on my behalf, is satisfied that there is a 
prima facie case, the farmer is informed of the committee's intention to apply for my consent to the 
taking possession of his land or the termination of his tenancy, as the case may be, and of the grounds 
upon which they are acting" (Hansard 18th November 1946, Vol. 430, Col. 19). Mr Gerald Williams 
MP complained in the House; "Is not the Minister aware that they [dispossessed farmers] were 
dispossessed because of the compulsory orders for cropping, which they could not carry out, and that if 
they were given the tools they could produce more food on these holdings ?" but the Minister replied; 
"No, Sir, I am only aware of the fact that they were dispossessed because of bad farming" (Hansard, 3rd 
February 1947, Vol. 432, Col. 1394). 
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(c) the unit should be properly stocked where the system of 
farming practised requires the keeping of livestock, and an 
efficient standard of management of livestock should be 
maintained where livestock are kept and of breeding where the 
breeding of livestock is carried out; 
(d) the necessary steps should be taken to secure and maintain 
crops and livestock free from disease and from infestation by 
insects and other pests; 
(e) the necessary steps should be taken for the protection and 
preservation of crops harvested or lifted, or in course of being 
harvested or lifted; 
(f) the necessary work of maintenance and repair should be carried 
out". 
(Agriculture Act, 1947, Section 2, Para. 11). 
The Act also contained a section on 'Pest and Weed Control' which, though primarily 
concerned with farmers' responsibility for the prevention of damage done by rabbits, 
also contained provisions "for securing the destruction of injurious weeds" (Section 4, 
Para. 102). In effect, the fight against all types of pest on farmland, including weeds, 
became embodied in policy, and if farmers did not fulfil their duties to ensure 'clean' 
fields, they risked being placed under supervision orders and even being dispossessed. 
More generally, the farming community's concerns of the day were reflected in the 
House of Commons Parliamentary questions and debates, and a reading of Hansard 
reveals the way agricultural development was represented. In particular, it identifies the 
emerging emphasis on the widespread adoption of new farming technologies and 
practices. For example, throughout 1948 the Minister of Agriculture was regularly 
questioned about the shortage of manufactured fertilizers or machinery. Mr S. Dye MP 
asked the Minister if he was 
"satisfied there are a sufficient number of spraying machines and supply 
of materials to destroy all annual weeds in corn and other crops to assist 
increased yields of crops per acre ?" (Hansard 7th July 1948, Vol. 451, 
Col. 1625). 
The lack of spraying machines was seen as a major constraint on the expansion of 
agricultural production (Makepeace, 1980; Southcombe, 1980). It was later suggested 
that because even average sized farms could not afford spraying machines, the county 
agricultural committees could help farmers with spraying by either spraying under 
contract or by hiring out their machines (Hansard Vol. 454, Col. 164). There was also 
an increased emphasis on stimulating arable production, and in June 1948, the 
Government used its new powers under Section 25 of the Act to give directions to 
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farmers to keep not more than a specified acreage of their land under permanent or 
temporary grassland. 
In a Parliamentary debate on agriculture in July 1948,11 months after the expansion 
programme had been launched, weed control continued to be a concern. Mr J. Alpass, 
the MP for Thornbury, said in his speech 
"this question of the control and elimination of weeds is not tackled 
sufficiently thoroughly. In my opinion it is done in too much of a casual 
fashion. It is not merely the man who neglects his duty in this respect 
who suffers; it is often the adjoining farmer. A little while ago I went 
round a certain part of my county and on some of the finest land .... I was horrified to see fields covered with thistles. I think the attention of 
the county agricultural committee should be drawn to that and that this 
question of the elimination of weeds should be tackled in a much more 
serious fashion" (Hansard 20th July 1948, Vol. 454, Col. 298). 
The enthusiasm for new technological options to improve productivity in agriculture 
was shared by many speakers in the debate. The MP for Wrexham, Mr Richards, 
explained 
"There is no doubt at all, I think, that a revolution has taken place in 
agriculture since the beginning of the war. The revolution, of course, is 
not entirely the result of the war. I think that when history comes to be 
written, the roots of the changes will be found in the work of scientists 
at Rothamsted, Cockle Park and Aberystwyth" (Hansard 20th July 
1948, Vol. 454, Col. 303). 
Similarly, in looking to the future, the path for agriculture seemed clear. Sir Ian Fraser, 
the MP for Lonsdale, said 
"I am one of those who believe that ordered mechanisation is perhaps 
the only way that eventually our agriculture can become completely self- 
sustaining, and therefore I want to see every possible effort made 
towards encouraging and increasing mechanisation of every kind" 
(Hansard 20th July 1948, Vol. 454, Cols. 309-10). 
The period 1945-50 saw not only the construction of the productivist policy framework 
in Britain but also important steps in the development of new herbicides. In Britain, 
research concentrated on MCPA, while in the US, the focus was on 2,4-D using 
phenol, a cheap by-product from oil refining. These phenoxy acid compounds have 
since grown to be the world's main herbicides controlling weeds in cereals. By 1950, 
organic chemistry was established as an important scientific discipline with the potential 
to provide a range of useful agrochemicals to control the major fungus, insect and weed 
pests. These developments were promoted by a network of actors keen to provide a 
chemical, technological solution to the question of improving agricultural productivity. 
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New institutions were put in place to foster the technological revolution that it was felt 
was required. The Agricultural Research Council (ARC), originally set up in 1931, 
was given greater powers and resources to advise and assess the value of research in 
the agricultural sciences (Cooke, 1981; Foreman, 1989). Also, the National 
Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) was formed in 1946 from the County War 
Agricultural Executive Committees as a state advisory service to encourage the adoption 
of new practices through the provision of free advice. Through these two structures, 
innovation in agricultural technology and its extension to farms combined to provide the 
technical base for the productivist policy framework of the next forty years. 
There was a strong sense of the public sector orchestrating the flow of technologies 
from publicly-funded scientific institutes via the advisory services to farmers. NAAS 
advisors were vigorous in their pursuit of the latest developments in agricultural science 
and widely promoted their adoption by farmers (McCann, 1989; Dancey, 1993). 
During the debate on the 1944 Agriculture Bill and the provision of a state advisory 
service, the then Minister of Agriculture had said, 
"no one will dispute, I am sure, the need for an adequate service of 
advice to agriculture. We want to try and ensure that everybody is in a 
position to know all about the latest developments in agricultural 
science. We also need.. . the practice of all the 
best farmers [to] become 
the practice of all. I have been encouraged in all this by the keenness of 
the farmers to take advantage of the additional advice that we have been 
able to give them, and also their readiness to emulate the more 
progressive farmers and by that success which has attended their efforts. 
That provides a justification for the suggestion we are making that we 
should continue, in peacetime, what has proved to be so successful in 
wartime" (quoted in Dancey, 1993, pp. 377-378). 
The unanimity of purpose that had existed during wartime between the state, 
agricultural science, commercial companies and the farming community continued after 
the war. Nowhere was this more so than in the diffusion of weed control technologies. 
During wartime, field investigations into MCPA and 2,4-D had been undertaken jointly 
by an ARC-funded research team, the Norfolk Agricultural Executive Committee and 
ICI (Lockheart et al., 1990), and the spirit of partnership and co-operation continued 
after the war. The origins of the chemical paradigm for weed control lay in the unity of 
purpose of this period when herbicides, in particular, became seen as the 'common 
sense' route for future crop protection amongst the key actors of the time. 
The ARC-financed team examining herbicides was reorganised in 1950 and became the 
ARC's Unit of Experimental Agronomy, based at Oxford University's Department of 
Agriculture. One aim of the Unit was "to promote communication and collaboration 
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between the main organisations concerned with the exciting development of chemical 
weed control" (Fryer, 1982, p. 78). It was soon realised that the rapidly increasing 
importance of chemical weed control in agriculture required that a permanent and 
enlarged centre for weed research be established with facilities for field and laboratory- 
based experimental work. Accordingly, the ARC bought an Oxfordshire farm where 
the Weed Research Organisation (WRO) was established in 1960. Research continued 
at Oxford University into the chemistry and physiology of herbicidal action, while the 
WRO concentrated on the practical use of herbicides and providing "a focus for weed 
control interests in [Britain]" (ARC, 1965, p. 4). By 1964, the unit had a staff 
complement of 70, and this had risen to 170 by 1980 (ARC, 1982). 
A key feature of the WRO, and one which underlines the sense of the public sector 
orchestrating the flow of new innovations from science to the farm, was its emphasis 
on liaison with other government organisations, especially the NAAS. Two senior 
NAAS officers were permanently stationed at the WRO with full access to all its 
research and information (ARC, 1965). The task of these 'Liaison Officers' was to 
keep abreast of advances in chemical crop protection and to facilitate the flow of up-to- 
date techniques onto farms via local NAAS officers (McCann, 1989, p. 55). Typically, 
they would deal with between 300 and 400 individual technical queries from NAAS 
district and county staff each year, but would also organise series of national trials on 
behalf of the NAAS. For example, in 1964 five trials demonstrating the use of pre- 
emergent herbicides in spring-sown cereals were organised by the WRO/NAAS Liaison 
Officers to show farmers how pre-emergent treatment could produce better crop yields 
than post-emergent sprays. Liaison Officers were also responsible for writing much of 
the advisory literature on weed control published by the NAAS and acted as its 
representatives on the British Weed Control Council. 
The philosophy and activities of the WRO were firmly rooted in the chemical paradigm 
for crop protection and its dominance was reinforced by the "very close links... between 
WRO and individual manufacturers" (ARC, 1982, p. 6). These links had been 
formalised at a meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture in 1952 involving 40 participants 
from the Unit of Experimental Agronomy, the major pesticide rrianufacturers and the 
public agricultural research institutes. It was agreed that five topics required attention: 
"(i) dissemination of information on weed control, especially between 
industry and official bodies; (ii) means of educating public opinion on 
weed control and spraying matters; (iii) the possibility of holding 
national or possibly regional conferences on weed control; (iv) economic 
aspects of weed control; (v) the possibility of arranging a co-ordinated 
programme of experiments and observational studies" (Fryer, 1982, 
p. 79, emphasis added). 
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To meet these ends, the British Weed Control Council was formed in 1953 and 
provided an important arena where links between herbicide manufacturers, public R&D 
scientists and public advisory officials could be maintained and networks strengthened. 
The NAAS acted as an important agent of agricultural change in the post-war period and 
helped encourage the diffusion of new technologies. Central to what Dancey (1993, 
p. 379) calls this "potent force for change" was the District Officer. NAAS District 
Officers were normally required to a hold a degree in agriculture and were typically 
responsible for an area covered by approximately 1000 holdings5. District Officers 
were supported by an array of specialist advice and research services at the county, 
regional and national levels. 
The network of R&D and advice promoting new chemical methods was extremely 
effective (McCann, 1989; Dancey, 1993), helped by the favourable economics of 
switching to using pesticides on farms. The switch to chemicals was made across 
much of the western world. Internationally, the post-war growth of the agrochemical 
industry was staggering, with the world market for crop protection chemicals increasing 
from around $700 million in 1945 to around $2500 million by the early 1960s, $4500 
million in the early 1970s and $10,000 million by 1980 all at 1979 prices (Braunholtz, 
1982). In Britain, the post-war developments in chemical crop protection were quickly 
taken up by farmers. Although no data exist on the area treated or the volume of 
pesticides applied, Table 2.2 shows the rising number of spraying machines in use over 
this period. Between 1942 and 1946, the number of ground crop sprayers in use in 
England and Wales more than doubled from 1,600 to 3,455 and in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1947 Agriculture Act there was a three-fold increase to 9,330 sprayers 
by 1952. Change accelerated in the 1950s, with a more than five-fold increase in the 
number of sprayers from 9,330 to 49,075 by 1959. By the late 1970s the number of 
sprayers had almost doubled again to 90,000 while over the same period their scale had 
also increased (Southcombe, 1980). 
The policy framework established by the 1947 Act operated without major change until 
1951 when a Conservative Government replaced Labour. Net output from agriculture 
had rapidly increased, as had state expenditure on farm support. The Conservatives 
abolished food rationing in 1954 and ceased subsidies on food consumption. 
However, the policy of agricultural expansion continued. Deficiency payments were 
reintroduced in an attempt to restore some semblance of a free market but within a 
strategy of maintaining price support through the Annual Price Review. 
5 In 1957 it was agreed that a new target of one advisor per 500 holdings of 15 acres or more should be 
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Table 2 .2- The Number of Ground Crop Sprayers in Use in England and Wales. 1942- 
1959 (1) 
Source: Laverton, 1962, p. 38. 
strived for. 
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Internal market prices were still determined by world market prices and these began to 
fall in the mid-1950s, increasing the liabilities of the Exchequer which had to make up 
the difference through deficiency payments. The Government's response was to make 
expansion more selective, with particular emphasis on beef, sheepmeat and home- 
produced feedstuffs, and with less support for the production of milk, pigs and eggs 
(Hansard, 15 March 1956, Vol. 55, Col. 559). The focus also switched from 
increasing output to encouraging improvements in efficiency and containing the costs of 
price support. Although these changes meant that the 1956 Review was the first not to 
be agreed by the farming unions, the 1957 Agriculture Act satisfied farming interests 
because it reaffirmed the principle of state support for agriculture, at least for the 
medium term. 
The Act stipulated that the guaranteed prices of each commodity would be maintained at 
not less than 96% of the previous year's level and, for livestock products, that 
reductions should not exceed 9% over a three year period. At the same time, the total 
value of the guarantees and production grants could not fall below 97.5% of the value 
of the preceding year. This gave farmers some assurance yet allowed the state the 
freedom gradually to reduce subsidies. The Minister of Agriculture said that the policy 
aimed to 
"promote the long term economic efficiency and competitiveness of the 
industry. It is not a measure to enable less-successful farmers to stay in 
business; far less is it a measure to perpetuate the existing patterns of 
production" (Hansard, 25 March 1957, Vol. 567, Col. 808). 
The state's main concern in the late 1950s was to prevent a rapid increase in the total 
amount of state support on price guarantees, subsidies and grants. This objective was 
achieved in that state support for agriculture rose only slowly from £227 million to 
£250 million between 1956 and 1960 (Annual Review, Cmnd. 2621,1965). 
The emphasis on efficiency from the mid-1950s onwards prompted a 'two-pronged' 
approach to implementing agricultural policy (Marsden et al., 1993, p. 55). This 
consisted, first, of the direct public financing of agricultural R&D and education, and a 
state advisory service, all of which helped to emphasise the development and promotion 
of technologies that saved labour and raised yields. The second prong was the 
orientation of support policy towards encouraging farmers to take up new technologies, 
both directly through capital grants and input subsidies, and indirectly through the 
steady but gradual squeeze on guaranteed prices. After 1951, the additions to 
guarantees were typically less than the increase in the costs of production, and were 
sometimes negative (see Table 2.3), such that the only way farm incomes could be 
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Ta le 2.3 - Increases in Guarantees and Changing Costs for Review Products 
£m 
Source: Bowers, 1985, p. 69. 
*- Because of changes in the system of protection these figures are not comparable 
with previous years. 
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improved was through increased efficiency. It was through this 'cost-price squeeze' 
that the inducement to take up new chemical technologies as an integral part of cropping 
practices became stronger. At the same time, the competitive pressures described by 
Cochrane (1979) as the 'treadmill' became more evident. 
Between 1950 and 1959 the promise of agricultural expansion throughout the advanced 
capitalist world raised the confidence of the agrochemical industry and the rate of 
innovation increased. During the decade, 140 new agrochemical products were 
introduced, and of these, 85 were insecticides, 35 were herbicides, and 20 were 
fungicides (Achilladelis, et al., 1987). 
The early 1960s was a period when the chemical paradigm gained even greater 
legitimacy and the technological trajectory it was encouraging came of age. The newly 
expanded WRO was turning its attention to prophylactic, pre-emergent herbicide use 
and the new types of rotations this allowed. Moreover, these developments were taking 
place in an atmosphere of renewed scientific and technological vigour as the wonders of 
chemical science and technology were being raised in the national public and political 
consciousness. It was in 1963 that Harold Wilson, the 'Prime Minister-in-waiting', 
delivered his speech to the Labour Party Conference in Scarborough which praised 
science as an agent of change. He called for the mobilisation of scientific research to 
meet the needs of technological development and argued that "in the Cabinet room and 
the boardroom alike those charged with the control of our affairs must be ready to think 
and to speak in the language of our scientific age" (quoted in Pimlott, 1992, p. 304). In 
such an atmosphere, the protagonists of crop protection's chemical strategy became part 
of a wider national effort to apply science and technology to the project of economic 
development6. 
World market prices for agricultural commodities fell further in the early 1960s, and 
because of the state's long term assurances to agriculture contained in the 1957 Act, the 
cost of meeting price guarantees rose from £ 151.2 million to £225.5 million between 
1961 and 1962 (Annual Review 1965, Cmnd. 2621). In response, attempts were made 
to limit production for some commodities, but the policy of 'selective expansion' 
continued. The new Labour Government of 1964 saw a crucial role for agriculture, 
spelt out in the 1965 National Plan, which said 
6 Coincidentally, Wilson's speech came only months after the publication in Britain of Rachel Carson's 
book, Silent Spring (1963), which pointed to the disturbing ecological consequences of pesticide use 
for the first time (see next Chapter). Carson's evidence was drawn primarily from the experience of 
insecticide use in the US, and did little to undermine faith amongst scientists and policy-makers in the 
use of herbicides to control weeds in Britain. It did, however, sow the first seeds of doubt over 
agriculture's 'dependence' on chemical methods. 
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"First it will help through increased production to meet the growth in 
demand. This will ease the pressure on our bill for imports of temperate 
agricultural produce. Secondly, by improving its labour productivity 
more rapidly than the increase in production, agriculture will continue to 
release substantial manpower resources and so help in closing the 
manpower gap extended during the plan period" (The National Plan, 
Cmnd. 2764,1965). 
However, a significant change in policy was signalled at the 1965 Price Review when 
the Government said that agriculture would "be expected to absorb ... through its 
increasing productivity, a large part of its increased costs " (Hansard, 17 March 1965, 
Vol. 508, Col. 1289). It was later calculated that at this review the additions to 
guaranteed prices fell short of agriculture's rising costs of production by £18.5 million 
(Winegarten and Acland-Hood, 1978). Such a shortfall only served to tighten the cost- 
price squeeze and thus intensify the search for efficiency gains in order to maintain farm 
incomes. 
Despite the under-recoupment of agriculture's costs at the reviews of 1966,1968, 
1969, output continued to expand, and by 1969 stood at more than twice its pre-war 
level. Moreover, support measures became increasingly characterised by import 
restrictions to prevent 'dumping' in the UK. These had the affect of pushing the cost of 
agricultural support more firmly onto the consumer via higher food prices, and at the 
same time giving the appearance of decreasing levels of expenditure. 
By the 1960s, herbicides had become the most important of the crop protection 
chemicals in terms of the number of innovations and the value of total sales. One 
hundred and ten new herbicides were introduced between 1960 and 1969 compared 
with 96 new insecticides and 50 new fungicides. Strong market demand for herbicides 
continued through the 1970s when 70 new products were introduced, compared to 60 
new insecticides and 42 new fungicides (Achilladelis, et al., 1987). Herbicides were 
also becoming more widely applied. For example, by 1969,65% of the UK's cereal 
acreage was treated with them, and this rose to 94% by 1975 (Grigg, 1989, p. 74). 
'Demand' did not materialise from thin air, however, and cannot be used on its own to 
provide an 'explanation' of rising pesticide use. Rather, demand had to be continually 
created and stimulated. The cost-price squeeze provided an economic stimulus to 
search for efficiency gains, but in addition, during the 1960s agrochemical companies 
targeted 'lead' farmers considered as local opinion-formers. They were provided with 
pesticides at greatly reduced prices, or even free of charge, in order to encourage the 
adoption of new chemical products (Tait, 1976). 
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The cost-price squeeze is widely evoked in the literature as a standard economic 
explanation of the widespread uptake of new agricultural technologies (Munton et al., 
1990; Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Clunies-Ross and Hildyard, 1992). However, 
there remains a question mark over whether farmers can be said to have been 'forced' to 
adopt new technologies, and this question has been posed by economists who prefer to 
conceptualise farmers as 'active profit seekers' rather than as passive or even reluctant 
agents of change (see Allanson et al., 1994, pp. 20-21). Once the chemical paradigm 
was firmly established, pesticide technologies would have become progressively more 
attractive to farmers as active profit seekers. Evolutionary economists of technological 
change have pointed to several reasons for what might be termed the 'increasing returns 
to adoption', all of which help reinforce technological trajectories (Arthur, 1988). 
These arguments can be applied to the diffusion of pesticides. First, the more any 
pesticide is used, the more is learned about its efficacy, making it more attractive to 
adopt. Second, technologies often offer advantages in 'going along' with other 
adopters as networks of users benefit from similar advisory and support services. 
Third, the expansion of the agrochemical market meant that the unit costs of producing 
pesticides fell as manufacturers benefitted from scale economies (Achilladelis, et al., 
1987). Fourth, pesticides that are more widely used often enjoy the advantage of being 
better known and better understood, making their adoption more attractive, especially to 
the risk-averse. Fifth, as pesticides are adopted, other technologies become part of their 
infrastructure. Thus, once a farmer has a spraying machine, a spray operator, a 
pesticide store and so on, alternative technologies are placed at a greater disadvantage. 
These factors do not fundamentally undermine the argument that the cost-price squeeze 
stimulated change, and it can still be viewed as a 'push' factor. However, its influence 
is likely to have been far less pronounced than recent political economy accounts 
suggest. The prevailing view expressed by politicians and advisors during the 1950s 
was that farmers were required to improve efficiency. Even as 'active profit seekers', 
farmers faced choices about how best to achieve this, and these choices were made in 
the particular social and technological context of the day. This context was one of rapid 
modernisation and a progressive chemical paradigm combined with the increasing 
economic attractiveness of switching to the new technological system. 
The growing importance of herbicides in crop production signalled an important turning 
point in farming practice, and provided a significant trigger to further intensification in 
the arable sector. Before the availability of herbicides, weed populations were kept 
down by means of crop rotations and cultivations so that no one weed species could 
benefit from a consistently favourable environment. By the late 1940s, arable farmers 
had generally reached a "high level of efficiency in weed control" using rotations 
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(Lockheart et al., 1990, p. 45). Until the 1950s, the emphasis had been on 
incorporating herbicides into existing husbandry systems that were basically 
unchanged. Their use merely replaced the hoe, harrow and sickle. However, during 
the 1960s, herbicides began to be used as part of a far more fundamental change in crop 
husbandry and themselves became "an integral part of the production process" 
(Robinson, 1980, p. 299). This change arose from their unique ability to kill off 
vegetation on a large scale without relying on cultivations, enabling farmers to grow a 
succession of cereal crops without recourse to the plough. Seed could be drilled 
directly into the stubble of the previous crop with weed growth having already been 
killed by spraying (Fryer, 1964, p. 524). The move from rotations to continuous cereal 
cropping profoundly altered arable farming. Until the 1950s it "continued to be 
regarded as bad farming to grow more than two straw crops in succession" (Elliott, 
1980, p. 288) because of the increased risk of weed infestation. The use of herbicides, 
however, transformed cereals from a 'fouling' crop to a 'cleaning' crop (Robinson, 
1980). As a result, by the late 1960s "rotation was considered an old fashioned word" 
with many believing that "farmers could have an almost complete freedom of cropping 
so far as weed control was concerned" (Elliott, 1980, p. 288). 
Herbicides have meant that there has been little need to return to rotational husbandry 
for weed control, despite the continued presence of grass weeds (Chancellor, 1980). 
Since the late 1960s and 1970s, farmers have switched from spring-sown cereals to 
more productive winter cereals -a switch made possible by the ability of herbicides to 
tackle the increased threat from grass weeds. Cereal producers have also been able to 
sustain programmes of continuous autumn-sown crops (Makepeace, 1980), using 
minimum tillage and direct drilling to speed up sowing, although this strategy has also 
"entailed a greater commitment to herbicides for weed control" (Lockheart et al., 1990, 
p. 46). 
Another important factor accounting for the increasing importance of herbicides, 
particularly in the US, was the development of plant breeding and hybridisation 
techniques (Kloppenburg, 1988; Goodman and Wilkinson, 1990; Goodman and 
Redclift, 1991). Chemical and farm equipment companies began to plan plant breeding 
research in order to develop 'packages' of mechanical, chemical and genetic 
innovations, thus establishing a radical new 'style' of agro-industrial innovation and 
development. The relationship between innovations in seeds and pesticides is a long 
standing one. Kloppenburg (1984; 1988) has shown, for example, how the 
hybridisation of corn was instrumental in facilitating the expansion of other branches of 
the agricultural supply industries, such as machinery and pesticide manufacturing. The 
noted corn breeder, George Sprague, observed that 
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"the objective in plant breeding is to develop, identify and propagate 
new genotypes which will produce economic yield increases under some 
specified management system (Sprague, quoted in Kloppenburg, 1984, 
p. 302 [Emphasis added by Kloppenburg]. 
This management system presupposed mechanisation and the application of pesticides. 
Indeed, hybrids were developed by breeders that were suited to higher levels of 
chemical application. The density at which corn was planted doubled between the mid- 
1930s and 1978, but higher plant densities meant greater vulnerability to insect, weed 
and fungal build up which, in turn, encouraged the greater use of pesticides. According 
to Kloppenburg, the corn crop accounted for a third of US herbicide sales by the early 
1980s and "has been a major contributor to the historical increase in the intensity of 
chemical use in American agriculture" (1984, p. 303). 
In Britain, the overall direction of agricultural policy pursued through the 1950s and 
1960s was maintained by the incoming Conservative Government of 1970 which was 
also planning for EEC entry. The policy aims of the time were summed up in the 1972 
Annual Review which said that 
"Our share of the enlarged EEC market including our own home market 
will depend on the competitiveness of our farmers. This means that we 
should aim to improve the already good record of productivity gain in 
our agricultural industry from the start of transition [to the Common 
Agricultural Policy] by stimulating the investment which is needed for 
expansion and by securing the advantages of increased scale" (Annual 
Review 1972, Cmnd. 4928, p. 5). 
Policy trends in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly the drift into tariffs on agricultural 
imports, prepared British agriculture for entry into the EEC's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Bowers (1985, p. 73) has gone so far as to say that "entry to the EEC 
can be seen as the logical culmination of UK agricultural policy in the 1960s. " The 
CAP originated in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome which stipulated that the CAP 
should 
"(a) increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical 
progress and by ensuring the rational development of 
agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of the 
factors of production, in particular labour; 
(b) ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, 
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture; 
(c) stabilise markets; 
(d) ensure the availability of supplies; 
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(e) ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices" 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1987, p. 18). 
Under the CAP, support measures for most crops including cereals took two forms: 
"(i) intervention measures on the internal market which, depending 
on their economic nature, may be subdivided into aids for 
public and private storage, withdrawals and similar operations, 
price compensation measures and guidance premiums; 
(ü) refunds on exports to non-member countries" (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1987, pp. 47-48). 
National intervention agencies, acting as agents of the Community, would buy any 
excess produce at a minimum price and put this surplus into store until it could be 
released. Also, import prices were fixed by being subject to a variable levy which 
moved in accordance with world market prices7. 
For the formulators of British agricultural policy, entry into the CAP was, therefore, 
more a process of continuity rather than one of change, and provided an opportunity to 
compete effectively within a much larger 'domestic' market. The Labour Government 
published a broad policy statement in 1975 entitled Food From Our Own Resources, 
which stated that 
"the Government take the view that a continuing expansion of food 
production in Britain will be in the national interest. It is mainly the cost 
in sterling terms of alternative supplies from abroad which determines 
whether expansion of home production is economically worthwhile ... but the objective of Government policy will be to provide farmers with a 
prospect of stability in their returns at levels encouraging the greater 
home production which would give the country an insurance against 
periods of shortage and higher prices" (MAFF, 1975, Cmnd. 6020, 
Para. 4). 
The transition period for Britain's entry into the EC ended in 1978. Even then, the 
policy of agricultural expansion remained intact, gaining further credibility in 1979 with 
the publication of Farming and the Nation, a White Paper which outlined further 
expansion over a five year period, despite evidence of looming surpluses for most 
major commodities within the EC (MAFF, 1979). 
7 In addition to these price controls, the CAP also contained structural measures. Directive 
72/159/EEC enabled the payment of grant aid for investment for the implementation of an approved 
development plan, was aimed at farm 'modernisation', and was implemented in the UK through the 
Farm and Horticultural Development Scheme. Directive 72/160/EEC was intended to encourage small 
farmers to retire and amalgamate holdings into full-time farms, and Directive 75/268/EEC introduced 
specific types of compensatory payments to farmers in 'Less Favoured' hill and mountain areas. 
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2_: I The Social Shaping of Pesticide Use in Britain 
The thirty years from 1950 to 1980 saw a chemical revolution in British agriculture. 
Production practices were transformed and the use of pesticides in general, and 
herbicides in particular, became the mainstay of arable crop protection. Using the 
language of Hughes (1983; 1987), a technological system came into being bringing 
with it a paradigm (and a trajectory) of its own. Dominant within this paradigm was the 
view that pest problems in arable farming were best tackled through chemical treatment, 
and so scientific effort was to be devoted to continually improving the efficacy of 
pesticide use in this context. A network of actors had a common interest in maintaining 
the technological system associated with the productivist model. The network included 
the state - which wanted to contain the costs of price support by encouraging 
improvements in agricultural efficiency; the agricultural scientists from both the public 
and private sectors - whose role it was to produce the new chemicals and the optimal 
means of applying them; and agro-industrial capitals -including those farmers prepared 
to adopt, modernise and accumulate, and the manufacturers of agrochemicals and 
spraying machinery who saw their markets and profits grow. 
Between 1948 and 1982, total sales of pesticides in the UK rose from £70 million to 
£542 million (both at 1982 prices), almost an 8-fold increase in real terms. In addition, 
the number of different pesticide products available to farmers rose from 216 to 700 
(DoE, 1983, p. 3). By 1982, over 31,000 tonnes of active ingredient of pesticide were 
being applied to more than 3.8 million hectares. This was also the year that the loading 
(or dosage) of pesticide reached its peak at an average of 8.25kg of active ingredient per 
hectare (see Table 2.4). 
The greater use of pesticides contributed to improvements in yields, along with the 
development of high yielding and disease-resistant varieties, and the increasing use of 
fertilizers. Before 1939, the average yield of wheat, for example, was little more than 2 
tonnes/ha but by the late 1980s had risen to more than 6 tonnes/ha, representing an 
annual increase of around 2.6% (Britton, 1990). It has been estimated that half of this 
increase in yield was due to improvements in the usage of pesticides (Stanley and 
Hardy, 1984). 
But just as important as the widespread use of pesticides was their importance in 
transforming practices on farms. For example, there has been an increasing emphasis 
since the late 1960s on growing winter wheat and, more recently, a change from spring 
sown to autumn sown barley, both of which have been made possible by the 
availability of pesticides. Moreover, applications of pesticide, and especially 
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Table 2.4 - Pesticide Usage on Arable Crops in England and Wales(1) 
Chemical Group 
1974(2) 1977 1982 
(Tonnes of active ingredient) 
1988 1993( 3) 
Insecticides (286.7) 520.4 591.8 490.3 523.6 
Molluscicides 19.3 203.3 164.7 101.1 
Seed treatments 540.4 524.1 266.9 388.0 286.3 
Fungicides 1090.6 1402.1 3542.6 5099.9 5817.4 
Herbicides 13683.3 17275.2 24228.5 16294.5 8376.0(4) 
Growth 
regulators 71.0 238.9 1109.3 1771.1 2641.5 
Total 
pesticides 15672.1 20025.8 31390.4 27216.6 17745.9 
Area grown 3839.5 3765.8 3800.7 4025.4 4569.7 
(000 ha) 
Loading 4.08 5.31 8.25 6.76 3.88(4) 
(kg/ha) 
Notes 
1. The data are from MAFF's Pesticide Usage Survey (Sly, 1977; 1981; Davis et 
al., 1990; 1993; see also Pitman, 1992). There have been six surveys of pesticide 
usage on arable crops in England and Wales (in 1974,1977,1982,1988,1990 and 
1992). The two most recent surveys include Scotland. Arable crops are defined as 
cereals, potatoes, peas and beans, oilseed rape and linseed. 
2. For 1974 the figure listed in parenthesis against insecticides is a combined total 
for insecticides and molluscicides. 
3. The data for 1992 covers England, Wales and Scotland, which includes around 
10% of Britain's agricultural land area treated with pesticides. 
4. The reduction in the weight of active ingredient applied, particularly for 
herbicides, and the falling pesticide 'loading' during the 1980s is not necessarily an 
indicator of declining pesticide use. It is what Beaumont (1993, p. 195) calls a 
"phantom" reduction. Indeed, the area treated with pesticides in Britain has continued 
to increase (Davis, et al., 1993). According to the officials who carry out the Pesticide 
Usage Survey, the figures indicate a shift to much more potent products which can be 
applied to crops at lower weights of active ingredient per hectare. 
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herbicides, have become more routinized and prophylactic in nature as farmers simplify 
and standardise crop management strategies. This shift has been helped by the 
availability since the 1960s of pre-emergent herbicides which are sprayed onto, and 
linger in, the soil killing weeds as they emerge. As a result of the favourable economics 
of pesticide use8, the chemical option has become standard practice. A series of factors 
have also helped to close off other non-chemical options. First is the increasing reliance 
among farmers upon the crop protection advice of technical advisors from off the farm. 
This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6. Second, the routinisation of 
spraying strategies, and the widely-acknowledged reliability of pre-emergent herbicides 
in particular, makes for a much less complicated pest control strategy with less risk of 
subsequent problems in the crop. The preventative use of pesticides as an 'insurance' 
against the risk of pest problems saves farmers having to modify crop husbandry 
strategies in more reactive ways after problems have appeared. 
It can be seen from the analysis presented in this chapter that the widespread adoption 
of pesticides in British agriculture has evolved in the context of a particular agricultural 
policy devoted to increasing efficiency via gains in productivity. Indeed, the 
development of pesticide technologies, and the concern to limit the costs of agricultural 
support, have meant that pesticide use and agricultural policy have 'co-evolved'. 
Moreover, British agricultural policy has to be seen in the context of the development of 
international capitalism. As the regulationists have suggested, the post-war period was 
characterised by intensive accumulation with land and labour being exploited at 
increasing intensities. Pesticides have been a key technology in this process. They 
have been instrumental in delivering productivity gains in agriculture, helping Britain 
along the path of self-sufficiency in temperate food products while at the same time 
easing balance of payments pressures. In turn, a powerful alliance of interests 
involving the state, agro-industrial capitals and agricultural scientists were keen to 
develop and maintain a technological system which fostered chemical cropping options. 
It was not until the 1980s that the contradictions inherent in this development model 
came to the fore. Concerns about the environmental consequences of an increasing 
dependence on pesticide use in agriculture were first expressed in the 1960s (Carson, 
1963), but it took the budgetary difficulties of the late 1970s and 1980s to expose the 
technology/policy model to a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis was compounded by an 
increasingly sophisticated environmental critique of modern agricultural practices. It 
was in this context that the EC's Drinking Water Directive first highlighted the problem 
of pesticide pollution of watercourses. 
8 By the late 1960s it was estimated that farmers were able to gain £5 in benefits for every £1 invested 
in pesticides (Strickland, 1970). 
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE MODEL IN CRISIS: 
POST-PRODUCTIVISM AND PESTICIDE POLLUTION 
1 Introduction: The International Farm Crisis and the British Experience 
Since the 1970s, the productivist technology/policy model has been in crisis and the 
problem of pesticide pollution of water has emerged in a context quite different from 
that in which pesticide use was first encouraged. This chapter examines the origins of 
the crisis and the implications for agriculture in Britain, before going on to discuss the 
emergence and constitution of the pesticide pollution 'problem' in the light of mounting 
economic, political and environmental pressures within the agro-food system. 
The farm crisis of the 1980s in Britain resulted from economic and regulatory changes 
in the international food system which undermined the stability of the post-war food 
order, brought increased competition in world markets, and exposed the productivist 
model to a crisis of legitimacy. In turn, British agriculture was being 'repositioned', 
both vertically in the food system and horizontally through new competing demands on 
rural space (Marsden et al., 1990a, p. 12). While the origins of the British crisis can be 
traced back to international changes, its national expression has been influenced by a 
range of political, social and ideological trends particular to the British experience. 
Internationally, the farm crisis has been an "expression of structural tendencies, 
inherited from an earlier period" (Goodman and Redclift, 1990, p. 19). The three 
decades after the Second World War were characterised by US hegemony in the global 
agro-food system (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Tubiana, 1989), but the 
technology/policy model became a victim of its own success and brought instability to 
the international regulatory systems. Rising agricultural productivity in advanced 
industrial nations replaced the fears of the early 1970s about world food shortages with 
new concerns about over-production, trade wars and the budgetary and environmental 
costs of agricultural support. Goodman and Redclift (1989, p. 6), bringing together the 
1 Since the late 1970s, studies have pointed to the closer integration of national food markets, the 
international standardisation of technologies for the production and consumption of food, and the rise to 
prominence of multi-national food manufacturing and agribusiness companies with their own global 
marketing and development strategies, all of which have globalised and yet destabilised the international 
agro-food system (Marsden et al., 1990a; Goodman and Redclift, 1991; McMichael and Myhre, 1991; 
Munton, 1992). 'Globalisation' of the agro-food system has taken place at a time when patterns of 
production and accumulation in the capitalist world economy as a whole have themselves become 
increasingly globalised (Dicken, 1992). 
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apparently fragmented events surrounding the international farm crisis, identify four 
main components. These are: 
(a) the development in the United States of a model of technological 
innovation and market intervention for agriculture and its 
international dissemination; 
(b) the breakdown of the post-war system of regulation of world 
agricultural trade managed by the United States; 
(c) the crisis of political representation and legitimation between 
farmers' organisations and the state; and 
(d) the failure to anticipate or contain the environmental problems 
associated with the new agricultural technology/policy model. 
The first component was examined from a British perspective in Chapter 2. The 
remaining three will be briefly explored here before going on to look in more detail at 
the expression of the crisis in Britain. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, world agricultural markets enjoyed a period of 
unprecedented stability under a system ('regime', or 'international food order') 
managed by the US with its roots in the Bretton Woods agreement. The US share of 
world agricultural markets grew and by 1970 accounted for nearly 35% of wheat 
exports, 50% of maize, 90% of soyabean and 30% of cattle-cake (Tubiana, 1989, 
p. 25). This dominance, along with American domestic production control 
mechanisms, such as set-aside and storage schemes, concessionary export sales and 
food aid, kept markets stable and basic food prices low. For example, the variance 
between average annual US export prices was 0.06 between 1963 and 1972, and 0.20 
between 1972 and 1983 (Tubiana, 1989, p. 43), an exceptional level of stability because 
agricultural markets tend by their very nature to be unstable given the biological 
constraints on production and the atomistic structure of the industry. 
The adoption of the technology/policy model in other advanced economies meant that 
the US dominance of world commodity markets came under threat. In particular, 
agricultural output grew rapidly in Europe under the powerful production incentives of 
the Common Agricultural Policy. From the 1970s, the EC increased exports to solve 
its own problems of surplus production, and although US and EC export strategies 
were sustainable until the mid-1970s because of world food shortages, commodity 
markets became more volatile in the 1980s. Competition between the two agricultural 
'super powers' ended the market stability of the 1950s and 1960s, and made multi- 
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lateral trade agreements more difficult to manage, leading to rising protectionism2. 
As well as sparking controversies amongst trade blocs, agricultural over-production 
also undermined the legitimacy of the productivist policy framework. The idea of 
subsidising farmers to produce food which then had to be stored became increasingly 
difficult to defend. Moreover, surpluses were subsequently exported at subsidised 
rates, disrupting world food trade and undermining Third World agriculture. 
Agricultural policy reform assumed a much higher profile on the political agendas of 
western countries and pressure to cut subsidies mounted3. 
It was from within the context of these international geopolitical trade negotiations that 
individual nation states addressed their own 'farm problems'. Because the international 
farm crisis is, above all, a structural crisis, its effects are similar across capitalist 
countries - rising farm bankruptcies, falling farm incomes and lower returns on capital. 
These trends have, however, been played out in different ways in different national 
contexts. In the US in the 1970s, agriculture was protected from instability because of 
increasing exports, favourable world market prices and farm support programmes. 
Stability created confidence and farmers borrowed to invest in land and equipment. 
After real interest rates rose sharply in the late 1970s, highly leveraged producers, were 
caught in a debt trap which led to collapsing land values, declining farm prices and 
increased numbers of bankruptcies. Similar problems have been faced in the EC, 
although different banking systems have made producers less vulnerable to 
bankruptcies than in the US. However, declining economic fortunes have been 
compounded by policy measures to tackle over-production, such as milk quotas. 
Agriculture's economic troubles have also posed problems for farmers' organisations. 
The number of farmers has declined, their economic power has been weakened, and 
food surpluses and the high cost of subsidies have undermined the public and political 
support for farming of the early post-war decades. These difficulties have come at a 
time of rising urban unemployment and the emergence of neo-liberal economic policies 
in many western countries, both of which have led to an increasing questioning of the 
legitimacy of state support for agriculture. 
2 Multi-lateral arrangements were replaced by bilateral agreements, with trade negotiated on a contract 
by contract basis, with a plethora of different credit terms, making it increasingly difficult even to 
establish a 'world market price' for some commodities. Under these more flexible conditions, both the 
EC and the US have tended to adopt much more aggressive trade policies (Goodman and Redclift, 1989, 
p. 10; Friedmann, 1982; 1991; 1993; Buttel, 1989; Tubiana, 1989). 
3 The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations represents an attempt to address these problems at the 
global level. That these talks went on for over six years is a measure of the intractability and 
complexity of the farm crisis, as well as a sign that the crisis has also been one of political legitimacy. 
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Environmental problems associated with the technology/policy model also undermined 
public and political support for farmers. Most prominent have been the loss of 
important wildlife habitats and valued rural landscapes and the pollution of water. Soil 
compaction and erosion have also resulted from specialised, intensive and mechanised 
production practices, and there has been an increase in the levels of toxic residues in 
foods. Together, these problems have undermined the notion of farmers as working 
closely with nature producing the nation's food, replacing it with a public image of 
farmers as highly subsidised polluters and destroyers of the countryside. 
These changes provided the broad political context for the British experience, but the 
pattern of farm change has also been strongly influenced by the repositioning of 
agriculture within the food system and the rural economy, which meant farmers had to 
face two further structural challenges. The first concerns their weakening economic 
position as food producers within the food system. Farmers are receiving a declining 
share of the value-added created by the system and, at the same time, their husbandry 
practices are being increasingly influenced by off-farm interests. This is occurring 
indirectly, through the uptake of ever-more specialised technologies, and directly as a 
result of the growing number of contractual arrangements between farmers and food 
processors and retailers. 
The second challenge arises from the growing consumption demands being placed on 
rural areas. These have led to the tighter environmental regulation of agricultural 
practices, which in Britain ranges from incentives to retain 'traditional' farming 
landscapes, to requirements to change existing practices to prevent water pollution 
(Lowe et al., 1992b). Tighter regulation reflects a growing general commitment to 
green issues as well as a changing perception of the purpose of rural areas, 
characterised by a shift from food production to meeting the rising demands for rural 
living space, recreation and conservation. It is to a more detailed discussion of these 
two challenges that we now turn. 
In Britain, agriculture enjoyed relatively favourable economic fortunes during the early 
1970s as a result of the transition to the Common Agricultural Policy. However, real 
full-time farm incomes dropped by 35% between 1970 and 1980 (Howarth, 1985), at a 
time when the cost of agricultural support trebled at current prices. After 1980, 
agriculture only partially recovered and by 1985 incomes had dropped again to three- 
quarters of their 1980 level in real terms, and only half their 1970 level (Harrison, 
1989; Hill, 1990). Indebtedness also rose. Total liabilities grew from £3.8 billion in 
1979 to £10.7 billion in 1991, and total liabilities as a proportion of total assets 
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increased from 8.5% to 18.5% over the same period (Johnson, 1986; MAFF, 1992). 
In addition, more investment now comes from borrowed finance capital than re- 
invested profits. 
At the same time as real farm gate prices have declined, the share of total value added in 
the food system that farmers have been able to capture has been diminishing. By the 
mid-1980s, the farm sector was receiving little over 15% of total value added in food 
production (Harvey, 1987). Farms have been increasingly tied to input sectors through 
the development of credit links (Marsden et al., 1990b), and at the same time, food 
retailers and processors have been able to achieve more favourable market relations with 
farmers as a result of their oligopolistic powers4. 
In the late 1980s, farming groups began to point to the increasing power of 
supermarkets as being in part responsible for their own declining economic fortunes. 
Reluctant to invest in the farm sector, British food retailers have also been able to 
extend control over the production process and achieve the market relations they desire 
through 'contract farming'. This allows retailers to emphasise quality standards and 
influence the timing of planting, spraying and harvesting of crops5. While contract 
farming represents opportunities as well as threats to farmers, the premiums offered for 
meeting quality targets are often not high enough to warrant the specified changes in 
farming practices. Harvey notes the problem for farmers to be "that higher quality may 
become the expected norm for which no premium is payable" (1987, p. 155), locking 
farmers into a 'quality treadmill'. Retailers acknowledge that regulating the food 
production process is one of the principal ways that they can maintain food quality. 
The Director of Quality Assurance for Safeway, the UK's 3rd largest food retailer, has 
pointed out that the role of the retailers in meeting food safety concerns "is to ensure 
that the product will be produced under satisfactory conditions and to a satisfactory 
specification" (Cumming, 1990, p. 62). According to Harvey (1987, p. 156), the 
requirement that farmers meet retailers' stipulations "will determine their future 
profitability as much as policy decisions in the EC". 
4 Since the mid-1960s, there has been what Wrigley (1987, p. 1284) describes as "a fundamental shift in 
the balance of power in the industry away from the suppliers or manufacturers of grocery items and 
towards the rapidly expanding retail corporations". The 1980s have seen the increasing dominance of 
five companies whose combined share of total grocery sales has risen from 43% in 1984 to 61% in 
1990 (Wrigley, 1992). This economic power is unusual in international terms, with Britain's largest 
food retailers, by the mid-1980s, enjoying "profit levels, employment levels, and sheer market and 
political power sufficient to rival the traditional giants of UK manufacturing industry" (Wrigley, 1987, 
p. 1285). 
5 In Britain, contract farming - where a farmer is contracted to produce exclusively for food retailing or 
manufacturing companies - has become more common since the early 1970s, such that, according to 
Clunies-Ross and Hildyard (1992, p. 69), "most of the poultry, eggs, pork and bacon, and over 90% of 
vegetables like peas and beans are grown to the order and specification of the food industry". 
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Farming groups, complaining about the so-called 'profitability gap' between farming 
and food retailing, have noted that between 1980 and 1990, the retail prices index rose 
by 106%, food prices increased by 71 %, and yet prices received at the farm gate only 
grew by 46% (Agricultural Supply Industry, 1990a). This prompted complaints that 
"the big five supermarket chains make more profit than the whole of British agriculture" 
(The Independent, 1990), because they "are able to dictate totally what products they 
require and to a large extent what price they will pay" (Croft, 1991, p. 14)6. 
The trends identified above help to explain why one of the most consistent features of 
change in rural Britain has been the retreat of agriculture. Agriculture has long been in 
decline as an economic force7. By 1981, manufacturing employment had outstripped 
agricultural employment in rural areas and the service sector became the source of work 
for most rural residents (Marsden et al., 1991). Moreover, a shift in political power 
and the way the countryside is represented in debates over the future of rural Britain is 
discernible, with the traditional dominance of production interests being replaced by 
consumption interests. This shift, according to Lowe et al. (1990b), involves 
"a growing awareness of 'green' issues and the effects of increased 
affluence on patterns of consumption which together have led to 
pressure for environmental and 'quality of life' considerations to be 
incorporated into large areas of public and private decision making. In 
the context of the use of rural space, the result has been to emphasise the 
importance of demands for housing, leisure and amenity at the expense 
of the more traditional concerns of food and fibre production". 
The move towards a 'post-productivist' rural Britain in which agriculture plays a 
diminished role has also been reflected in agricultural policy. The Government's 
response to the declining economic fortunes of agriculture has been to promote the 
diversification of farm businesses, helping to accelerate social change in the 
countryside. More people have wanted to move from urban to rural areas, and this has 
coincided with efforts in agriculture to find new, non-farming uses for land and 
buildings (Watkins and Winter, 1988; Kneale et al., 1992). 
Such changes often leave farmers feeling that their position has been undermined by 
new social groups moving into the countryside (Ward et al., 1994). Farm 
6 Supermarkets were also accused of changing the specifications of fruit and vegetables during a 
contract, without any discussion with the producer, introducing sale or return clauses in supply 
contracts for highly perishable products, and delaying payments to suppliers (Richardson, 1991; Davies, 
1992). 
7 The shedding of labour from farms has been going on for at least 150 years, but between 1950 and 
1990 the numbers employed in British agriculture fell from almost 1 million to under 300,000 (Body, 
1991, p. 114). At the same time, agriculture's contribution to rural employment and regional 
economies more generally has steadily diminished 
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diversification and the conversion of barns means that many farmers now have new 
neighbours with quite different perceptions of the function of the countryside. This can 
lead to direct pressure to change their farming practices. More generally, there is a 
perception amongst farmers that social change is diminishing their autonomy. Middle 
class newcomers are often viewed as the harbingers of new values and procedures by 
which farming will be increasingly judged by society at large. It is against this 
background of declining public and political support, coupled with increasing 
'informal' regulation driven by social change in the countryside, that the farmers' 
experience of the farm crisis in Britain must be set. 
A sense of alienation and growing frustration is developing amongst a farming 
community that has seen the goalposts of public policy moved dramatically. The 
certainty of the productivist era has been replaced by the ambiguities of an agricultural 
and rural policy which has sought to contain the costs of production support, promote 
farm diversification, and provide increased protection for the rural environment. While 
the farm crisis has been primarily an economic one, this has been accompanied by a 
crisis of legitimacy. Indeed, the two processes are mutually reinforcing, and further 
compounded when linked to the growing concern about the condition of the farmed 
environment. 
3.2 Agriculture's Ecological Crisis in Britain 
The agriculture-environment debate in Britain dates back at least to the early 1960s and 
concerns about the impact of pesticides on wildlife. By the early 1970s, concerns had 
broadened to the loss of wildlife habitats arising from rationalisation of the farmed 
landscape. Fears were originally expressed in terms of the threat to wildlife, but 
environmental groups began to call also for the protection of attractive rural landscapes. 
Farming practices since the 1950s had reduced the diversity of habitats. Most 
damaging were the removal of hedgerows, the ploughing up of uncultivated field 
margins, the reclamation of scrub and woodlands, the reduction in rotations and 
fallows, the replacement of permanent pasture by leys and arable cropping, land 
drainage and the elimination of standing water and farm ponds, and the treatment of 
grassland and arable land with selective herbicides and insecticides. The rate of loss 
reached epidemic proportions during the 1960s when about 10,000 miles of hedgerow 
were being removed each year, radically altering the landscape of large tracts of lowland 
Britain (Countryside Commission, 1977)8. 
8 More recent survey work by the Countryside Commission and the Department of the Environment 
suggests the annual rate of hedgerow removal in England and Wales was 2900 miles a year between 
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Hedgerows often became redundant following the shift from mixed farming to 
specialised arable production, losing their purpose as livestock barriers, and the use of 
larger farm machinery required larger, more rectangular fields. In a process which 
closely parallels that causing pesticide pollution, hedgerows were removed because of 
"the effect of a system which systematically establishes financial 
inducements to erode the countryside, offers no reward to offset market 
failures and increases the penalties imposed... on farmers who may want 
to farm in a way which enhances and enriches the rural environment" 
(Cheshire, 1985, p. 15). 
Landscape change became a highly-charged issue during the 1970s as accumulating 
evidence emerged of the scale of change since the 1940s (Westmacott and Worthington, 
1974; 1984; Barr et al., 1986; Countryside Commission/Huntings, 1986). This 
evidence allowed pressure groups, such as the Council for the Protection for Rural 
England, to bring the issue to wider public attention, and to ask more fundamental 
questions about the relations between agriculture and the environment. 
The farming lobby's first response to the environmental critique was to blame bad or 
'maverick' farmers (Cox and Lowe 1983, p. 65), preferring to draw attention to the 
good stewardship of most farmers and the efficiency of the industry as a whole. 
However, as the rate and scale of change became evident, the notion of 'maverick' 
farmers as solely responsible became inadequate, especially as studies of farmers' 
attitudes to conservation revealed many who regretted the environmental changes they 
had made but feeling that they had little alternative (ADAS, 1976; LeVay, 1979; 
Worthington, 1979; Social Research Consultancy, 1982; MacDonald, 1984; MAFF, 
1985; MORI, 1987). This evidence shifted attention from individual behaviour to 
structural factors (Newby et al., 1977). Agricultural policy was blamed for 
environmental change, with the central tenet of the 'policy thesis' being that policy had 
provided farmers with access to guaranteed markets, fixed prices, capital grants and an 
advisory service, conditions that created confidence, encouraged the specialisation and 
concentration of production, increased output, hastened the substitution of capital for 
labour, and led to a more intensive use of farmland. 
1969 and 1980, rising to 4000 miles a year between 1980 and 1985 (Countryside Commission, 1986). 
Field boundaries provide important wildlife habitats for at least 20 species of mammals, 37 species of 
birds and 17 species of butterflies (Nature Conservancy Council, 1977), and so the combined impact of 
the removal of hedgerows with other aspects of the intensification of agricultural production has been 
the loss of, or damage to, many habitats and the increasing threat to the survival of some plant and 
animal species. 
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Despite broad agreement over these points, determining the precise significance and 
contribution of agricultural policy measures to environmental change has proved more 
difficult. There is a tendency to presume mechanistic responses by farmers to the 
economic signals provided by regulated markets, and then to make assumptions about 
the causes of environmental change on this basis. In an attempt to chart a midway 
course between the individualistic 'maverick thesis' and the macro approach of the 
'policy thesis', Potter (1986; 1987) combined a macro-perspective on policy with farm- 
level impacts on land use change including 'family processes', such as succession, 
adaptability and the sets of values held by farmers. He suggested that "environmental 
damage may result from behaviour which is conditioned by investment norms and 
notions of what makes good farming practice" (1986, p. 149). He categorised farmers 
on the basis of their investment style, identifying those who made systematic and 
programmed investments in land improvement as the harbingers of greatest change. 
Given the wide variety of conditions on farms, these arguments represent a valuable 
palliative to the 'policy thesis'. Farmers manage their businesses within a range of 
constraints beyond their control, but exercise options within this range. This realisation 
prompted a series of studies in the late 1980s which integrated structural conditions 
with a focus upon the internal nature of farm businesses. These suggested that 
economic and policy conditions have demanded lower unit costs, achieved largely 
through more capital intensive production systems, with farmers obliged to adopt new 
cost-reducing technologies to offset falls in real prices (Munton et al., 1987a; b; 1990). 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, new concerns about industrialised agriculture's 
impact on watercourses came to the fore. The main agricultural water pollutants are 
pesticides, nitrates and livestock effluents. In England and Wales, the number of 
reported farm pollution incidents more than doubled during the 1980s, with the most 
frequent pollutants being cow slurry (55%) and silage effluent (20%) (National Rivers 
Authority, 1992, p. 11). Pollution occurs when effluents are allowed to enter water 
courses, usually because of inadequate storage facilities or poor management. This has 
arisen primarily because a smaller number of farms now carry larger cattle herds, 
making safe disposal of effluents more difficult. The problem has been exacerbated by 
the switch from straw-based to slurry-based livestock housing systems and the 
concreting of farmyards. In addition, the increasing use of manufactured nitrogen 
fertilizers in farming is thought to have been in part responsible for rising nitrate levels 
in water. Similarly, numerous water supplies in Britain exceed the EC standard for 
pesticides (FoE, 1988). 
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The evolution of the controversies surrounding agricultural pollution have paralleled 
debates about farm landscape change. The initial response by farming interests has 
been to question the severity of the problem, and then to blame 'bad farmers'. It is only 
after strongly contested debates that the production system itself might come to be 
regarded as unsound. Indeed, it is only relatively recently that water pollution has 
become one of the most prominent environmental issues for agriculture. Lowe (1992) 
gives three reasons for the relatively late emergence of farm pollution as a public and 
political issue. First, water quality regulation prior to the 1980s had concentrated on 
urban and industrial sources, which meant that the lack of control over farming became 
more and more apparent, with pollution control oriented towards point source 
problems. Diffuse pollution creates a much more intractable regulatory problem. 
Second, the decline of heavy industries during the late 1970s and 1980s eased some of 
the long-standing air and water pollution problems in urban areas, leaving the 
agricultural sector more exposed to critical inquiry. Third, the growing recognition that 
agricultural policy provided an 'engine' for intensification led to a realisation that, 
unlike most other environmental problems, government support policies were 
implicated alongside market forces. 
In the light of the series of environmental problems outlined above, an increasingly 
detailed environmental critique of the technology/policy model emerged. Goodman and 
Redclift argue that 
"the environmental effects of modem agriculture point to contradictions 
within the entire model on which the food system is based. Modem 
agriculture developed out of the partial separation of 'farming activities' 
from the natural resource base on which these activities were 
traditionally dependent" (1991, p. 201). 
The origins of the contradictions lay in the breakdown of the self-sustaining and cyclical 
patterns of farming practice of the pre-war period. The post-war transformation centred 
on industrial technologies that "[broke] into the cycle of renewal, failing to return to the 
resource base what has been removed from it" (1991, p. 203). 
3.3 The Implications of the Crisis for the Production and Use of Pesticides 
The challenges for British agriculture described present farmers with conflicting 
messages. The demands of the food system seem to necessitate the adoption of 
increasingly sophisticated industrial technologies that commit farmers to financial 
relations with agro-food companies from which it is difficult to withdraw. The 
changing role for farming within the rural economy, on the other hand, requires that 
they take less risks with the environment and internalise some of the costs of the 
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environmental disbenefits they cause. Pressures for market deregulation in agricultural 
commodities has grown (Arnold and Villian, 1990), but at the same time the demand 
for regulation of food quality and farming practices has increased. The pressure for 
improved regulation is reflected in the recent introduction of a straw burning ban, the 
withdrawal of some chemicals, and more rigorous effluent handling controls, changes 
which now constitute a significant source of business uncertainty, sometimes requiring 
substantial investment in fixed equipment, or major changes to farming practice (Lowe 
et al., 1992a; Ward et al., 1994). 
The primary concern for farmers, however, is an economic one. Declining profitability 
has promoted a range of changes in the ways that farms are managed. At the most 
extreme, many farmers have left the industry and sold their businesses9. For those 
remaining, strategies have included the search for non-agricultural sources of income, 
the development or selling-off of land, the quest for greater efficiency in the use of 
inputs, or in some cases, increases in the scale or intensity of production. A key feature 
since the late 1980s, however, has been the growing economic risks faced by 
farmers 10, 
The farm crisis has also brought state support for agricultural R&D under increasing 
pressure (Harvey, 1988). Public funding was cut and the private sector has been 
encouraged to play an increasing role in funding 'near market' research 11. Since the 
early 1980s, the AFRC's 28 research stations and institutes have been either closed or 
9 The number of holdings of at least 2ha in England and Wales fell from 206,000 in 1970 to 164,000 
in 1986 (Britton, 1990, p. 20). 
10 Harrison (1989) has categorised these risks into seven types. First, greater risks arise because of 
higher real interest rates and greater indebtedness than in the 1970s. Second, farmers have been less 
able to sell land and lease it back from financial institutions in order to relieve their debt burdens. 
During the 1970s, financial institutions were net purchasers of agricultural land (Munton, 1985), 
although this had been reversed by the mid-1980s. Third, rapidly rising land prices in the 1970s meant 
that many farm family members (usually brothers or sisters) who had been left farm assets demanded 
that their shares be paid in cash. This meant that farm operators had to 'buy out' family members, 
often borrowing from higher cost sources such as banks, rather than the more traditional within-family 
loans. Fourth, because farming has become far more heavily dependent on manufactured inputs, 
farmers become subject to additional price risks. Fifth, economic risks increase because the farmers' 
terms of trade continue to deteriorate as the costs of inputs rise while many farm commodities 
command lower real prices. Sixth, farm product prices since the late 1980s have been far more 
variable than during the early 1980s, thus increasing economic risks faced by the farmer. Seventh, farm 
incomes, in consequence, have become much more volatile than they were during the 1970s. 
11 State support for agricultural R&D remains significant compared to publicly funded research in other 
industries. In 1990/91, UK civil provision for R&D was £2.79billion, according to the Government's 
Chief Scientific Advisor, of which £246million may be attributed to agriculture and fisheries research 
by MAFF, the Departments of Agriculture in Northern Ireland and Scotland and AFRC, equating to 
around 9% of the total (Stewart, 1991). All Government funding of near market R&D was withdrawn 
by 1991/92, because of the Government's view that MAFF should "no longer act as a proxy-customer 
for applied R&D on behalf of industry" (Priorities Board, 1990, p. 2). However, the tendency for near 
market research to be carried out collaboratively with the AFRC means that the public sector has still 
maintained partial directive responsibilities. 
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amalgamated into seven English and Welsh institutes, each with one or two main sites. 
Some 1643 jobs were lost between 1983 and 1988 representing a 34% reduction in the 
scientific workforce (AFRC, 1990). Industrial capital has become increasingly 
involved in funding near market research, and the AFRC's 'external' income from 
industry rose from £4M in 1983/84 to £16.5M in 1990/91 (ARFC, 1991a), and is 
projected to increase to £25 million by 199617 (AFRC, 1992). 
There has also been a shift in emphasis during the 1980s away from R&D directed 
towards farm based production and towards 'public good' work (AFRC, 1989; Upton, 
1991). Surplus production and environmental problems attracted criticism of the role of 
publicly funded agricultural R&D, which many saw as still being geared to increasing 
productivity through new technologies. Tudge, for example, complained that 
"not all research in food production is moving in directions that seem 
destined either to feed more people or to relieve pressure on domestic 
livestock or wildlife. Much, indeed, including much of the kind that is 
most likely to produce short-term profits, is moving in precisely the 
opposite direction" (Tudge, 1987, p. 40). 
In response, the AFRC began to stress its role in areas of public concern, emphasising 
its contribution to research into environmental and safety issues. However, despite the 
new emphasis on food safety and environmental studies (AFRC, 1991b; MAFF, 
1992), forty years of research into yield-raising technologies have left their mark and an 
emphasis on improving productivity through the application of new technologies 
remains. Key actors in British agricultural R&D, such as politicians, agricultural 
economists and research scientists, many of whose interests lie in the maintenance of 
the productivist technology/policy model (Kloppenburg, 1991; 1992), are still wedded 
to this view. For example, in addressing a conference titled 'Agricultural and Food 
Research - Who Benefits ?' (see Wise, 1991), the theme of which was that R&D 
should drive 'efficiency' and 'competitiveness' in the agricultural sector, Professor 
William Stewart, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Cabinet Office, and formerly Secretary 
to the AFRC, said; 
"The key question of this symposium is "Who benefits from agricultural 
and food research and development ?" The answer, quite simply, is that 
the UK public has benefited. However, it would be counter-productive 
and complacent if we left it at that. We now have to ask: if UK 
agriculture and food production has been satisfied; if we are now able to 
compete with the best in the world, how do we ensure that this will 
remain to be the case not only today, but equally importantly, tomorrow 
? We have only to look at the fertile lands of eastern Europe, 
performing sub-optimally at present. We note the improving agricultural 
production of our other European partners. We see the necessity to 
compete globally if we are to compete effectively. We are a small 
country, perched off the coast of continental Europe, remote from 
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expanding areas of population growth, and we see the perturbations 
which GATT discussions have on our international competitiveness" 
(Stewart, 1991, p. 8). 
Stewart's initial tenet was challenged by Harvey at the same conference. Harvey 
suggested that it was not the public who gained because the sectors providing 
agriculture with its most important manufactured inputs are highly concentrated (see 
also Ward, 1990), and so firms are able to influence the prices charged for inputs. He 
said 
"Since these firms can set their prices, they could capture the benefits of 
technical change for themselves, rather than passing the benefits on to 
the producer in the form of lower prices" (Harvey, 1991, p. 27). 
Private corporations and multi-national companies play an increasing role in agricultural 
R&D. It has been estimated that in the combined field of agriculture and food R&D, 
annual public investment is exceeded by that of the private sector (Beck et al., 1990). 
The majority of new technology is produced by companies in the agricultural supply 
industries. Accurate figures for research spending on agriculture are deemed to be 
commercially sensitive and so are difficult to obtain, but data published in the company 
annual reports show that research expenditure in agriculture is a sizeable concern12. 
The concentrated structure of agricultural supply industries mean that considerable 
research effort is required to maintain a competitive edge in product development. In 
Britain four multi-national companies control over 60% of the pesticide market. By the 
late 1980s, ICI had the highest share with 19%, Schering held 16%, and Monsanto and 
Bayer 18% each (Ward, 1990). A small number of large firms supplying a large 
number of small farm businesses, leaves suppliers able to influence, and even set, the 
prices charged for inputs. They then capture much of the benefits of technological 
change themselves. Harvey (1991) argues that rapid technological development in the 
input sector is associated with increasing concentration, increasing spatial size of 
markets and increasing R&D investment, and suggests that the fortunes of the 
agricultural sector itself may have little impact on these processes. 
The present unstable economic and political climate for agriculture has reduced 
profitability as sales of agrochemicals have declined. The fall in profitability has been 
12 For example, in 1985 Unilever's research expenditure was £253M. Of the year's main research 
projects, all but two were related to food processing and handling (Unilever Company Annual Report, 
1986). Similarly large budgets can be found in the annual reports of ICI and much of the agrochemical 
industry. For example, the newly merged companies of Schering and Hoescht to form AgroEvo will be 
spending £150 million per annum on pesticide related R&D (Davies and Whytock, 1994). 
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exacerbated by the high cost of bringing new products onto the market13. One strategy 
has been to strengthen links between innovation in seeds, plant genetics and 
agrochemicals (Kloppenburg, 1988; Goodman and Wilkinson, 1990). Seeds have 
"come to be recognised as the ideal vehicle for the delivery of agrochemicals to the 
field" (Kloppenburg, 1988, p. 246). As a result, agrochemical companies have 
acquired seed and plant genetic research companies. According to Goodman and 
Wilkinson, these acquisition strategies recognise "that the seed is central to the 
marketing of the new plant biotechnologies.... [and that] .... control over the technology 
incorporated in the seed can be used to extend markets for inorganic agrochemicals" 
(1990, p. 139). 
Major chemical, pharmaceutical and oil companies have bought more than 120 seed 
firms since the mid-1960s (Kenney et al., 1983). The most recent wave of acquisitions 
since the mid-1980s has been driven by a need to consolidate market share in plant 
varieties in anticipation of biotechnological innovations (Goodman and Redclift, 1991, 
p. 171), especially the possibility of developing varieties that are resistant to 
agrochemicals14. According to the Financial Times, 
"for ICI and its rivals, the aim is to create an agricultural package 
reaching from fertilizers, through pesticides to the plant itself, which can 
be tailor-made through genetic manipulation to fit the maker's system 
and no-one else's" (Financial Times, 13 June 1987). 
For example, seeds have been dressed with chemicals which block herbicidal action so 
they can receive applications of herbicides after planting. Usually, treated seeds are 
only able to receive applications of those agrochemicals from the parent company of the 
seed firm. However, this still represents a mechanical union of seed and chemical. 
Biotechnology, on the other hand, gives rise to the possibility of a union at the genetic 
level, with seeds being genetically programmed to either respond to, or to require, the 
application of particular agrochemicals. 
New products and practices have increasingly reached the farmer, not as public goods 
supplied by the state but in the form of commodities supplied by private interests. 
Agricultural R&D has facilitated a shift in emphasis from the farm into industrial 
13 For example, to create an adequate data package for official approval of a pesticide in the UK takes at 
least 8 years and costs at least £30 million (Marks, 1992). 
14 ICI took over Garst Seeds, the third largest US corn seed producer in 1985, Sinclair McGill, a 
leading UK seed firm in 1986, and Societe Europeenne de Semences in 1987, a takeover which placed 
ICI in the world's top ten seed producers. Other agrochemical companies in the world's top ten include 
Monsanto, Ciba-Geigy, Shell and Sandoz (Goodman and Wilkinson, 1990). ICI also unsuccessfully 
bid for the Plant Breeding Institute in Cambridge, which was privatised in 1987 and sold to Unilever. 
Concentration in the seed industry is likely to continue because the largest multi-nationals still only 
account for under 15% of total sales (Goodman and Redchft, 1991, p. 172). 
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settings and R&D can therefore be understood as "an essential component of the 
contemporary dynamic of ... accumulation 
in the agricultural sector" (Kloppenburg 
1988, p. 35). Changes in the structure of agricultural R&D, therefore, hold important 
implications for farm-based production because technologies, in both product and 
advisory form, can be used to control production and markets (Hawkins, 1991). 
The privatisation of agricultural science has led to closer collaboration between private 
companies, higher education and public sector research. For example, the AFRC aims 
to increase its research staff at universities from 9% in 1988 to 23% by the mid- 1990s 
(AFRC, 1992). Industry and state institutes require the expertise of the bio-science 
departments at universities as they start to finance projects in less familiar fields. For 
example, ICI set up academic partnerships with 30 joint post-doctoral research 
schemes, 30 schemes with research councils, and with over 200 academic consultants 
in the late 1980s (ICI Company Annual Report, 1989). Universities are quite willing to 
aid this collaboration which provides extra income at a time of funding pressures. 
Traditionally, politicians and research interests assumed that the main beneficiaries of 
new technologies would be farmers. As the farm has become a less important element 
of the agro-food complex, this assumption has been increasingly questioned. With 
declining farm incomes, farmers' willingness to adopt capital intensive technologies 
may have declined. However, the need of industrial capital to retain a market has meant 
that an innovative farming community is still required by the suppliers of agricultural 
technology. A number of strategies have become apparent. First, new technologies 
have been 'packaged' such that, for example, new seeds require the use of certain 
sprays. Second, credit and financial incentives via banks and leasing companies have 
been used to maintain innovation (Marsden et al., 1990b). Finally, firms use technical 
specialists to advise farmers on the inputs to use (Hawkins, 1991; Ward and Munton, 
1992). Even so, the economic squeeze of the 1980s has forced farmers to take a closer 
look at the efficiency with which inputs are used. The result has been that the quantity 
of pesticide applied in England and Wales (in terms of tonnes of active ingredient) fell 
between 1982 and 1988 by 13.3% (see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2). Although the quantity 
of fungicides applied grew by 44.0%, herbicides declined by 32.7% over the same 
period15. However, the increasing influence of the private sector in R&D and in the 
technology transfer system (Figure II, p. 19) has helped maintain the importance of 
chemical crop protection strategies on the farm (see Chapter 6). 
15 It should be noted again that a decline in the quantity of pesticide applied in terms of tonnes of 
active ingredient need not necessarily imply a reduced risk of pollution because there has been a shift to 
more potent products. For this reason Beaumont (1993, p. 195) suggests that the official statistics 
demonstrate only a 'phantom' reduction. 
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1-4 Pesticide Pollution of Water in Britain 
The first concerns about the harmful environmental effects of pesticides came in the 
1950s (Sheail, 1985, p. 7). By 1956, deaths of wood pigeons and pheasants were 
being linked with pesticides used as seed-dressings, although wildlife losses were 
"generally dismissed as inevitable and localised, without any major or lasting effects on 
species populations" (Sheail, 1985, p. 58). As evidence linking seed-dressings to bird 
deaths grew, pressure from conservation interests intensified and in 1962 a voluntary 
ban on their use was introduced16. But a serious debate on the future of pesticides was 
difficult to stimulate. As Sheail notes 
"It had been hard enough to persuade the sceptical and apathetic that the 
sudden losses of thousands of birds in 1960-61 were caused by 
pesticides; it was even more difficult to convince them of the more subtle 
dangers posed by the persistence of certain types of pesticide" (Sheail, 
1985, p. 86). 
In 1963, the publication of the Rachel Carson's book, Silent Spring, caught the public 
imagination with its blistering attack on the indiscriminate use of pesticides and its claim 
that long term genetic and ecological problems could result from the build-up of 
residues. Crucially, she saw one of the key problems to be the dominance of chemistry 
over biological and ecological sciences, and wrote, 
"in my opinion the chemists and the engineers are leading us into very 
grave difficulties and the biologists are not making their views known 
with anything like the necessary effectiveness" (quoted in Sheail, 1985, 
p. 88). 
Carson's claims were supported by findings of high concentrations of DDT in bald 
eagles in the US, and soon became widely cited in calls for more stringent controls on 
pesticide use. The book marked an important turning point. 
In Britain, the controversy that arose from the book prompted an investigation by the 
inter-departmental Advisory Committee on Poisonous Substances in 1963 into 
persistent organochlorine pesticides. The Government accepted the Committee's 
recommendations, banned the use of aldrin and dieldrin in sheep dips, sprays and 
fertilizers and began a review of the use of DDT. 
16 By this time, in California, Hunt and Bischoff (1960) had also established that residues of an 
insecticide could be found in fish populations, and residues were building up in the food chain. 
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The high public profile of pesticide pollution problems in the 1960s, coupled with fears 
about the threat to human health, led to a more general examination of pesticide usage in 
the scientific literature (Edwards, 1970; 1977; Irvine and Knights, 1974; Perring and 
Mellanby, 1977). A new type of treadmill - the pesticide treadmill - came to the fore. 
As Tait explains 
"the term treadmill implies a self-fuelling trend towards ever increasing 
and more expensive pesticide usage, and many of the factors driving this 
process are biological in origin" (Tait, 1981, p. 230). 
Specifically, the use of pesticides disrupts ecosystems leading to the use of more 
pesticides to maintain effective control. Either pests develop resistance or new pests are 
unintentionally created. For example, the use of a pesticide to control one pest can 
upset the ecological controls regulating other insect populations such that they become 
pests themselves, or the numbers of the pest's predators falls leading to a resurgence of 
the original pest later in the season (Metcalf, 1980). A combination of pesticide 
applications may then be required each year. Resistance is another important aspect of 
the ecological dynamic of the pesticide treadmill. Emerging evidence of pest resistance 
prompted the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) to study the 
matter (RCEP, 1979, pp. 47-50). It concluded 
"we are deeply concerned about the threat posed by the development of 
resistance to insecticides and fungicides and we are not convinced that 
the significance of this threat has been sufficiently appreciated by 
MAFF. We recommend that serious attention should be given to the 
development of strategies to combat pest resistance and to problems that 
would arise in introducing them" (1979, p. 212). 
The idea of a pesticide treadmill provided an ecological logic to help explain increasing 
pesticide use. However, while pest resistance and the emergence of new types of pest 
have been documented for individual pesticides and individual pests, there is still no 
scientific consensus on pest resistance as an intrinsic characteristic explaining increasing 
pesticide usage in general. 
The problem of pollution of surface and groundwaters by agricultural pesticides did not 
materialise until the 1980s. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, in its 
1979 study of agriculture and pollution, devoted over a quarter of its report to looking 
at pesticides but water pollution was not specifically dealt with. Instead, the main foci 
for concern were risks to human health from pesticide residues in food, risks to farm 
workers from contact with sprays, and risks to wildlife from the cumulative effects in 
the food chain. The only threat to watercourses was perceived as coming from the 
careless disposal of pesticide containers or spray tank washings which, it was felt, 
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could cause acute, but transient incidents (Tait, 1981). Otter has argued that it was an 
absence of good monitoring data that "generated an atmosphere of complacency" (1992, 
p. 1). 
Events during the 1980s have challenged this complacency, and the means by which 
agricultural pesticides pollute ground and surface waters is now the subject of much 
greater scientific effort (see, for example, Lawrence and Foster, 1987; Croll, 1991; 
Gomme et al., 1991; 1992; RASE/ADAS, 1992; Greig-Smith et al., 1992; RCEP, 
1992; Walker, 1991). This change was set in train by the EC's Drinking Water 
Directive (80/778/EC), agreed in 1980. The Directive, which became law in Britain in 
1985, set a very low maximum admissible concentration (MAC) level of 0. lµg/1 for 
any individual pesticide and 0.5µg/l for total pesticides. These were the first legally- 
enforceable, numerical standards for pesticides in water in Britain. The Department of 
the Environment has subsequently provided its own list of toxicologically derived 
maximum concentrations which drinking water supplies must not exceed (DoE, 1989). 
Most of the DoE maxima are higher than the EC MACs, but meeting the EC MACs still 
remains the legal requirement and long term policy objective in Britain. In order to meet 
the MACs, considerable additional treatment will be required at waterworks and at high 
cost (Croll, 1991). Until treatment facilities are installed, water companies in Britain 
are exempted from legal action when the pesticide MACs are exceeded providing that 
(a) the DoE's toxicological limits are not also exceeded; (b) the water company gives an 
'undertaking' under Section 19 of the Water Industry Act 1991 to meet the MAC by 
upgrading water treatment; and (c) the Secretary of State for the Environment has 
published Notices of Satisfaction17. 
The EC's MACs have been criticised by agriculturalists, the agrochemical industry and 
other commentators for having no toxicological basis (see, for example, GIFAP, 1990; 
British Agrochemicals Association, 1992; Eureau, 1992; Fawell, 1992; European Crop 
Protection Association, 1993). It is now not clear why the particular MAC levels were 
chosen. According to the Royal Commission 
"the limit of 0.1µg/1 which applies to any individual pesticide is believed 
to be based on a one-time limit of detection for chlorinated insecticides. 
As such it was regarded as a surrogate zero" (RCEP, 1992, p. 126). 
17 These British arrangements were recently challenged in the High Court by Friends of the Earth who 
argued that they constituted a breach of the Directive and thus of European law. The Court upheld the 
validity of the Government's approach after affidavits from senior DoE officials indicated that at all 
times the Secretary of State had accepted the undertakings with the intention that ultimately the UK 
would comply with its obligations. In other words, the Court was convinced that meeting the MACs 
remained the objective of policy in the UK (Macrory, 1994). 
101 
Earlier limits had been devised by American and Canadian regulatory authorities in 
1976 and 1978 respectively, based on pesticide toxicity. These were subsequently 
adopted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1984 to guide national regulatory 
authorities in setting standards18. Most of the toxicological limits were higher than EC 
MACs and were used by the DoE to inform its own advisory limits. The British 
Government has been pressing the European Commission to review its MACs for 
pesticides in drinking water, driven partly by the high cost of treating water to remove 
pesticides (Maddox, 1992). Water companies claim that they will need to invest a total 
of £800 million in improved water treatment, and annual operating costs will rise by 
£80 million a year, if the MACs are not to be exceeded (ENDS, 1992a, p. 9). 
Crucially, the EC MACs have provided an authoritative norm. They have come to 
represent the very definition of pesticide pollution as a public problem, and a yardstick 
against which the extent of pesticide pollution in water can be measured. During the 
1970s, water pollution from farming practices had become something of a non- 
problem. The water authorities acquiesced in the priority given by government to the 
expansion of food production over the curbing of farm pollution, and this led to a lack 
of effort in the monitoring of agricultural pollution. For example, schemes initiated by 
the former river boards to bring farm discharges under formal consent procedures were 
not pursued and the main river monitoring activities of the water authorities focused on 
major stretches affected by urban and industrial pollution. In any case, the periodic 
sampling procedures used were not designed to pick up the diffuse pollution typically 
caused by farming activities. Hence, there was a lack of information about the extent of 
farm pollution, completing a circle that, in effect, closed off the issue. The dearth of 
information meant, in turn, a lack of public awareness leading to little pressure on water 
authorities or policy-makers to address the issue, or on politicians to acknowledge its 
existence. What might be called the 'vicious circle of the non-problem' of farm 
pollution is depicted in Figure 3.1. It applies to the case of pesticide pollution but also 
to that of pollution from farm effluents 19. 
It was, however, the introduction of the EC MACs and the monitoring required to 
demonstrate compliance that provided the opportunity for environmental groups to 
18 The WHO guideline values are set at levels designed to protect human health. As the RCEP 
emphasises, "they may not be suitable for the protection of aquatic life. Experience has shown this to 
be the case" (RCEP, 1992, p. 126). 
19 In the case of pollution from livestock effluents, social change in the countryside helped to break the 
circle and bring the issue to wider public attention (Ward et al., 1994). Central to this process has been 
'the farm pollution incident'. The gathering, collating and publicising of statistics on pollution 
incidents, often reported by concerned individuals among the new ruralites, have provided the missing 
numbers that have enabled farm pollution to become a public issue through becoming a 'measurable' 
problem (WAA/MAFF, 1986). 
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Figure 3.1 - Farm Pollution in the 1970s: The Vicious Circle of a Non-Problem 
No Figures on 
Farm Pollution 
No Pressure to 
Collect Figures 
No Pressure on 
Policy Makers to act 
No Public 
Concern 
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quantify the pesticide pollution 'problem' for the first time. Friends of the Earth had 
been monitoring the environmental impacts and health hazards of pesticide use during 
the early 1980s (Friends of the Earth, 1985; Rose, 1990). Incidents reported by 
members of the public and local FoE groups were collated in an effort to "show that a 
major problem of pesticide pollution exists" (FoE, 1985, p. ii). Many of the reported 
incidents involved people in the countryside suffering from contact with pesticides, but 
in a few cases pesticides had entered watercourses. However, the dearth of information 
on the extent of the threat to water from pesticides was severely limiting. 
Other events in the mid-1980s combined to provide a setting within which pollution 
from farming practices gained a much higher profile. The mid-1980s saw the first 
recorded decline in river water quality at the national scale (DoE/Welsh Office, 1986), 
and this prompted a 1987 House of Commons Environment Committee to examine the 
pollution problem. The Committee concluded that growing farm pollution was an 
important contributory factor to declining river quality (House of Commons 
Environment Committee, 1987). This also came just when several environmental 
groups were becoming interested in water pollution and were keen to show that Britain 
was the 'Dirty Man of Europe' (Rose, 1990). Evidence of declining environmental 
quality was pursued as the achilles heel of the Thatcherite free-market and deregulatory 
philosophies, and the privatisation of the water industry gave a high-profile to such 
matters, specifically raising questions about how water quality should be regulated. 
The EC's Drinking Water Directive also meant that, for the first time, data were 
available on the spread of pesticide contamination of water. This enabled FoE to 
narrow the scope of its pesticide campaign to look specifically at pesticides in drinking 
water. Water Authority records, collected to satisfy the Directive's monitoring 
requirements, were surveyed and data for pesticides in water were investigated for 10 
Water Authorities and 28 Statutory Water Companies. The survey revealed that 
between July 1985 and June 1987, the EC's MAC for any single pesticide had been 
exceeded in 298 water supplies and the MAC for total pesticides had been exceeded 70 
times (FoE, 1988). The worst affected region overall was East Anglia followed by 
Thames (see Table 3.1). The report, which subsequently informed a major feature in 
the Observer Magazine in August 1989 (Observer, 1989), brought the now measurable 
problem of pesticide pollution to wider public attention. 
The data FoE published demonstrated for the first time the geographical spread of water 
pollution from pesticides (Figure 3.2). They showed that surface waters were under 
greater threat than groundwaters, and pointed to herbicides as the most common cause 
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Table 3.1 - The Regional Distribution of Pesticide Contamination of Drinking Water 
Supplies 
Source: Friends of the Earth, 1988. 
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Figure 3.2 - Areas Where Water Supplies Breach the EC Standard for Pesticides, 1988 
Source: The Observer, 1989. 
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of contamination. This finding was supported by evidence from scientific studies 
looking at the risks to water from pesticides (Lawrence and Foster, 1987; Croll, 1986; 
1991). A study by the British Geological Survey in 1986 had recognised that accidental 
spillages and container disposals were not the only threats to water quality, and 
concluded that 
"The greatest threat to groundwater quality from the normal use of 
agricultural pesticides is likely to be associated with relatively soluble 
herbicides that are very widely and regularly applied for weed control in 
cereal production" (Lawrence and Foster, 1987, p. 26). 
The region with the greatest extent of cereal production is East Anglia. Surface and 
groundwaters were monitored for pesticides throughout the 1980s, firstly by the 
Anglian Water Authority and, after the privatisation of the water industry in 1989, by 
Anglian Water Services (Croll, 1986; 1991). By the early 1990s, the herbicides 
Atrazine, Simazine, Mecoprop, Isoproturon and Chlortoluron had been frequently 
found in surface waters in Britain at concentrations up to 0.5µg/l with a maximum of 
11.5µg/1, over a hundred times the limit for drinking water (Croll, 1991). A routine 
monitoring programme began in the Anglian region in April 1985. After new methods 
suitable for the routine analysis of water for Chlortoluron, Isoproturon and four other 
herbicides became available in 1987 (Water Research Centre, 1987), these products 
were added to the list of pesticides to be routinely monitored. 
By 1990,700 water samples from Anglia region had been analysed and it was found 
that Isoproturon was the most frequently detected pesticide in surface waters, followed 
by Atrazine, Simazine, Chlortoluron and Mecoprop (see Table 3.2). The detected 
frequency of pesticide pollution of groundwaters was much less (Table 3.3), with 
Atrazine the most prevalent followed by Simazine and Isoproturon. Atrazine and 
Simazine are used widely outside agriculture, including for weed control on highway 
verges, railway land and industrial sites. The studies in the Anglian region found that 
"the quantities [of Atrazine and Simazine] used in agriculture (50 tonnes/annum) are 
much less than that required to produce the level of triazines detected" suggesting non- 
agricultural users were also to blame (Croll, 1991, p. 392). This left Isoproturon as the 
most commonly detected pesticide in Anglian surface and groundwaters solely 
attributable to farming practices. 
Isoproturon (IPU) is a pre-emergent herbicide used to kill grass weeds such as black 
grass and wild oats in cereal crops. It is a member of the urea family of herbicides and 
is applied directly onto the soil, usually in the autumn, before the crop has germinated. 
By inhibiting photosynthesis, IPU kills weeds that have either just germinated, or are 
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Table-3_. 
_2 - 
Pesticides Detected in Anglian Surface Waters 
Source: Croll, 1991. 
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Table 3,3 - Pesticides Detected in Groundwaters 
Source: Croll, 1991. 
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about to germinate at the time of spraying. First marketed in Britain in 1974, IPU is 
now a cheap, off-patent pesticide available under a range of brand names, the most 
common being Arelon, Javelin, Tolkan and Hytane (see Hassan, 1990). 
MAFF's Pesticide Usage Surveys repeatedly reveal IPU as the most extensively used 
cereal herbicide in Britain. In 1992,2,181,248 ha were treated with a total of almost 
3,000 tonnes of active ingredient (Davis et al., 1993, p. 30). Of all the agrochemicals 
used in Britain, only sulphuric acid, used in heavy doses to kill off the tops of potato 
plants prior to harvest, is applied in greater quantities. 
Pollution risks arise because IPU can persist in the soil for up to four months (Riley 
and Eagle, 1990, p. 256). The availability and competitiveness of pre-emergent cereal 
herbicides like IPU made the switch to winter cereals technically feasible and 
economically viable (see pp. 77-78). The switch also increased the risk of pollution in 
other ways. Research by Evans (1990) has demonstrated how the area of land in 
England and Wales sown to winter cereals increased by a factor of three between 1969 
and the late 1980s, and found that it is land sown to winter cereals that is the most 
susceptible to soil erosion caused by run-off. More erosive rain falls in October and 
November when poorly covered ground is vulnerable to run-off and pre-emergent 
herbicides have been recently applied. Studies funded by MAFF in the late 1980s 
found IPU present in the waters of field drains at levels of 2.16µg/l (Greig-Smith et al., 
1992), and more recently, studies by ADAS and the Institute of Arable Crops Research 
detected levels of IPU in run-off water from fields at between 60 and 600µg/l, up to 
6000 times the EC limit for drinking water (ENDS, 1992b, p. 10). Because there has 
been little systematic monitoring of pesticides in water, evaluating the extent of the 
pollution problem remains difficult. Moreover, if water is not monitored for a particular 
pesticide, then any pollution will not be recorded. It is, therefore, very difficult to be 
certain about the precise extent of pollution by pesticides20. 
The collection and collation of data on pesticide pollution has become more standardised 
since the establishment of the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) in 1990 following 
water privatisation. Annual reports are now compiled which contain the results of an 
annual technical audit of the quality of drinking water supplied by the 39 water 
companies in England and Wales (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 1991; 1992a; 1993). 
The 1992 audit found that 33 different pesticides were detected above 0.1µg/l in water 
20 The limitations of pesticide pollution monitoring were well illustrated by the case of a pollution 
incident in Oxfordshire in 1991. A small quantity of Lindane was dumped into a sewer, but broad 
spectrum analysis carried out monthly failed to pick up the incident, and it was only when dead fish 
were spotted that samples were taken. Results showed Lindane present at 220µg/l in the effluent 
discharge and 3p. g/l in the River Cherwell (ENDS, 1991, p. 6). 
110 
supplied to customers compared with 34 in 1991 and 31 in 1990; and that 3.0% of 
analyses exceeded 0.1µg/l compared with 2.8% in 1991 and 2.1% in 1990 (Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, 1991; 1992a; 1993). However, it is unclear whether this increase 
arises from increasing pollution or more effectively targeted monitoring. In any case, 
its focus is on pesticides in drinking water supplies rather than pesticides in the general 
water environment. There remains no systematic, national monitoring schemes or 
publicly available data on pesticides in 'raw water'. 
The causes of pesticide pollution and the precise mechanisms by which pesticides enter 
surface and groundwaters remain poorly understood and are now coming under closer 
scientific scrutiny (Kjolholt, 1990; Foster et al., 1991; ENDS 1992b; Mattheissen et al., 
1992; Walker, 1991; Williams et al., 1991; Carter, 1993). The ways in which 
pesticides pollute water are varied and complex (see Figure I, p. 18). Surface waters are 
at risk from the inappropriate storage and disposal of pesticides on farms, and accidents 
usually take the form of a point source pollution incident with pesticides getting directly 
into streams or rivers. Surface waters can also be polluted during and after crops are 
sprayed, either through the spraying of pesticide directly onto water at field margins, or 
through the run-off of pesticide from the land surface, or through field drains. 
The threat from run-off has been assessed as part of the 'Granta Catchment Pesticide 
Study' in Cambridgeshire, one of the most detailed studies of the movement of 
pesticides (Hennings et al., 1988; Clark et al., 1991; Gomme et al., 1991; 1992). 
Findings suggest that much of the pesticide detected in rivers had been washed from the 
land, often via field drains. This means that most pollution would be expected to occur 
during and immediately after periods of rainfall as the pesticide gets washed in 'pulses' 
into rivers. It also explains the detection of peak pesticide concentrations in rivers 
orders of magnitude greater than their background concentrations (ENDS, 1992b). 
Groundwaters tend to be at risk chiefly from the normal spraying of pesticides on land. 
Generally, between 10% and 40% of pesticides applied reach their target area (weeds or 
pests). A significant proportion remains in the soil, and this is greater for soil-applied 
pesticides than those aimed at plant leaves. Pre-emergent herbicides pose the greatest 
risks because they are applied in by far the greatest quantities and are applied directly 
onto, and linger in, the soil to kill weeds as they emerge (Foster et al., 1991). 
The science of detecting pesticides in water and tracing their movements in the 
environment is partial and uncertainties have left the issue open to contestation between 
different groups. In the main, the debate has centred on the applicability of the EC 
MACs. As a surrogate zero they embody the notion that pesticides have no place at all 
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in drinking water. This remains the view of the EC (ENDS, 1993a, p. 37) and is shared 
by environmental groups in Britain like Friends of the Earth (1993) and the SAFE 
(Sustainable Agriculture, Food and Environment) Alliance (SAFE Alliance, 1993). 
In contrast, an alliance of actors has been pressing for the MACs to be changed, 
including the UK Government (1991), pesticide manufacturers (GIFAP, 1990; 
European Crop Protection Association, 1993) and the British and European water 
companies (Eureau, 1992). Their main challenges relate to the costs of implementation 
and the scientific basis of the MACs for protecting health. The MACs are argued to be 
'unscientific' because they are not based on toxicological assessments of health risks. 
Currently, when water supplies exceed the MAC, water companies have to install 
equipment to remove pesticides from supplies. The costs of this strategy run to 
hundreds of millions of pounds (see ENDS, 1992a). Other regulatory responses to the 
problem are being considered, however. For example, MAFF are conducting a large 
review of older pesticides using stricter standards than have been used in the past21. 
Moreover, since April 1992 the use of Atrazine and Simazine on non-cropped land has 
been banned by MAFF. The ban is viewed as a precedent because it is the first major 
regulatory decision to be influenced directly by the need to comply with the EC MACs 
rather than by conventional toxicological considerations (ENDS, 1992c, p. 33). 
Regulatory pressure on pesticides is likely to continue to increase, particularly in the 
light of agreements made by the Government at the Third International Conference on 
the Protection of the North Sea in 1990 (Beaumont, 1993) and the increasing interest in 
implementing policies for sustainable development (UK Government, 1994). It is 
possible that some of the more persistent and problematic pesticides, which were once 
approved, will be withdrawn from use. Furthermore, the concept of water protection 
zones has, since the mid-1980s, been gaining acceptance among policy makers and 
regulatory agencies (NRA, 1992; RCEP, 1992) who are beginning to consider tougher 
controls on the use of polluting pesticides in specific catchments (ENDS, 1990a; 
Bareden et al., 1990; Farmers Weekly, 1990). This could follow the model of 
MAFF's Nitrate Sensitive Areas established in 1989, whereby particularly vulnerable 
catchments or aquifers are targeted for additional regulatory controls on farming 
practices in order to protect water quality. This strategy has the advantage of not 
penalising all farmers in order to solve the environmental problems of specific localities. 
21 As otter has pointed out "The lack of analytical methodology to follow pesticide movements and 
fates in the environment has led to the assessments for approval purposes being based on simple 
models with little validation. Had we known how mobile the triazine herbicides are in the aquatic 
environment we would not have allowed the widespread uses they now enjoy" (Otter, 1992, p. 1). 
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Water protection zones would mark a significant shift in the pattern of regulation. The 
focus for regulation has, until now, been the pesticide manufacturer, with chemicals 
tested before they are officially approved for sale. This means that farmers have been 
relatively free from regulations designed to prevent pesticide pollution, provided they 
abide by the manufacturers' instructions laid down on product labels. The lack of 
farmer-oriented regulation is in marked contrast to the regulation of livestock effluents 
where it is day-to-day farming practices that have been forced to change to meet stricter 
water pollution control regulations (Lowe et al., 1992a). Although there are guidelines 
on how pesticides should be used (MAFF/HSE, 1990), these are poorly enforced (see 
Chapter 7). The introduction of water protection zones would, however, mean that the 
focus of regulation would shift to the farmer, and would increase the influence of 
environmental policy over the pesticide pollution process (see Figure II, p. 19). 
In the policy debates surrounding the pesticides in water issue a slow and still 
incomplete shift in the way the nature of the problem is understood can be observed. 
Traditionally, 'economy' and 'environment' have been considered as two separate 
spheres, which has meant that environmental problems such as pesticide pollution stand 
for themselves as isolated and detached phenomena. They are solved by means of 
environmental policy, typically through standard-setting and end-of-pipe technologies 
(such as treatment facilities to remove pesticides from supplies at waterworks). 
More recently, however, the discourse surrounding 'sustainable development' has 
challenged this conception, and the economy and environment are becoming 
increasingly viewed as inseparable spheres. At a cognitive level, environmental 
problems are not isolated but impinge upon economic activity, requiring not only that 
the term 'economic' be redefined to include environmental costs, but also that policies 
focus not just on environmental consequences but on production processes and policies 
too. The implication is that agricultural pollution shifts from being a problem of 
unfortunate by-products of production to an indictment of unsound production systems. 
Thus, with pesticides in water there is an increasing recognition that a preventative 
pollution control policy requires the regulation of the ways that pesticides are used in 
production systems, rather than the current end-of-pipe water treatment approach 
(Beaumont, 1993; Friends of the Earth, 1993; Ward et al., 1993). 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has explained how the technology/policy model described in Chapter 2 
entered a period of structural crisis in Britain and elsewhere. The crisis has more than 
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an economic or budgetary dimension. Crucially, there has been an associated crisis of 
legitimacy, an important element of which has been a succession of environmental 
problems. In turn, an increasingly sophisticated environmental critique of the 
technology/policy model has emerged, and pesticide pollution has been constructed as a 
problem in this context. 
In terms of the pesticide pollution production process illustrated in Figure II (p. 19), the 
structural crisis has affected the nature of the relationship between agricultural support 
policies and R&D, technology transfer and farm management. Also, the state's retreat 
from funding agricultural R&D has enabled private companies to increase their 
influence over the production and diffusion of new agricultural technologies. 
The 1980s saw the increasing influence of environmental policy and the system of 
pollution regulation within the pollution production process after monitoring of 
pesticides in water began to highlight the spread and levels of contamination. The 
importance of water monitoring strategies and the production of quantified 'measures' 
of contamination also demonstrate how what constitutes 'pollution' is itself socially- 
negotiated. It was the implementation of the EC's Drinking Water Directive that 
brought the issue to light in the first place. Thus, not only is technological change in 
agriculture socially shaped, but also the environmental impact and the construction of 
regulatory solutions can themselves only be fully understood in their social and 
historical context. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE STUDY ARE AND FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the study area for the local empirical work, the Bedford Ouse catchment, 
is described, with particular attention paid to the historical evolution of its farming 
systems, the current agricultural structure, hydrology and local pesticide pollution 
problems. The methodology for the local empirical work is then explained. 
The Bedford Ouse catchment was selected as the location for the study because it 
appears archetypical of the agricultural pesticide pollution issue in eastern Englands. 
This archetypicality is not just a matter of numbers, although recorded levels of 
pesticide pollution are relatively high in national terms (see Croll, 1986; 1991; RCEP, 
1992). More importantly, the catchment could serve as a prototype for the expression 
and construction of pesticide pollution issues and their regulatory solutions in a national 
context. In principle, the research could have been extended to other study areas but 
given constraints on time this would have meant sacrificing the level of detail thought 
appropriate. An intensive survey strategy was preferred to an extensive one because of 
the particular interest in processes rather than patterns of change. This choice has, 
however, meant that a particular type of challenge has had to be addressed: 'How do 
you know that the area chosen is typical of pesticide pollution problems ?' 
Such a question implies that if the study area is not typical, then the study's findings 
cannot be extrapolated from the particular setting to the general issue of pesticide 
pollution. This issue has been addressed by Mitchell (1983) in relation to case studies. 
He argues that questions about typicality betray 
"a confusion between the procedures appropriate to making inferences 
from statistical data and those appropriate to the study of an idiosyncratic 
combination of elements or events which constitute a 'case"' (p. 188). 
This confusion arises from a failure to distinguish between surface relationships 
(correlations) and logical connections between features of a situation. While the validity 
of extrapolating correlations from a sample to the whole population does depend on the 
representativeness of the sample, the validity of inferences concerning the processes 
which link features does not. In the latter case, and regardless of whether the data are 
I In the early stages of the research, an interview with the Senior Water Quality Officer of Anglia 
Water Services pinpointed the catchment as one in which serious levels of pesticide pollution had been 
detected. 
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quantitative or qualitative, validity depends on the cogency of the reasoning. 
Describing a relationship does not involve the same sorts of procedures as explaining it. 
Questions about typicality usually betray more than just confusion over analytical 
practice. They also rest on the assumption that the pursuit of 'the typical' is a 
meaningful quest. In the case of agricultural pollution this assumption is highly 
dubious. Pollution problems are heterogeneously constituted, locally composed and 
locally specific (Ward et al., 1994). The research presented here could have sought to 
identify some combination of the typical arable farm and typical geography, but even if 
this was possible it would not be able to identify 'typical' pollution problems. A 
particular type of farming may be typical of a particular area, but there is no such thing 
as an area or farm that typifies pollution. In these circumstances, it was decided to 
focus on a single geographical area which was an archetypical rather than a typical 
locality in the pesticide pollution issue - the Bedford Ouse catchment. 
4.2 The Bedford Ouse Catchment Studv Area 
The catchment of the Great Ouse is one of the largest river catchments in England. It is 
usually divided into four sections; the Bedford Ouse (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1), which 
includes the headwaters from the source to Earith and has an area of 3,030 sq km, the 
Ely Ouse, with an area of 3,285 sq km, the Middle Level, with an area of 815 sq km, 
and the Tidal Ouse, which extends to the mouth of the river at King's Lynn in Norfolk 
and whose area, including the North Norfolk rivers, is 1,455 sq km. The Great Ouse 
rises at Teatworth near Brackley to the west of Buckingham, and is joined by Padbury 
Brook at Foxcote, just to the east of Buckingham, the River Tove at Cosgrove, the 
River Ouzel at Newport Pagnell and the River Ivel between Bedford and St Neots. A 
number of smaller rivers also feed the Bedford Ouse throughout its length. Most of 
these rise in impermeable clay covered catchments, their flow dominated by surface 
water run-off which responds rapidly to rainfall. Groundwater from the Chalk, the 
Greensand and the Great Oolite aquifers also contribute to the base flow of the river. 
The total length of all rivers which make up the Bedford Ouse catchment is 775km, the 
length of the Bedford Ouse itself being 108km. 
Approximately one million people live in the Bedford Ouse catchment, almost two- 
thirds of the population for the whole catchment of the Great Ouse in just over one-third 
of the whole catchment area, a population density of over 330 people per km2. The 
area has gained population rapidly in recent years, particularly as a result of the growth 
of Milton Keynes and other local towns (Table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.1 -A Map of the Bedford Ouse Catchment 
17 
Table 4.1 - The Main Features of the Bedford Ouse 
Source: RCEP, 1992, p. 208. 
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Table 4.2 - Population Growth of the Main Towns in the Catchment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Town Population % Growth 
1981-91 
1981 1991 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Milton Keynes 123,296 171,676 +39.2 
Bedford 74,300 71,635 - 3.6 
Biggleswade 10,900 12,961 +18.9 
Buckingham 5,948 9,141 +53.7 
Source: 1991 Census of Population. 
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Population change, coupled with rapid economic development during the 1970s and 
1980s, has meant that the local economic context within which farmers run their 
businesses has been transformed (Murdoch and Marsden, 1994). The Ouse catchment 
forms part of a particular spatial pattern of population growth in the South East region. 
This pattern has been summarised by Hall (1984, p. 15) as a 
"ring of strongest population growth [which] has moved steadily further 
out from London... [I] n the 1951-61 decade it was on average... 15 to 35 
miles from London. By 1961-71 it was... 30 to 60 miles away and by 1971-81 more than 60 miles distant". 
This pattern of population change is also reflected in rapid economic growth which has 
'leapfrogged' the Metropolitan Green Belt, leading to expansion in a series of major 
towns surrounding London (including Bedford and Milton Keynes). There has also 
been a parallel shift from manufacturing to service employment, and the area of greatest 
growth, the so called 'Golden Crescent', lies around the north western part of the outer 
south east region. The Ouse catchment is situated on the eastern edge of this crescent. 
Throughout the 1970s, Buckinghamshire's population was the fastest growing in the 
UK, increasing by nearly 20% between 1971 and 1981. Rapid growth continued 
during the 1980s, with the county's population increasing by a further 10% (Murdoch 
and Marsden, 1994). The Green Belt and the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty in the south of the county have meant that much of the 1980s' growth has been 
channelled northwards towards Aylesbury, Milton Keynes and the Ouse catchment. 
For example, between 1981 and 1991, the population of Milton Keynes grew by 40%. 
Farming in the Ouse catchment area has traditionally been of a mixed character, based 
mainly upon dairying, sheep and arable enterprises. The proportion of the catchment's 
agricultural land in the top quality grade (Grade 1) is slightly lower than the national 
average, whilst almost a third of the land is Grade 2, a proportion more than twice the 
national average (Table 4.3). Almost 60% of the area is Grade 3 land and 10% is 
Grade 4. During the post-war period change can be broadly characterised as a gradual 
'arable-isation'. Statistics at county level are shown in Table 4.4. For Bedfordshire 
and Buckinghamshire, the proportion of the total cropped area under wheat and barley 
more than doubled between 1959 and 1989 from 25.1% to 50.5%. The shift to cereal 
production began in the 1960s and 1970s and was more marked in Bedfordshire than 
Buckinghamshire. By 1979,63% of Bedfordshire's total cropped area was under 
wheat and barley compared to 42% in Buckinghamshire. These trends are reflected in 
the agricultural geography of the Ouse catchment. The eastern part of the catchment (in 
Bedfordshire) is dominated by cereal production, whereas to the west of Milton Keynes 
(in Buckinghamshire), the catchment has more mixed farms. Here, the spread of cereal 
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Table 4.3 - The Quality of Agricultural Land 
-------------- 
-- 
----------------------------------------------- 
% of agricultural land area 
----------------------- 
----- 
------------------- 
------------------- ------------ ----------------------------------------------- 
England Buckinghamshire 
------------------ 
Bedfordshire Ouse 
catchment* 
-------------- 
Grade 1 
----------------------------------------------- 
2.8 0.7 
----------------------- 
3.6 
------------------- 
2.0 
Grade 2 14.6 8.3 40.3 30.0 
Grade 3 48.9 67.0 53.7 58.0 
Grade 4 19.8 23.9 2.4 10.0 
Grade 5 13.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
*- estimated figures from map measurements. 
Source: MAFF, County Agricultural Statistics. 
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Table 4.4 - The Changing Proportion of the Area of Crops and Grass Under Wheat and 
Barley. 1959-89 
------------------------------------------------ 
1959 
------------------ 
1969 
------------------ 
1979 
------------------- 
1989 
------------------------------------------------ 
Bedfordshire 35.5 
------------------ 
53.5 
------------------ 
63.4 
------------------- 
63.0 
Buckinghamshire 18.3 34.3 41.5 41.6 
Bedfordshire and 
Buckinghamshire 25.1 41.9 50.4 50.5 
combined 
Source: MAFF county agricultural statistics. 
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cropping has also been more recent (see Table 4.4). 
Differences in land quality between Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire have meant that 
historically cereal yields have been higher in Bedfordshire than in Buckinghamshire. 
The graphs shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the changing yields for wheat and 
barley in Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire against the average for England. Both 
wheat and barley yields in Buckinghamshire were lower than the national average for 
most of the period 1939-1970, while those in Bedfordshire tended to be higher. Since 
the early 1970s, however, yields have been subject to greater fluctuations and the 
pattern is less clear2. 
Cereal production in the study area is affected by two main arable weeds - black grass 
(alopecurus myosuroides) and wild oats (avena fatua). It is through the relatively 
successful control of these weeds using pre-emergent cereal herbicides that the growing 
of cereals has been able to flourish since the 1960s (Wilson, 1992). Surveys have 
emphasised the durability of grass weeds, despite detailed attention to husbandry 
(Froud-Williams and Chancellor, 1982; Hollies, 1982), and so herbicide efficacy is 
usually a significant factor in determining cereal yields (Gwynne and Murray, 1985; 
Hutson and Roberts, 1987). Research by Hollies (1982) found that over 50% of wild 
oat and over 40% of black grass treatments gave better than 90% control, but 20% gave 
less than 80% control, and clear relationships were found between crop yields and 
weed prevalence. Average yields suffered by 17% from weed competition, and the 
difference in gross margins between infested and 'clean' crops was calculated to be 
about 25%. 
Black grass is found throughout Britain (Hubbard, 1954) but it tends to be most 
concentrated in the arable areas of southern England (Figure 4.4) where it now rivals 
wild oats "as the number one arable weed" (Gwynne and Murray, 1985,1985, p. 113). 
A 1977 survey recorded black grass present on over 50% of cereal growing farms in 
England (Elliott et al., 1979) with 40% of the infested acreage being chemically treated, 
most commonly with Chlortoluron and Isoproturon which "have fairly consistently 
given the best control of black grass" (Gwynne and Murray, 1985, p. 118). 
The same chemicals are used to control wild oats which only emerged as a major weed 
problem following the expansion of cereal production during the Second World War. 
Concern grew during the 1960s and 1970s to such an extent that a national Wild Oat 
Advisory Committee was set up to increase awareness of the wild oat 'explosion' and 
2 Unfortunately, MAFF ceased publishing comparable yield data at the county level in 1982. 
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Figure 4.2 - Estimated Whea t Yields (in tonnes per hectare) for Bedfordshire. 
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Figure 4 .3- Estimated Barley Yields (in tonnes per 
hectare) for Bedfordshire, 
Buckinghamshire and England. 1939-1980s 
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Figure 4.4 - The Percentage of Winter Cereal Acreage Infested With Black Grass in 
ADAS Regions in England and Wales. 1977 
Source: Elliott et al., 1979, in Gwynne and Murray, 1985, p. 114. 
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its impacts (Gwynne and Murray, 1985, pp. 101-102). The distribution of wild oat 
infestation during the mid-1970s is shown in Figure 4.5. Since then, wild oats have 
become more effectively contained in some areas, although the South Midlands and 
East Anglia remain the most affected areas (Evans and Yates, 1985). 
Since the 1970s, the Bedford Ouse catchment has continued to be one of the most 
heavily infested areas of black grass and wild oats in cereals because of its heavy soils. 
In addition, the move towards continual cereal cropping had left a reservoir of buried 
black grass and wild oat seeds, both of which can lie dormant for years in the soil only 
to germinate after being disturbed by cultivations (Gwynne and Murray, 1985). 
Data on the responses by farmers to weed problems in cereals are not collated at local or 
county levels, although there is some information at the regional level. Two points are 
clear. First, as might be expected, the regional breakdown of the usage of herbicides 
corresponds to the geography of cereal production and weed infestation. Thus, as 
Table 4.5 shows, more than twice as much Isoproturon is used in MAFF's eastern 
region (1131 tonnes in 1988) than in any other region. Second, data from the annual 
Farm Business Survey suggest that since the early 1970s, the costs of spraying have 
become an increasingly important element of total variable costs across a range of cereal 
crops in the eastern region (Murphy, 1989; 1992). For example, between 1971 and 
1991, the proportion of total variable costs taken up by spray costs almost trebled from 
15.7% to 46.0% for winter wheat, and more than doubled from 16.0% to 34.3% for 
spring barley. Similarly, between 1974 and 1991, spray costs as a proportion of total 
variable costs more than doubled from 20.3% to 43.5% for winter barley (Figure 4.6). 
4.3 Water Pollution in the Ouse Catchment 
The headwaters of the Ouse catchment lie in gently rolling countryside, but the land 
soon becomes flat and low-lying. The rain that falls on permeable chalk recharges 
aquifers rather than running off the surface, and groundwater from the chalk makes up 
about 50% of the flow of the river at Bedford. This means that seasonal variations in 
flow are less in the Ouse than in those rivers which receive a greater part of their flow 
from run-off. Smaller differentials between maximum and minimum flow also make 
the Ouse a more reliable source of water throughout the year. Thus, according to 
Warren, 
"the Bedford Ouse is probably better thought of less as a stream of water 
in an isolated channel than as only the visible part of a much larger body 
of water moving not only through the river channel but also through the 
adjacent gravels" (1992, p. 224). 
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Figure 4.5 - Wild Oat Levels and Distribution in 1976 
Source: Gwynne and Murray, 1985, p. 101. 
128 
A 
Image removed for copyright reasons
Table 4.5 - The Regional Use of Isoproturon (IPU) 
Source: Drinking Water Inspectorate, 1992b, p. 59, using MAFF's 1988 Pesticide 
Usage Survey data. 
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Figure 4 .6- Spray 
Costs as a Percentage of Total Variable Costs for Cereal Crops in 
the Eastern Counties, 1971-91 
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The waters of the Ouse catchment are an important resource for public supply and 
irrigation. The water used for public supply is returned to the river system as sewage 
effluent. The effluent makes up an important part of the flow of the river and helps 
even out flow throughout the year. Moreover, water is exported out of the catchment to 
supply Luton and Dunstable to the south, with the sewage effluent returned to the Ouse 
catchment in the headwaters of the Rivers Ouzel and Flit. Water is also extracted all 
year round at Clapham to supply Bedford. Because effluent is received from a series of 
sources upstream of Clapham and Grafham, there is "a substantial degree of re-use of 
the river water" (Warren, 1992, p. 226). 
Water is abstracted for public supply at several points along the Bedford Ouse, and 
there are reservoirs for storing water at Foxcote (just west of Buckingham) and 
Grafham Water (downstream of Bedford). The reservoirs secure local water supply by 
balancing winter and summer flows in the river. More water is taken from the 
reservoirs in the summer when the river flow is lower, and there have been pressures 
on local water resources, particularly during the dry summers of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In 1990, river flow declined so much at Grafham that abstraction from the 
river for the Grafham Water reservoir had to be stopped in order to protect the minimum 
flow stipulated in Anglia Water Services' abstraction license. The proportion of 
effluent flow in the river has risen from 11 % of the flow at Earith in 1971 to 16% in 
1986 (RCEP, 1992, p. 228), reflecting the rise in population over the period. There are 
currently 112 sewage works discharging to the Bedford Ouse, but these are mostly new 
installations with tight effluent standards. 
In the 18th century the Ouse catchment was predominantly rural and the river was used 
as a source of drinking water. The catchment was little affected by the industrial 
revolution of the 19th century. However, water quality began to deteriorate in the 
second half of this century because of the intensification of agriculture and population 
growth (RCEP, 1992, p. 208). According to the DoE's system of classifying river 
quality, the Bedford Ouse is class 1B or 2 (lower good and fair) throughout its length, 
with the exception of a short reach downstream of Brackley which is class 3 (poor). 
Agricultural pollutants are an important contributory factor to poor river quality, and 
nitrate levels have been rising since 1965 (Warren, 1992, p. 230). By the late 1960s it 
was estimated that agriculture contributed about 90% of the nitrate in the river (Owens, 
1970), and during the 1980s levels have regularly exceeded the 50 mg/l limit of the 
EC's Drinking Water Directive. As a result, water for Bedford has to be blended with 
supplies with lower nitrate levels (Whitehead et al., 1981), and it is feared that 
"additional treatment of water may be needed in future to deal with contamination with 
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pesticides" (RCEP, 1992, p. 208). Algae proliferate in local reservoirs at Foxcote and 
Grafham, both of which are filled from the Ouse, because of high phosphate levels 
caused by sewage. According to a study conducted for the Royal Commission in 1992, 
"Significant improvements in the Bedford Ouse will ... be difficult 
in 
view of increasing demands for supply from a river with an already high 
degree of re-use. Nevertheless, pollution from pesticides and nitrate is 
likely to decline slowly as a result of constraints on their use in 
agriculture" (RCEP, 1992, p. 208). 
In 1970, chlorinated pesticide levels in the Bedford Ouse were found to be around 
0.02µg/l (Billington, 1970), but since then a greater variety of products have been used 
and in much greater quantities. Surveys in the Anglian Water region have established a 
range of pesticides in water at concentrations greater than the EC's MAC for drinking 
water (see Croll, 1986; 1991), and several pesticides have been detected in the Bedford 
Ouse in recent years. The Department of the Environment has set Advisory Values 
(AVs) for pesticides in drinking water based on toxicological information, and these 
AVs tend to be higher than the EC's 0. l µg/l MAC (see pp. 101-102). In the Ouse, 
between 1987 and 1990, recorded levels of Atrazine at Clapham ranged from 0.14 to 
1.68µg/1 (AV=2); Simazine ranged from 0.02 to 1.89µg/1 (AV=10); Mecoprop ranged 
from 0.1 to 2.7µg/l (AV=10); Isoproturon ranged from 0.2 to 5.13µg/1 (AV=4) and 
Dimethoate from 0.02 to 0.94µg/1 (AV=3) (RCEP, 1992, p. 231). Isoproturon (IPU) is 
the only pesticide in the Ouse catchment to have been detected at levels exceeding not 
only the EC MAC (where it was found at over fift times the drinking water standard) 
but also the higher AVs set by the DoE. Monitoring has found that concentrations vary 
considerably from month to month, which suggests that surface run-off of pesticides 
from farmland is significant (Croll, 1991). Once again, this variation suggests that the 
timing of the monitoring is crucial to determining the levels of pesticide pollution. 
IPU, along with Atrazine and Simazine, is now seen as one of the most problematic 
pesticide polluting the Ouse catchment. Because Atrazine and Simazine are heavily 
used by local authorities and British Rail for non-specific weed control, IPU is left as 
the most serious pollutant solely attributable to farming. The Secretary of State for the 
Environment was given powers to designate water protection zones within which the 
use of polluting pesticides could be controlled under the 1974 Control of Pollution Act, 
and these powers remain under the 1991 Water Resources Act. Under current 
conditions, IPU and the Bedford Ouse catchment could be seen as leading contenders 
for regulatory action (ENDS, 1990a, p. 7), but so far no such action has been taken in 
response to agricultural pollution in the Ouse catchment nor elsewhere. 
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44 Methodology Empirical Schedule 
In the spring of 1991 a farm survey was carried out in the Bedford Ouse catchment in 
Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire (Figure 4.1). All the farms surveyed either had a 
cereal enterprise, or had recently stopped growing cereals, and all were located within 
the catchment. In total, 63 farmers were interviewed, drawn from two other samples. 
The first of these - the 'Arkleton sample' - contained 300 farms in Buckinghamshire 
which had been surveyed in 1987/8 and again in 1991 as part of a European-wide, EC- 
funded research programme examining pluri-activity and co-ordinated by the Arkleton 
Trust (Arkleton Research, 1990; Shucksmith et al., 1989; MacKinnon et al., 1991). 
The 'Arkleton sample' was provided by the Ministry of Agriculture's Census Branch 
from its list of registered agricultural holdings. A list of 300 names and addresses was 
supplied according to a standard sampling frame used in each of the 24 European study 
areas. This sample, stratified according to farm size in terms of land area, was 
designed to allow comparison between similar sized holdings throughout Europe. 
Given Britain's relatively small number of small farms in European terms, this 
sampling frame made for an over-representation of smaller farms in the 
Buckinghamshire sample (see Table 4.6). However, bias was reduced through the 
drawing of a sub-sample based in the Ouse catchment which only contained cereal 
producers because these tended to be the larger farms. Moreover, any drawbacks 
arising from bias in the original Arkleton sample were considered to be outweighed by 
the advantages of interviewing farmers who were already part of a longitudinal study 
and for whom background information on farming change was already available. 
The 'Arkleton sample' was analysed and it was found that of the 300 farms, 65 were 
growing some cereals in 1988 and fell within the Bedford Ouse catchment area. 
Arrangements were made such that at the end of each interview in 1991, the Arkleton 
researcher asked these selected farmers if they would mind being visited again during 
the following few weeks by an associate to talk about the environmental issues they 
faced. Interviews were then arranged by telephone with those who agreed, making for 
a relatively high response rate (14 refusals from 63 farmers contacted). In each case, 
the household member who identified himself or, occasionally, herself, as being in 
charge of the farm business was interviewed. 
This sample of 49 Buckinghamshire farmers was 'topped up' with a further 14 
interviews with farmers from another sample in order to increase the number of farms 
to be studied. The second sample of 79 farmers in north Bedfordshire covered an area 
which overlapped with the Ouse catchment. The farmers had been interviewed in 1985 
as part of a large study of farm occupancy and landscape change in five different 
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Table 4.6 - The Size of Farm Holdings in Buckinghamshire 
--------------------- 
Size category 
---------------------------- 
MAFF Census 
-------------------------- 
Arkleton 
--------------- 
Ouse 
------ 
statistics Sample catchment 
Sub- 
---- 
sample 
-- ------ ----------------- ---------------------------- 
No. % 
-------------- 
No. 
------------ 
% 
------------- 
No. 
- 
% 
--------------------- 
Under 20ha 
---------------------------- 
841 41.4 
-------------- 
178 
------------ 
59.9 
--------------- 
1 
------- 
1.6 
20-99.9ha 765 37.6 109 36.7 18 28.6 
100-299.9ha 374 18.4 8 2.7 30 47.6 
300ha+ 52 2.6 2 0.7 14 22.2 
--------------------- 
Total 
---------------------------- 
2032 100% 
-------------- 
297 
------------ 
100% 
--------------- 
63 
------- 
100% 
Note: The MAFF census data relates to 1989 and the Arkleton data is from the first 
baseline survey in 1987. Both these data sets contain all types of farm, whereas the 
Ouse catchment sub-sample used for the research for this thesis contains only cereal 
producers. 
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English study areas (see Munton et al., 1987a; Ward et al., 1990). The sample was re- 
analysed and it was found that 20 of the farms fell within the Ouse catchment and grew 
some cereals when last interviewed. It was possible to contact 17 of these farms, and 
14 agreed to be interviewed. This number, combined with the farms drawn from the 
'Arkleton sample', yielded a sample for the survey of 63 farmers in the Ouse 
catchment. The additional Bedfordshire farms, which were on average much larger 
farms, also provided a means by which the farm size bias in the original 'Arkleton 
sample' could be further reduced. As Table 4.6 illustrates, the Ouse catchment sub- 
sample contains a greater proportion of larger farms and a smaller proportion of smaller 
farms than MAFF's census returns indicate for the whole population of holdings in 
Buckinghamshire3. Cereals tend to be found on larger farms in the region, and both the 
MAFF Agricultural Census data and the original 'Arkleton sample' contained 
smallholdings characterised by part-time sheep enterprises and the letting of grass keep. 
Thus, there is no reason to suspect that the derived sample is not broadly representative 
of cereal producers in the Ouse catchment. 
The main objectives of the survey were to reveal farmers' perceptions of pollution 
problems and how they might be solved, to identify the economic and technological 
choices they face, and to understand how they have adjusted their practices to changing 
economic and regulatory circumstances. In addressing these objectives, and in the light 
of the conceptual approach described in Chapter 1, three main methodological issues 
were addressed. 
First, there was a concern to go beyond the enumeration of attitudes and to avoid 
imposing definitions upon the interviewees. It was intended to capture farmers' own 
representations of pollution problems and to understand how their interests and actions 
are constituted. These matters raised issues of question type and design. In general, 
researchers of agricultural issues tend to use highly structured surveys, but it was felt 
that this survey should include open-ended questions. Second, some quantitative data 
were needed, primarily relating to the farm, its enterprises and farming practices, in 
order to set other responses in context. A balance had to be struck between quantitative 
and qualitative questions, bearing in mind the need to avoid too lengthy an interview. 
Third, the topic of study was a contentious issue for the farming community. In the 
main, farmers feel defensive about environmental issues, and feelings have been 
running high in the aftermath of a whole series of food safety and environmental scares 
in which the finger had been pointed at the farmer. Any farmer who had been 
3 It must be made clear, however, that this comparison is between a sample of farms in the Ouse 
catchment which straddle Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire, although more than three-quarters of the 
farms fall within Buckinghamshire, and MAFF returns for just Buckinghamshire. 
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prosecuted in the courts for a pollution offence would be likely to be particularly 
sensitive to ill-considered questioning. 
Following standard practice (Fowler, 1988) a pilot study was organised to test the first 
draft of the questionnaire. Particular emphasis was placed on checking the clarity of the 
questions, the consistency of farmers' understanding of the terms used, the quality of 
their responses, as well as their sensitivity to the emotive issues to be probed. The pilot 
study also enabled the identification of additional questions and the removal redundant 
ones. Ten farmers were interviewed in June 1990 for the pilot study. The sample was 
drawn from earlier studies (Munton et al., 1987a) and consisted of farmers who had 
been noted as 'good respondents' in field notebooks. The interviews were tape- 
recorded and subsequently transcribed, and the results used to develop the final survey 
questionnaire. Farmers included in the pilot survey were excluded from the main 
survey. 
The pilot survey identified a number of important issues in the development of the 
questionnaire. Firstly, the ordering of the questions was critical. The quality of 
responses and the general tone of the interviews improved if more general questions 
about farm characteristics were asked first and the more specific and detailed questions 
about pesticides and pollution problems were left until later. Farmers were much more 
willing to explain how they felt about pesticides and pollution issues once they were 
confident that the research was intended to study farmers' problems and its findings 
were not to be used as further criticism of farming practices per se. Secondly, the 
breadth of some of the issues, combined with the level of detail required, meant that 
there were pressures on time. It was, therefore, important that any overlap amongst 
open-ended questions be minimised. Any questions requiring a simple 'yes' or 'no' 
answer, or straight-forward factual responses, were put into a 'tick-box' form. Where 
possible, farmers were passed a card with optional responses listed on it. Thirdly, 
problems with differing interpretations of some terms were highlighted. For example, 
it became evident that the farmers in the pilot survey had a narrower definition of 
technology than expected. They seemed to see technology as primarily computers, 
electronics and big, complicated machines. Hence the term 'products and practices' 
replaced technology in the final questionnaire. Finally, it became clear that farmers 
were more prepared to talk about the environmental consequences of agriculture in 
general and about 'other farmers" practices than to consider the impact of their own 
farming procedures. It therefore became necessary to address this issue in a more 
subtle and indirect way. 
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In consequence, the questionnaire was redesigned so that the interviews would take the 
form of 'structured' or 'mapped' conversations rather than simply lists of questions 
'fired' at the farmers. As well as redesigning particular questions, removing some and 
including new ones, the questionnaire was ordered such that sections logically followed 
on from one another. (A transcription of a pilot interview is included in Appendix A 
and the full questionnaire for the farm survey is included in Appendix B). 
The first section of the final questionnaire was designed to elicit straight-forward factual 
information on the general characteristics of the farm business and household, with 
particular emphasis on how, and why, circumstances had changed during the period 
1981-1991. As the survey involved returning to farms which had already been studied, 
much of this section was a matter of checking on the accuracy of existing data which 
had been transposed from earlier questionnaires, and filling-in gaps and bringing 
material up to date. 
In the second section, the style of the questions differed. Here the aim was to gather 
material on farmers' motives, ethos and aspirations, on their perceptions of the choices 
and constraints which they face, and on their expectations of the future, including 
succession to the business. The concept of the family's farming 'strategy' was of 
particular interest. It was also hoped to tease out the role of environmental perceptions 
in the construction of the farmer's business tactics and self-image. Responses were 
intended to shed light on what drives change on farms, in order to help understand the 
different approaches to pollution control adopted by farmers which were addressed later 
in the questionnaire. The third section examined farmers' understanding of the role of 
technology. It probed, inter alia, who, in their view, gained from technological change 
and where they believed technological change was heading. 
By this stage, about half way through the interview, responses elicited a strong sense of 
the characteristics of the farm household and business, how and why these had changed 
during the 1980s, how the philosophy or style of farming was perceived and justified, 
and in which direction it was hoped the farm business would develop in the future. 
Pollution had not been raised explicitly by the interviewer and if the environment had 
cropped up in discussion, it would have been at the farmer's instigation. The next 
section of the questionnaire tackled environmental issues. These were introduced by a 
question about environmental damage with the words "some people say that... ". By 
these means it was hoped that the interviewer could remain disassociated from criticism 
of the farming community. The following questions then invited farmers to discuss 
how environmental concerns had affected their farming and to outline any experiences 
they had had of direct pressure to alter their ways from neighbours or officials. 
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The more contentious pollution issues were then introduced into the conversation 
indirectly' by means of a question on sources of advice concerning various farming 
activities, including drainage, crop nutrition and pesticide use. This question provided 
the critical link with the next section which elicited specific technical details on farming 
practice in relation to potentially polluting activities. The key questions covered how 
and why herbicide use had changed, and what determines when and how agrochemicals 
were applied. A series of questions followed which related to farmers' perceptions of 
the scale of agricultural pollution in relation to that from other industries and the nature 
and effectiveness of pollution regulations. Scenarios were used to establish farmers' 
preferred policy options for the regulation of pollution, and their perceptions of the 
impact of different regulatory regimes on their own businesses. Finally, farmers were 
asked about any contact they had had with the NRA and HSE, and how they personally 
viewed NRA and HSE staff and their styles of regulation. 
The main farm survey took place between April and June 1991. Most interviews lasted 
between one and one and a half hours, although several lasted over two hours, and the 
longest took over three. The material collected via the questionnaire was supplemented 
by a field notebook in which additional details were recorded immediately after the 
interview. The main points covered in this less formal way were the tone of the 
interview, the quality of the farmer as a respondent, the appearance of the farm, and any 
particularly instructive or revealing responses. This material proved useful in assisting 
with the post-coding of data and the interpretation of the questionnaire responses. 
The farm survey work was supplemented by semi-structured interviews with officials 
and representatives from farming and environmental groups and other actors in the 
science and policy world. Here, besides eliciting views and perceptions of the pesticide 
pollution problem and how it might be solved, information was also sought on how 
interviewees had participated in certain key developments, such as the drawing up of 
the revised Code of Good Agricultural Practice and the implementation of regulatory 
policy. In effect, the interviews in many cases were part oral history (see Thompson, 
1978). 
For this reason the structure of the interviews was necessarily quite loose. The actors 
interviewed were located at different places in the network and their roles were 
generally particular to the individual, so it would not have been sensible to ask each of 
them exactly the same set of questions. Rather, each interview was approached through 
a number of issues and themes which it was hoped that the interviewee would be 
prepared to discuss. This stimulated particular lines of thinking, and various devices 
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were used to keep the conversation open. These included letting the interviewee speak 
in his or her own terms, avoiding interruptions except for purposes of clarification or 
when time was short and important issues remained to be covered, and asking, once the 
prepared themes had been covered, whether there was anything else that the interviewee 
wanted to discuss. Each interviewee's position and role in the network was always 
established, along with the nature and extent of his or her participation in the pollution 
issue. Frequently, it was found that on reflection points needed clarifying or new 
questions arose. These were pursued by letter or telephone. 
A 'snowball method' was used to identify prospective interviewees in the science and 
policy arenas. Information obtained from official publications identified a number of 
key witnesses. They in turn suggested other people who had played key roles or who 
might otherwise assist, and so on. Most of the interviews were attended by at least two 
members of the PATCH research team (see Footnote 3 on p. 16) and notes taken during 
each interview were fleshed out in more detail immediately afterwards. Interviews were 
then typed up as soon as possible. Not all interviews were carried out by the author, 
although all interview transcripts from the PATCH Programme have been made 
available for the research informing this thesis4. 
This type of interview provided rich data. The methods were sufficiently detailed for 
the results to be taken as accurate and believable accounts of individuals' views and 
experiences. In some cases, however, especially those of policy actors, they are 
unlikely to be complete accounts, either because particular questions were not asked or 
because the person concerned preferred not to comment. Nonetheless, the results are 
regarded as sufficient for the purpose of attempting to analyse the phenomenon of 
pesticide pollution and the construction of solutions to it. 
4.5 General Characteristics of the Ouse Catchment Farm Sample 
The 63 farms in the Ouse catchment sample could not be said to form a group of 
traditional 'family farms' as described elsewhere in the literature (see Symes and 
Appleton, 1986; Marsden et al., 1989). They compare more directly with the kinds of 
unit in Buckinghamshire described by Marsden et al. (1991) and those in Bedfordshire 
described by Munton et al. (1987a). Farm business ownership, for example, is 
complex and differentiated. While almost two-thirds of the farms (40 farms, 63.5%) 
were owned as family partnerships, only a fifth (13 farms, 20.6%) were owned by 
'sole operator' individuals and about a sixth (10 farms, 15.9%) were limited companies 
4A list of those actors interviewed is included as Appendix C, and the list differentiates between those 
interviews that were carried out by the author and those conducted and transcribed by colleagues. 
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owned and usually managed by company directors. The trend during the 1980s was a 
gradual move towards more complex forms of business ownership. Twenty-four 
proprietors (38.1 %) altered the structure of their businesses, although the vast majority 
concerned personnel changes within family partnerships. Eighteen of the changes 
involved either a new partner entering the business or an older partner retiring, or both. 
The remaining changes involved the establishment of limited companies and family 
partnerships. Traditional, local farming families appeared less dominant than in other 
areas of Britain (Marsden et al., 1987; 1989; 1992b) and over 60% of the farmers 
surveyed said that they had no other close relatives involved in farming in the local area 
(north Buckinghamshire and north Bedfordshire). 
A variety of agricultural enterprises were found among the sample. A third were arable 
farms with no other agricultural enterprises. Just over a quarter (17 farms, 27%) were 
mixed arable and livestock farms where the farmer considered the arable enterprise to be 
the most important in economic terms. Fourteen farms (22%) were mixed enterprises 
but chiefly dairy farms, and 9 farms (14%) were mainly sheep, beef or pig farms. On 
three farms, all arable land had been entered into set-aside schemes since 19885. The 
mix of farm enterprises varies with the geography of the study area, with mixed arable 
and livestock farms being more numerous in the western part of the catchment while 
larger, wholly arable farms dominated the area to the east of Milton Keynes. 
The mean farm size for the sample was 217 hectares (541 acres) and the median was 
158 hectares (390 acres). Average farm size varied considerably according to the mix 
of farm enterprises. As Table 4.7 shows, those farms that were wholly arable had by 
far the largest average size. The average size of the 14 farms in the sample where 
dairying was the most important enterprise was less than half that of the specialist arable 
farms. Not surprisingly, the average area of land under cereals in 1991 was greatest 
for the wholly arable farms, and least for the dairy farms. 
Farm size is also linked to business organisation. The limited companies tended to be 
much larger businesses and averaged 484 hectares in size. This compared with an 
average of 182 ha for the family partnerships and 121 ha for the sole operator 
businesses. During the period 1981-1991,22 of the farms (34.9%) grew in size, 28 
farms (44.4%) stayed the same, while 13 (20.6%) experienced a net loss of land. It 
was, on average, the larger farms that were more likely to grow and smaller farms that 
were more likely to shed land. The average size of the 'expanders' was 313 ha 
compared with 137 ha for those that experienced a net reduction, and 180 ha for those 
5 Those farmers who had ceased growing cereals were asked about pesticide use, advice and cropping 
arrangements at the time when they last grew cereals, which would have been at least as recent as 1988. 
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Table 4.7 - Farm Enterprises. Average Size and Area of Cereals 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Farm Type No. of Mean Farm Mean Area 
farms Size (ha) under cereals 
in 1991 (ha) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arable 20 (32%) 310.2 173.0 
Mixed 
(mainly arable) 17 (27%) 225.4 117.6 
Mixed 
(mainly dairy) 14 (22%) 131.4 44.4 
Mixed 
(mainly sheep, 
pigs or beef) 9 (14%) 167.2 64.3 
Other 
(e. g. set aside) 3 (5%) 106.7 0.0 
Source: Fann survey. 
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that did not change. The 'expanders' grew in size by an average of 71 ha (22.7%) 
between 1981 and 1991, while those that got rid of land shrank in size by an average of 
27 ha (19.7%). 
Tenure and land rights were also subject to restructuring during the 1980s. In 1991, 
almost two-fifths of the sample (24 farms, 38.1%) were wholly owner-occupied farms, 
27 farms (42.8%) were mixed owner-occupied and rented, and under two-fifths (12 
farms, 19.0%) were wholly rented. Taking the farmed area of the sample as a whole, 
the farms covered 13,702 ha (33,855 acres) of the catchment area, 9,792 ha (71.5%) of 
which was owner-occupied land, 3426 ha (25.0%) was securely rented as defined 
under the Agricultural Holdings legislation, and just 484 ha (3.5%) was rented under 
insecure leases. As Table 4.8 shows, the total area farmed by the 63 farms increased 
by 1217 ha (9.7%) between 1981 and 1991, with land under insecure leases expanding 
by over 20%, land under owner-occupation increasing by 17% and land rented under 
secure leases falling by 17%. 
There is no reason to suppose that the 63 farms do not comprise a broadly 
representative sample of cereal producers in the Ouse catchment in terms of the range of 
sizes present, the types of enterprise and the various ownership arrangements. Indeed, 
the farm characteristics and types of changes outlined above broadly parallel those of 
other studies and so, in the context of the recent literature, can be said to be fairly 
typical of recent trends more generally (Carr, 1988; Munton et al., 1987a; b; Whatmore 
et al., 1987b). 
In Part III of the thesis, some of the material obtained from the farm survey will be 
presented to illustrate the current context for farmers' pesticide practices. In Part Ia 
particular conceptualisation of pesticide use and pollution was developed in which 
emphasis was placed on farmers' actions in the context of the historical evolution of a 
technological system. In Part II the historical evolution of pesticide use in association 
with British agricultural policy was examined, along with the onset of the crisis of 
productivism in the 1980s and the emergence of pesticide pollution as an issue of public 
and political concern. Part III goes on to use the empirical material to explore the 
contemporary conditions surrounding pesticide use and pollution in a particular locality. 
In the empirical analysis, the sample size is not large enough to support detailed 
statistical analysis of sub-groups of the sample. No attempt will be made to use 
statistical analysis to identify causal relationships between farm or farmer type and 
pesticide practices. Instead, the main analytical task is to identify key characteristsics 
among the sample in relation to families' farming strategies, farmers' understandings of 
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Table 4,8 - Net Change in the Area Occupied - 1981-91 (ha) 
------------- 
DDat 
-------------------- 
Owner 
---------------- 
Secure 
------------------- 
Insecure 
------------------ 
Total 
Occupied Leased Leased 
------------- 
1981 
-------------------- 
8382 
---------------- 
3701 
------------------- 
402 
------------------ 
12484 
Gains +1509 + 190 +121 +1820 
Losses - 98 - 465 - 40 - 603 
Net +1410 -275 + 81 +1217 
1991 9792 3426 484 13702 
% change 
1981-91 +16.8% -7.4% +20.2% +9.7% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
% of 1991 
total 
farmed 71.5% 25.0% 3.5% 100% 
area 
Source: Farm survey. 
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environmental problems and pollution, pesticide practices and attitudes to advice, and to 
explore the spread of different traits through the sample. 
In the next chapter the experiences of the sampled farmers during the agricultural crisis 
of the 1980s are examined, along with their strategies for coping with their rapidly 
changing contexts, their understandings of environmental change and their pesticide 
practices. Chapter 6 then examines in detail the role of technical advisors in farmers' 
decisions about which pesticides to use and how to use them. 
In Chapter 7, farmers' understandings of the nature of the farm pollution problem in the 
Ouse catchment are explored and their views are compared with those of a sample of 
dairy farmers interviewed in Devon in 1991 as part of the PATCH research programme 
(see Footnore 3, p. 16), before going on to examine farmers' relations with the 
regulatory authorities and their possible responses to restrictions on herbicide use. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
AGRICULTURAL RESTRUCTURING AND 
CHANGING PESTICIDE PRACTICES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter empirical evidence is presented to describe and account for change 
during the 1980s on the sampled farms in the study area. The varying strategies 
employed by farm households are examined, and particular attention is paid to the 
reorganisation of farm enterprises and farming practices and the search for new forms 
of income through diversification and land development. Farmers' philosophies, their 
representations of farm 'improvement' and 'nature' and their responses to increasing 
environmental concern are explored, before discussing how pesticides are used and 
understood. 
The analysis will seek to demonstrate how pesticide practices, and the ways these 
change over time, are subject to different sets of sociological and economic processes. 
Pesticide practices need to be set within an understanding of farm business and 
household development trajectories and, in particular, the changing economic 
importance of arable production. A farm household almost totally dependent on cereal 
production provides a quite different context for pesticide use to one where, for what 
ever reason, the goal for farm production is simply to break even. Moreover, pesticide 
usage is closely bound up with farmers' 'ways of thinking' about what constitutes good 
farming, healthy farms and improving the land. 
5.2 Heterogeneity and Agricultural Change 
A recurring theme in Part I was the marked shift in the 1980s in the structural 
conditions within which farmers operate. As the economic fortunes of British 
agriculture entered a period of steady decline unprecedented in the post-war period, 
certainty became replaced by uncertainty. Farm households sought to ensure survival 
by means of a range of different strategies. For example, land and business ownership 
arrangements have been restructured and labour has been shed, while some farm 
enterprises have been rationalised or closed down, and others have sought new sources 
of non-agricultural income. As it has become more difficult for farm families to make a 
living from farm-based production, so the variation in survival strategies has increased. 
Indeed, differentiation has become an important feature of the 'post productivist' period 
for British agriculture. At first glance, the 63 farms surveyed in the Ouse catchment 
provide a relatively coherent sample. All the farms fall within the same river catchment, 
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and all grew some cereals (wheat, barley or oats) in the 1987/88 season. Yet, despite 
these commonalities, the sample is highly differentiated in terms of what farm families 
are doing and for what reasons. 
Falling profitability has been a key feature of the 1980s for farm businesses in Britain 
(see pp. 87-89). Farms in the Ouse catchment have been no exception, with declining 
financial returns from agricultural production a common experience. Farmers were 
asked if their farm businesses had made a profit, a loss or broken even, taking the 
results from the three most recent financial years together (i. e. April 1988-March 1991). 
Just under half the farmers (31 farms, 49.2%) claimed to have made a profit, five of 
whom emphasised that the profit was 'only slight'. Twenty businesses made a loss and 
12 had broken even. When asked how viability had changed during the 1980s, 50 
farmers (79.4%) said that their economic returns had declined, and nine said that they 
had increased, with no change on four farms. Static or falling real prices and rising 
costs of production were the main reasons cited for falling profits. 
Producer prices for agricultural products have been declining in real terms since the 
1950s, except for a five year period in the mid- 1970s following Britain's entry into the 
EC and the world economic crisis of 1973. Since the 1970s, the downward trend has 
resumed and at a faster rate. Producers' real prices have been falling at an annual rate 
of 1.9% since 1974, but the decline since 1976 has been at an annual rate of 4.4% 
(Britton, 1990, p. 10). There has been additional downward pressure on cereal prices 
since the mid- 1980s as the EC has sought to tackle the budgetary problems caused by 
over-production. In 1986 the Commission introduced a 'co-responsibility levy' to 
penalise producers for over-production, followed in 1987 by a stabilizer package which 
set a production threshold for the EC of 160 million tonnes. By limiting intervention 
buying, farmers suffered because of the price penalties attached to the production 
threshold (Neville-Rolfe, 1990). 
As well as financial pressures on cereal production, EC steps to control over-production 
in other commodities have also affected agriculture in the Ouse catchment. For 
example, 14 farms in the sample were mainly dairy units and a further eight had gone 
out of dairying during the 1980s. For these farmers, the 1980s had proved to be a 
tumultuous time with the introduction of milk quotas in 1984. The move caused 
surprise and consternation among dairy farmers who found their milk production was 
suddenly restricted to an amount 9% less than their 1983 output. However, once dairy 
farmers had recovered from the initial shock, it became accepted that the quota system 
did at least provide some stability for their sector. In addition, milk quotas helped, at 
least temporarily, to avoid the sharp price reductions that soon were to be visited on 
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other sectors and through the late 1980s dairying was the most profitable farming sector 
(MAFF, 1992). However, since their introduction, milk quotas have been cut 
periodically in order to bring output more into balance with consumption within the EC, 
and the quota for 1991-92 was only 81% of the 1983 production level. Moreover, in 
1990-91 the net price received for milk in the UK fell in absolute terms for the first time 
since 1984 (Federation of United Kingdom Milk Marketing Boards, 1991, p. 104). 
Not surprisingly then, 55 of the 63 farmers (87.3%) cited financial pressures as the 
most important difficulty they faced. Not only were prices for farm produce static or 
falling in real terms, while the costs of labour, machinery and other inputs continued to 
rise, but at the time of the survey (April-June 1991) interest rates were at historically 
high real levels, causing extra difficulties for those with mortgages or overdrafts. The 
sense of despair was widespread and deeply felt. One farmer explained; 
"This last three years, the whole business feels like it's ground to a halt. 
You don't know what to do or where to go... There is a lack of profit to 
reinvest and you don't feel the farm is going forward. It's very difficult 
to accept after a period of expansion and improvement " [Farmer 
interview no. 29]. 
The second most prevalent difficulty cited by the farmers, and exaggerated by the first, 
was uncertainty (mentioned by 20 farmers, or 31.7%). It derived from a variety of 
specific concerns. Firstly, two sets of international negotiations were underway at the 
time of the survey and their implications for British agriculture were the source of much 
speculation in the farming press. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was to be 
reformed with the aim of cutting subsidies, while negotiations under the Uraguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were also seeking to move farm 
prices closer to world market levels. The two sets of negotiations left farmers feeling 
insecure about future farm prices and contemplating the prospect of compulsory set- 
aside for cereal land under a reformed CAP. In addition, the day to day uncertainty of 
the markets, particularly for beef and sheep, was unsettling those farmers with 
livestock, as were fears over the future of milk quotas. Concern centred on the 
regulation of markets by politicians and bureaucrats, and especially those in Brussels. 
Nineteen farmers (30.2%) also pointed to increased regulations. Regulations relating to 
the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) had been introduced in 1988 
and were a major source of complaint (see also Blake, 1991). They required, inter alia, 
that farmers assess the risks to workers and the environment posed by pesticide use and 
record these on paper as a 'COSHH assessment'. One farmer complained that "you are 
required to be a walking encyclopedia". In addition, a straw burning ban was about to 
be introduced. Other types of environmental regulation were also cited as posing 
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'major problems'. Nine of the 19 farmers who complained about greater regulation 
specifically mentioned the control of water pollution. Most of these had significant 
livestock enterprises. As one farmer with a large beef herd explained 
"Complying with all the regulations [is a major difficulty]. It's 
impossible to keep up with them all. The National Rivers Authority will 
cost farmers more than ever and will drive a lot out of dairying" [Farmer 
interview no. 35]. 
Only three mentioned controls on agrochemical use. There was a feeling that COSHH, 
in particular, was far too detailed in its application to agriculture. One farmer, running a 
170 ha beef and arable farm, exclaimed that 
"Increasing water pollution legislation [is a major difficulty]. I can cope 
at the moment but if more agrochemical restrictions are introduced, or 
new legislation on nitrogen.... Quite a lot of these things keep coming 
along. Often you can comply with the spirit of them but not the 
letter-and there's always a cost involved" [Farmer interview no. 40]. 
Related to increased regulatory interference was concern at the changing public 
perception of agriculture. Seventeen farmers (27%) cited this as a major difficulty. 
Most farmers viewed their falling public standing as closely bound up with increasing 
environmental controls over farming practices (see also Ward et al., 1994). Difficulties 
often manifested themselves in conflicts between farmers and non-farming people in 
rural communities, and access had become a point of conflict for four farmers. But 
most complaints were less specific and were aimed at the media's representation of 
farmers and environmental problems. One particularly bitter farmer in his 50s 
complained; 
"The bloody public have become anti farming and want to take over the 
countryside. They want to mind their own business. They think they 
own the place. It gets my back up" [Farmer interview no. 44]. 
Ask any profession to list the major difficulties they face, and lack of money is sure to 
rank high on the list. However, amongst the farmers interviewed there was a very 
strong sense that they were experiencing financial pressures the like of which they had 
not known before. This was combined with a sense of frustration and helplessness 
arising from a lack of control over their destinies. A frequent comment was that even 
by working harder and harder, the situation could be little improved. For some, the 
sense of despair was forcing a rethink about continuing in farming. One farmer who 
had been required to lay off his farm-hand through financial pressures, and was also 
considering seeking work off the farm, candidly explained, 
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"The job has become very insular. You are stuck on the farm and you 
can go 3 days without seeing anyone else apart from the family. You 
can get a bit fed up with your own company. I miss my man. You 
know, Ifi nd it harder to motivate myself' [Farmer interview no. 39] . 
It was not surprising then, that when the farmers were asked if they felt that things were 
more difficult for them in 1991 than they had been 10 years earlier, the response was 
emphatic. Only two farmers felt that things had improved. One had been establishing 
himself in business in the early 1980s and felt that he was in a more secure position 
now. The other was an elderly farmer in his 60s who was running down his business 
before retirement and was enjoying new vocations. The important point is the strong 
sense that things were getting worse. Many felt they had to work harder and yet they 
were losing public and political support. 
A particular source of pressure was the level of borrowing. Eighteen farmers (28.6%) 
had mortgages for the purchase of land, most of which were taken out with banks, 
although 7 were with the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation. Forty-three farmers 
(68.3%) had loans for other purposes, 29 for machinery, and 36 had overdrafts. Table 
5.1 shows the level of indebtedness among the sample. Although data on change in the 
level of indebtedness was not systematically collected, many farmers commented that 
their debts had increased in recent years at a time of low incomes. Whilst a quarter of 
the sample had no borrowings, on 18 farms (28.6%) over a quarter of annual farm 
income was taken up by loan repayments and interest. 
Tighter financial conditions were forcing a range of responses. 'Family farming' is less 
dominant in Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire than might be found in other parts of 
Britain (Whatmore et al., 1987b), and this was reflected in the sample. At one extreme 
was a group of large farming companies, whose origins may have been as large family 
farms, sometimes employing managers to oversee the day-to-day running of the 
farming operations. At the other extreme, was a group of smaller farms where the 
operators had significant business interests outside agriculture and could, therefore, be 
described as part-time or hobby farms. Between them were family farms where the 
interests and aspirations of family members were more closely linked with the fortunes 
of the farm business. The strength of the family's ties to the farm is often derived from 
a combination of the historical pattern of land ownership and future plans for the 
business, and it is notable that over a third of the farmers interviewed (22 or 34.9%) 
had not taken over the farm business from another family member, and only 34 farmers 
(53.9%) were planning to pass on the farm to the next generation in the family. A 
study in Buckinghamshire in the late 1960s found the proportion of farms being 
managed with a succession to the next generation planned for to be 75% (Harrison, 
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Table 5.1 - Level of Indebtedness Among the Sampled Farm Businesses 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Proportion of annual No. of Farms % 
farm income taken up 
by loan repayments 
and interest. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
None 16 25.4 
Less than 1/4 25 39.7 
1/4 - 1/2 11 17.5 
1/2-3/4 3 4.7 
Over 3/4 4 6.3 
Don't Know 
-------------------------- 
3 
------------------------- 
4.7 
------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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1975). Although the sample was drawn in a different way to the Ouse catchment 
sample, leaving a question mark over the direct comparability of the two, the gap 
between Harrison's finding and the more recent figure would seem to suggest a decline 
in the commitment of farm families to continuity in agriculture. This may be a result of 
the poor financial returns in farming at present and the current sense of despondency 
among the farming community. The relative unattractiveness of agriculture as a career 
would be accentuated in a rural area like the Ouse catchment with its rapidly growing 
economy (see Chapter 4). 
One of the first lines of defence when facing lower margins is to re-examine the farm's 
labour requirements. On almost half the farms in the sample (31 farms, or 49.2%) 
hired labour had been shed during the 1980s by either not replacing retiring farm- 
workers or making farm-workers redundant. Many farms, therefore, became far more 
dependent on the work of family members. By 1991, at least three-quarters of the total 
labour requirements on 31 of the farms were met by family labour, usually with 
agricultural contractors being hired to carry out the few additional specialist tasks. 
Another adjustment farmers make is to alter the balance of crops and other enterprises. 
The 1980s were a period of significant adjustment. One trend was the decline in the 
importance of cereal production following major expansion during the 1970s. Since the 
mid- 1980s wheat, barley and oats had become less profitable in relation to other crops 
and enterprises and the proportion of the farmed area under cereals declined on 37 of 
the farms in the survey (58.7%) and increased on only 12 farms (19.0%). By 1991, 
only 50% of the farmed land was under wheat, barley and oats. It was the smaller 
sized farms with more significant livestock enterprises who most commonly cut back 
their cereal acreage. Eight farms had stopped growing cereals since 1988, with three of 
these entering all their arable land into voluntary set aside schemes. Non-agricultural 
income was much more important to these farm households, contributing, on average, 
more than 60% of total household income in 1991. Those opting for set-aside were 
also a group of small farms with a mean size of only 85.4 ha, well under half that for 
the whole sample (217.5 ha). Those mixed farms with dairy enterprises tended to build 
up dairy herds at the expense of cereal production, reflecting the recent relative 
profitability of dairying. Additional milk quota would be bought, usually from dairy 
farmers that had closed down. Of the 14 farms in the sample which were 'mainly 
dairying', 10 had expanded their milking herds by an average of 36% in terms of cow 
numbers since 1981. (The remaining four had stayed the same). Because of increasing 
yields per cowl, their output will have expanded by an even greater amount. The 
1 During the 1980s, the average annual milk yield per dairy cow in England and Wales increased by 
8.5% from 4715 litres per cow in 1979-80 to 5115 litres in 1990-91 (Federation of United Kingdom 
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smaller, mixed farms that maintained some cereal production tended to simplify cereal 
cropping arrangements, concentrating on a smaller range of crops most commonly by 
cutting out oats and barley. 
For those farms where cereal production continued to be of central importance, major 
changes in cropping patterns often took place. Break crops such as oilseed rape, beans 
and linseed became much more important, mainly because of an increase in their relative 
profitability. Almost half the farms grew oilseed rape in 1991, a new crop for many. 
Over 1260 ha were sown that year, making up almost 20% of the total area of arable 
crops. Falling margins for wheat production, combined with favourable EC subsidies 
for oilseed rape and linseed in particular, were prompting a widespread shift away from 
continuous wheat cropping. This shift was also partly a result of the high cost of 
growing wheat on heavy soils. Where it has been common practice among local 
farmers to grow wheat on the same land for perhaps four years running in the early 
1980s, many farmers were adopting more complex arable systems in order to increase 
the number of 'first wheats' in the rotation. 
Despite modern farming techniques, after the first year of wheat, yields decline in the 
second and particularly the third and fourth years. Blackgrass and other weeds can 
become a particular problem. On 23 of the farms (mainly the larger, specialist arable 
farms), rotations of, for example, four wheats followed by a break crop, had been 
replaced by rotations of wheat-beans-wheat-oilseed-wheat-linseed. A greater number 
of 'first wheats' in the rotation resulted in lower expenditure on sprays (especially 
herbicides and fungicides) and manufactured nitrogen fertilizer. The advantages are 
two-fold: lower input costs for wheat crops, and more favourable prices for oilseed 
rape and linseed. 
For many farms in the sample, however, economic pressures had become so severe that 
more fundamental change was required based upon the search for new sources of non- 
agricultural income. While some farmers have seen diversification as a survival 
strategy designed to maintain family occupancy of the farm, others have discovered that 
non-agricultural enterprises can be lucrative, choosing to run down their agricultural 
enterprises and concentrate on new activities. Differing degrees of household 
pluriactivity accentuated the local differentiation already resulting from recent rounds of 
restructuring. By 1991, less than a third of households relied entirely on farming for 
their income, and for over a third agriculture contributed less than 75% of total 
household income. Since 1981 the balance between agricultural and non-agricultural 
Milk Marketing Boards, 1991, p. 40). 
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income had altered on 36 farms, with 31 of these (49.2% of the sample) deriving a 
larger proportion of household income from non-agricultural sources. Half the sampled 
farm households received income from either off-farm employment or from non- 
agricultural enterprises on the farm (Table 5.2). The most common source of non- 
agricultural income was off-farm employment. While in most cases it was the farmer's 
wife who sought off-farm work, in four cases financial pressures had forced the farmer 
to seek off-farm employment too. In addition, four farmers in the sample carried out 
contracting work for other local farmers. These changes were typical of those recorded 
in a larger survey of Buckinghamshire farm households (see Marsden et al., 1991). 
Among the 63 farmers in the sample, 19 had significant non-agricultural enterprises 
based on the farm, almost all of which had been established during the 1980s. The 
most common initiative involved converting redundant farm buildings for light 
industrial use (Table 5.2). A study of the development of small industrial units in 
Buckinghamshire had found that three sets of processes underly this increasing number 
(Marsden et al., 1991). These were the decline of agricultural productivism leading to a 
search for new on-farm income sources, the restructuring of the local economy 
resulting in new market demands for small-scale (under 1500 sq ft), flexibly leased 
workplaces, and a liberalisation of the rural planning system in 1987 and 1988. There 
has been no comparable research at a national level which would allow a proper 
contextualisation of this trend, but it is plausible to assume that in the Ouse catchment, 
part of a prosperous rural region close to London, these trends are generally more 
pronounced. For the farmers, once planning permission had been granted and 
investment made in converting buildings and providing infrastructure, their role 
becomes one of landlord, disengagement from agricultural production being linked to 
new rentier roles. Of all the different types of on-farm diversification, industrial units 
represented the most successful means of sustaining accumulation according to many 
local farmers. 
Farm-based tourism or recreation enterprises had been established on four farms during 
the 1980s2, although qualitative evidence derived from discussions with farmers 
suggested that coarse fishing, bed and breakfast and farm open days were not 
sufficiently profitable to allow disengagement from farming altogether, providing little 
more than what Ilbery (1991, p. 207) calls 'pin money'. Such activities represented a 
means of supplementing household income in the struggle for survival. In addition, 
four farmers derived income from horse enthusiasts. One farmer simply let grazing 
land to local horse owners, although three others had established liveries on their farms. 
2 One household, in addition, had a long established bed and breakfast business. 
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Table 5.2 - Non-Agricultural Income Sources 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Income Source Number of farms % of sample 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Off-farm work 
(farmer & spouse) 22 34.9 
Agricultural 
contracting 4 6.3 
Farm tourism/ 
recreation 5 7.9 
Industrial 
units and 7 11.1 
haulage. 
Food processing 
and marketing 4 6.3 
Horses 4 6.3 
Benefit payments 5 7.9 
Investments 8 12.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Fann survey. 
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The close proximity to Milton Keynes ensured a steady supply of visitors to ride. 
Again, liveries provided a means merely of supplementing income from agriculture. 
For five farm households, state benefit payments such as income support, pensions and 
child benefit had become significant sources of household income. For two 
households, the situation had not become critical. They had obtained planning 
permission on parts of their farm and were waiting for the housing market to improve 
before selling off the land for development. These farmers hoped to join the eight 
others in the sample who had sold or developed land in recent years and by this means 
were supplementing their farming incomes with the proceeds. 
In summary, diversification of income sources among farm households in the Ouse 
catchment broadly takes three forms. Firstly, there is the search for off-farm 
employment, most commonly by the farm wife, as a strategy for survival of occupancy. 
Secondly, there is the establishment of farm-based recreation enterprises, which is 
usually also part of a survival strategy to supplement farm income rather than to replace 
it. Thirdly, there is the conversion of capital assets through the development of land 
and buildings3. These changes slot, sometimes uncomfortably, into long-standing 
patterns of adjustment such as the shedding of labour and changing the balance of farm 
enterprises. It is problematic to talk of this multiplicity of adjustments as 'strategies' 
because many actions have been forced rather than strategic or planned (see Chapter 1, 
pp. 45-46). Rather, these farm businesses and households could be said to be on 
different types of development trajectory. 
During the survey farmers were not only asked about recent changes to their businesses 
but also about their future plans. They were questioned about what sorts of things their 
future plans depended upon and what they thought might spoil them. From the 
responses, farms were grouped according to their development trajectory. The 
groupings were based on current changes in combination with future plans4. For some 
3 These diversification strategies identified in the Ouse catchment are broadly comparable with the 
results of other recent studies elsewhere in Britain (see, for example, Ilbery, 1991; MacKinnon et al., 
1991; Shucksmith et al., 1989) although the number of industrial unit developments appears particular 
to the local and regional context. 
4 In categorising farm businesses into the different development trajectories, the responses to questions 
85-90 on the questionnaire were used (see Appendix B). These related to the farmers' aims and 
objectives for the next two years and then over a longer period, and any specific plans they had to 
achieve these aims. From responses to these questions, the disengagers, developers, diversifiers and 
expanders were easily grouped. The remaining group of 23 farmers fell into two categories, and this in 
part arose from the differential abilities among the farmers to articulate their future plans during the 
interviews. Three of these farmers said they intended to 'carry on as we are and hope for the best'. They 
had no specific plans to make changes but would alter enterprises and practices as the need arose. The 
remaining 20 farmers had no plans to develop or take on additional land, diversify or disengage. They 
were, however, committed to making adjustments where necessary, mainly as part of a continual search 
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a clear and considered strategy could be discerned. For others, changes in the farm 
business were a response to changing external conditions. For example, some farmers 
who rented their farms found they were unable to develop land and buildings to realise 
assets because of the conditions in their tenancies. Five broad development trajectories 
could be identified, and farmers were classed as either developers, diversifiers, 
expanders, adjusters and disengagers (see Table 5.3). The nature of each trajectory is 
outlined below. 
Adiusters: Over a third of farm businesses were classed as adjusters. They were 
seeking to remain in agriculture and maintain or improve profitability through 
improvements in efficiency. Particular emphasis was placed on keeping down the costs 
of production, either by altering crop rotations, increasing self-sufficiency in feeds, or 
improving the quality of livestock carcasses. 
Expanders: Almost one-fifth of the sample (12 farms) were expanders. They were also 
seeking to remain in agriculture but planned to maintain or increase profitability through 
increasing either the scale or the intensity of production. Most commonly they were 
planning to take on additional land or increase livestock numbers. 
Diversifies Seven farm busnesses (11.1 %) were diversifiers. The intention again was 
to remain in agriculture, although for these businesses survival could only be ensured 
through diversification to supplement income from farming. 
Developers: Ten farm businesses (15.9%) were classed as developers. Farmers were 
planning to continue with agricultural production but business survival was 
underpinned by land development. Thus, six farmers were hoping to sell land with 
planning permission for houses, two were developing industrial units, one a golf 
course and one a mineral extraction site. 
Disengagers: Eleven farm businesses (17.5%) were disengagers charcterised, in effect, 
by gradual withdrawel from agriculture, although all 11 wished to maintain occupancy 
of the farm house. They had either decided to put land into set-aside or to let it to 
neighbouring farmers. Several of these farmers had employment off the farm, or had 
diversified in the past and were now concentrating much more on the non-agricultural 
aspects of their businesses. 
for efficiency gains. 
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Table 5.3 shows some of the characteristics of the farms in each development trajectory 
group. For example, agricultural income was most important to the expanders who 
derived, on average, 93.0% of household income from farming. Adjusters also derived 
more than three quarters of their household income from farming, but developers and 
diversifiers obtained around two-thirds of total household income. For the 
disengagers, only a half of total household income was derived from farming. 
Developers were the youngest farmers, with an average age of 45.1 years, and 
disengagers the oldest with an average age of 52 years. Disengagers were also the least 
likely to be planning for succession. Only 3 of the 11 intended to pass on the farm, and 
in each case, the successor would, in effect, be taking over a non-agricultural business. 
Eight of the 10 developers were owner-occupiers, with two renting most of their land. 
Clearly, the land development strategy is one more open to farm families with land of 
their own. Diversification was also a strategy dominated by owned farms (5 out of 7), 
and two-thirds of the expanders were owner occupiers too. Almost half of the 
disengagers and the adjusters were rented farms. 
The farm family's strategy can also depend on the types of enterprises present on the 
farm. For example, only one of the diversifiers was a dairy farm. The twice-daily 
milking routine on dairy farms makes it much more difficult for farm families to find the 
time to develop and run non-agricultural enterprises. Indeed, dairy farms were much 
more likely to be expanders or adjusters following more 'agricultural' strategies. In 
turn, nine of the eleven disengagers were arable or mainly arable farms. 
A pattern also emerges when economic viability is assessed against these development 
trajectories. For example, over 80% of expanders (10 out of 12 farms) had made a 
profit when the financial returns of the last three years were combined, and only one 
had made a loss. Of the 7 diversifiers, 5 were in profit (71 %) as were almost half of 
the adjusters (11 farms or 48%). The farms where viability was suffering most were 
the developers and disengagers. Under a third of the developers and only 2 
disengagers (18%) made a profit, while half these farms had made a loss. 
The overall picture is, therefore, one of increasing differentiation. Among a group of 
farm businesses, all in the same river catchment and all having recently grown cereals, 
we find not only a wide range of business and household characteristics, but also a 
variety of development trajectories. Some are involved in a marked retreat from 
agricultural production and an economic dependence on it. Others are struggling on, 
seeking agricultural solutions to the problems of falling margins. All seem to be keen to 
maintain occupancy of their farmhouses, even if this means selling off or setting aside 
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Table 5.3 - Farm Characteristics by Farm Development Trajectory 
---------------- ---------------- 
Average 
------------------- 
Average % 
----------------- 
Average 
-------------------- 
Average 
--------------- 
% 
size under farmer % planning 
(ha) cereals age agricultural succession 
income 
---------------- Adjusters ---------------- 204.7 ------------------- 68.9 
----------------- 49.6 -------------------- 77.3 
--------------- 56.5 
(23 farms) (141.7) (22.8) (11.5) (26.9) 
Expanders 296.2 43.9 46.3 93.3 66.6 
(12 farms) (289.5) (18.5) (11.4) (13.5) 
Diversifiers 211.6 51.0 47.3 65.9 71.4 
(7 farms) (154.8) (42.3) (10.1) (30.4) 
Developers 284.6 49.6 45.1 68.4 50.0 
(10 farms) (245.9) (27.2) (12.3) (36.8) 
Disengagers 98.3 47.3 51.8 50.7 27.3 
(11 farms) (66.0) (28.5) (9.3) (27.6) 
- - --- ---- ---------------- Whole ---------------- ------------------- ----------------- ------------------- - 
---- -- 
sample 
---------------- 
217.5 
---------------- 
48.6 
------------------- 
48.4 
----------------- 
73.0 
-------------------- 
54.0 
--------------- 
Note: Averages are means and the standard deviations around the means are in brackets. 
Source: Farm survey. 
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land and retreating from an essentially agricultural life-style. 
Crucially, however, these shifting economic and social conditions provide the backdrop 
for processes of technological change, day to day farming practices and the ways in 
which these alter over time. An understanding of why a farmer uses particular crop 
protection systems cannot be separated from an understanding of the development 
trajectory of the farm business and the aspirations of the farm family. It is, after all, the 
meeting of the farm family's needs and wants that is often the ultimate reason for using 
pesticides in the first place. The ways in which pesticides are used and understood will 
be examined later in the chapter. First, farmers' philosophies and values are explored, 
particularly concerning farm improvement and 'nature'. These underpin farm 
development trajectories and the way farming practices are carried out. 
5.3 Farmers' Philosophies, Nature and the Logic of Farm Improvement 
Because of the land-based nature of agricultural production, farmers are at one and the 
same time both food producers and managers of the rural environment. Notions of 
resource management and resource conservation are not new to farming. Traditional, 
mixed farming systems, in particular, have had resource conservation at their heart. A 
central and analogous idea in the ethos of 'family farming' has been to do more than 
make a living out of the family's asset (the farm). It must also be passed on to the next 
generation in sound working order. Thus, notions of resource conservation (in a 
utilitarian sense) are often strongly linked to norms of family continuity in farming. 
Even in an era of technological 'sophistication', farmers still express the need to 
conserve their farms' productive base. The single-minded pursuit of short-term 
improvements to that productive base may undermine the long-term sustainability of 
farming itself because of the continued dependency of farming on the integrity of the 
natural environment (Body, 1991; Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 
1979; Conway & Pretty, 1991). But what constitutes the productive base of the farm 
has changed. Farmers who are considering passing on their businesses to their children 
will be keen to ensure that their farms are in 'good condition'. By this they frequently 
mean that the tractors, field machinery and the farm buildings are all in good working 
order, and that farm roads and field drainage make the farm easier to manage. 
Conservation of the farm's resources is a crucial element in the farmers' understandings 
of their farms' 'condition'. 
Farmers also express some of these notions in terms of their soil, or land being 'in 
good heart'. This concern has two strands. First, field boundaries have to be properly 
159 
managed and kept in good repair, especially on farms carrying livestock. This ensures 
not only that hedges, ditches and fences are adequately stock-proof (a utilitarian notion) 
but also that the farm looks tidy and well-kept (both a utilitarian and aesthetic notion). 
More importantly, the second element of land being in good heart is rooted in utilitarian 
ideals, and involves the maintenance of soil fertility. Thus, in the eyes of farmers, a 
'good farmer' is one who typically will keep the land in good heart and so be in a 
position to pass on the farm in a better condition. 
To explore such sentiments further, the Ouse catchment farmers were asked about this 
notion of 'improving' their farms. The question was worded "farmers often say that 
they would like to pass on their farm to the next generation in a better condition than 
when they took it on themselves. What does the phrase 'in a better condition' mean to 
you ?" 
The idea meant quite different things to different farmers. To seven of the 63 (11 %), it 
meant that the farm should be tidy and well-maintained. This technical definition of 
'better condition' involved the tidiness of hedges, the good maintenance of yards and 
buildings and an element of making the farm easier to run. Over half the farmers (34 or 
54%), however, talked about the farm being more productive and 18 (28.6%) thought 
better condition meant that the farm should be more economically viable. Under the 
'more productive' category, farmers tended to talk about the land being 'in good heart'. 
Any farmer who used this term was further questioned about what it meant to them. For 
most farmers, the notion implied that the soil be fertile and productive. It should be 
capable of sustaining high yields. But the term also implied a responsibility to the land. 
There was broad agreement that a good farmer "should not take more out of the soil 
than gets put back in". The soil should not be 'robbed' of its nutrients. As one farm 
manager running a 100 ha arable business explained, 
"[Better condition means] land in better heart, with a better soil 
structure, and capable of growing better crops. If the soil structure is 
correct and the land is clean and free from weeds then you'll get better 
yields" [Farmer interview no. 13: Adjuster]. 
It is within this context of a 'logic of farm improvement' that farmers' attitudes to 
environmental change in the countryside must be set. The dual objectives are to have a 
farm that has the capacity to provide a viable income for both the current and the next 
generation of the farm family, and for it not to have been 'robbed' of its productive 
capacity. 
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The survey evidence also suggests that farmers have, in the main, become sensitised to 
environmental issues. Almost two-thirds of the farmers interviewed acknowledged that 
modem agricultural practices can have an adverse effect on the environment. However, 
the types of environmental problem that they went on to talk about varied. Fourteen 
mentioned problems with "the overuse of sprays". However, when questioned further, 
most were more specifically concerned about the effects of insecticides on friendly 
predator species like ladybirds. Only four farmers specifically mentioned problems of 
the persistence of agrochemicals in the environment, and only three of these specifically 
mentioned the threat to water quality from leaching and run off. Other environmental 
issues cited by farmers were landscape change (mentioned by 11), nitrate leaching (9), 
pollution from livestock effluents (8) and the loss of wildlife (6). It is clear that while 
there is some general unease about heavy usage of pesticides, pesticide persistence and 
the threat to water quality is not an issue that looms large in their thinking. 
Farmers talked extensively about agriculture's environmental problems and their 
causes. Some talked about "a small number of bad farmers" who caused problems, 
echoing the rhetoric of farming organisations in the 1970s who talked of 'maverick' or 
'rogue' farmers responsible for habitat loss and removal of landscape features (see 
Chapter 3, p. 91). Others blamed 'the system'. They complained that farmers had only 
done what they had been encouraged to do by Government policy. Furthermore, two 
thirds of farmers acknowledged that environmental concerns had begun to influence the 
way they farmed. Eighteen cited the management of environmental features on their 
farms. They had planted trees, were choosing to keep hedges rather than pull them out, 
and were building ponds and maintaining footpaths. For these farmers, responding to 
wider environmental concerns meant 'managing' or even 'creating' pockets of nature on 
their farms. This zoning of the farm environment in the minds of the farmers was well 
illustrated by one farmer in his late 40s running a 140 ha arable and sheep farm. When 
asked how environmental concerns had affected his farming practices, he said 
"Yes, I have a two and a half acre conservation area. If we see 
something nice we transplant it. We see our fields as our factory floor 
and our little conservation area as our haven" [Farmer interview no. 32: 
Developer]. 
Moreover, the art of managing nature is itself the subject of social construction and 
there is no consensus among the farmers about what a good farming environment 
actually consists of. For example, one elderly farmer on a 120 ha mixed dairy and 
arable farm said 
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"I don't like to see the countryside as an extension of suburbia, with 
clinically trimmed hedges. I like to see nature's shagginess, with 
blooms at different times, and bushes and young trees in the 
hedgerows" [Farmer interview no. 26: Adjuster]. 
On the other hand, a young part-time farmer on a small mixed holding, when asked if 
environmental concerns had impacted upon farming practices, expressed a noticeably 
different view. He said 
"Yes, we keep it neat and tidy. We don't let it go back to nature. We 
spray out weeds and make it look nice" [Farmer interview no. 26: 
Adjuster]. 
Other responses to increasing environmental concern among the farmers involved the 
greater care in the use of sprays (cited by 13), investment in effluent control systems (7) 
and ceasing straw burning (5). Some went on to explain that they were more careful 
when deciding which insecticides to use, and tended now to choose those that would 
not harm ladybirds. Conversely, one third of the farmers said that wider environmental 
concerns had not at all affected what they do. The majority of these did not consider 
themselves to be doing any damage in the first place. 
Notions of efficient and productive farming practice and farms in 'good condition' were 
further explored by asking the farmers if they made comparisons between themselves 
and their neighbours, and if so, on what basis. Almost four out of five farmers (50 or 
79%) said that they did look at what their neighbours did. The basis upon which they 
drew these comparisons fell into three main categories. The first group (20%) made 
comparisons mainly based on notions of good farming, the health of stock and tidiness 
of fields. For example, one part-time farmer running a 40 ha arable farm explained, [I 
look at] "how their farm and crops look ... if they 
look as good and healthy as mine. It 
has to be clean. I don't like to see weeds" [Farmer interview no. 34: Adjuster]. A 
second group (20%) made comparisons based on the timing and methods employed on 
the farm, such as, for example, who was out spraying and when, and what types of 
machinery were used. The third and largest group (60%) made comparisons in terms 
of yields. A typical response in this group came from a farmer in his mid-50s running a 
500 ha arable farm who said "Man is a competitive beast. I like to feel I'm doing the 
job at least as well and hopefully better than the competition" [Farmer interview no. 5: 
Adjuster]. 
The responses suggest that production-maximising values still have strong currency 
amongst farmers, although notions of 'good husbandry' are also important in the sense 
that farmers feel some responsibility to what they see as the 'health' of their land. 
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However, more important than the preoccupation with yields, and of central interest to 
this study, was the widespread concern with weeds. Whether farmers were drawing 
comparisons on the basis of productivity or tidiness, weeds seemed to provide a useful 
gauge of how they were doing. Half of the farmers in the sample said that they looked 
over the hedge to see whether neighbours were winning the battle against weeds, and 
many expressed strong aesthetic concerns about 'clean', weed-free fields. 
The aesthetics of neatness and weed control as a form of care has been studied by 
Nassauer (1988), whose research highlighted how the expression of care is an 
important motive for people involved in managing landscapes. While the notion of 
'care' includes a sense of solicitude, protection and nurturance, it at the same time can 
involve the domination or subordination of nature. The control of weeds is 
undoubtedly an act of dominance in this sense, although it has a scientific rationale 
insofar as weeds compete with crops for light, water and nutrients. But because people 
see beauty in neat, well-kept landscapes, weed control also has a strong aesthetic 
motive which involves demonstrating care of the land. The responses from the survey 
suggest that it is the utilitarian notions of clean (weed-free), tidy (rationalised) farm 
environments which are dominant in their farming culture (or way of thinking). The 
farmer who appreciated "nature's shagginess" in hedgerows held a minority view. The 
majority saw their contributions to rural environmental management as planting trees in 
field corners or on unproductive parcels of land, digging ponds, maintaining styles and 
managing footpaths, thus helping to create 'pockets' of nature and facilitate access for 
walkers to enjoy them. These activities could be kept separate from the farmed 
environment which should be kept clean and tidy. 
Weeds pose a threat to the viability of cereal production. On the heavy soils of the Ouse 
catchment, where forty years ago profitable cereal cropping would not have been 
possible, it has been the control of black-grass and wild oats in particular that has 
enabled cereal growing. Uniformly coloured fields with as few weeds as possible and 
with the crop drilled in straight lines symbolise the farmers' success in the battle against 
nature's constraints on production. It is easy to see how farmers take pride in 
eliminating weeds. One farmer, typical of many, explained 
"When I came here the farm was undrained, wet and weedy. It was just 
ticking over. Now it's clean, it's drained and the crops look well" 
[Farmer interview no. 7: Adjuster]. 
Moreover, these deeply felt convictions and the clear understanding about the role of 
weeds compares with doubts about the significance of the environmental impacts of 
agrochemical use. Because environmental impacts might be unobservable in the short 
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and medium term, farmers find it difficult to accept that their efforts against weeds are 
problematic. In addition, they argue that they would surely not be allowed to use any 
chemicals that pose a threat to the environment. Their faith in the need to combat weeds 
is mirrored by a faith in the inherent safety of the chemical weapons they use. As one 
farmer in his late 40s running a 300 ha mixed farm said 
"You're using strong chemicals, but if they're used properly and 
professionally, they're advantageous to mankind. We are guided very 
much by the chemical companies. We hope and believe that 
everything's been properly tested. We buy them in good faith. If you 
buy a car, you don't question the research and manufacturing process, 
you buy it in good faith" [Farmer interview no. 2: Adjuster]. 
In the trade off between the profitable production of cereal crops and the threats posed 
to surface and groundwaters, the interests of agronomy transcend those of the water 
environment. This is crucially because of the relative strengths of the two convictions 
within farmers' ways of thinking. Weeds are an easily identifiable economic threat, 
whose presence goes against the farmers' strong convictions in favour of rationalised, 
clean fields. There are no such strong convictions about the environmental impacts of 
pesticides. Provided they are used as directed on product labels, the ways in which 
they pose pollution threats seem doubtful, long term, distant and unproven. When 
coupled with a relatively strong faith in the registration and approval of chemicals that 
have been properly and 'scientifically' tested, the assessment of pollution risk need not 
be taken further. 
Furthermore, risk assessment remains locked within a dominant productivist logic. 
Some farmers admitted that a 'more careful' use of pesticides or nitrogen arose from the 
need to cut costs rather than any moral sense of protecting environmental resources. 
Specifically, the analysis of the farmers' representations of 'nature' and 'improvement' 
suggest that concerns about weed control and clean fields are more important to farmers 
in the Ouse catchment than concerns about the pollution of surface and groundwaters by 
pesticides. It is in the context of this trade-off that actual and potential changes to 
pesticide use need to be assessed. 
5.4 Reducing Herbicide Use in the Ouse Catchment 
In a series of semi-structured questions, methods for cutting herbicide use were 
suggested. Farmers were asked if they employed various techniques, if they might 
consider others and if not, what they saw as the main drawbacks. The results are 
shown in Table 5.4. Almost 70% of farmers would not consider cultural methods of 
weed control (nil cultivation, scratch cultivation or direct drilling) as means of reducing 
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Table 5 .4- Measures to Cut Herbicide Use 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Method Number of farmers (%) 
Already Use Would Would Not 
Consider Consider 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cultural Methods 4(7%) 14 (25%) 39 (68%) 
Undercut Label 
Dose Rate 50 (89%) 4(7%) 2(4%) 
Undercut Advisor's 
Dose Rate 22 (39%) 4(7%) 30(54%) 
Mechanical Weeding 2(4%) 9(16%) 46(81%) 
Organic Farming 0* 19 (33%) 38 (67%) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- No organic farmers but two 'Conservation Grade' producers. 
Source: Farm survey. 
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herbicide use, and over 80% would not consider mechanical weeding. Both options, it 
was argued, would be more costly than applying chemical herbicides, and they were 
much less thorough and would lead to a build up of weed problems in the future. As 
one farmer on a 500 ha arable farm explained, 
"Cultural methods lead to a build up and a backlog of certain pernicious 
weeds and then you require more herbicides later. You just scratch the 
surface really" [Farmer interview no. 5: Adjuster]. 
Similar views were expressed by several farmers, highlighting the extent to which the 
chemical control of weeds has become an acceptable and unproblematic practice among 
farmers. Moreover, the straw burning ban (introduced under the 1990 Environmental 
Protection Act to take effect from the end of 1993) will make chemical herbicides even 
more attractive because burning straw and stubble are usually an essential component of 
cultural weed control (ENDS, 1992b). 
Organic farming, defined as applying no agrochemicals and seeking a premium on the 
price of the crop, was rejected by two thirds of farmers. The remainder said that they 
would be happy to consider organic farming but felt that the economics were currently 
unfavourable. One of the central tenets of the ethos of good arable husbandry would 
also be undermined by organic farming systems. As one farmer running a 115 ha 
diversified arable farm said, 
"It would drive me crazy, the rubbish and muck [weeds], I'd probably 
get complaints from my neighbours too" [Farmer interview no. 16: 
Disengager]. 
Some, however, were sympathetic to the philosophy behind organic farming but the 
current costings ruled it out as an option. One of these farmers suggested that 
"Unfortunately, organic farming wouldn't be viable. It would be a 
major relief to get off that treadmill if only we could afford to do it" 
[Farmer interview no. 34: Adjuster]. 
One practice already widely in use was to apply the chemicals at dose rates lower than 
those recommended by the manufacturers on the product label. Almost 90% of the 
farmers said that they already undercut herbicide dose rates advised on product labels, 
but this tended to be only on the advice of their spray advisor. When asked if they ever 
undercut the dose rates advised by their advisor, under 40% of farmers said they did 
so. Over half the farmers said they would never consider applying herbicides at dose 
rates lower than those recommended by their advisor, making the negotiative process 
between farmers and advisors as crucial to practice. 
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5 Conclusions 
From the analysis of the empirical evidence on agricultural restructuring and changing 
pesticide practices in the Ouse catchment, a number of points become clear. First, 
patterns of farm business development, which crucially set the parameters for changing 
pesticide practices, have fragmented during the 1980s among the farms surveyed in the 
catchment, chiefly as a result of the decline in economic fortunes. A range of 
development trajectories can be identified which involve differing levels of dependence 
on, and commitment to, agricultural production. While most farm families wish to 
maintain occupancy of the farmhouse and the essence of an agricultural lifestyle, a 
significant proportion of households are making changes to reduce their financial 
dependence on agricultural production in general, and on growing cereals in particular. 
At its most extreme, some farmers are becoming landords of small rural industrial 
estates or managers of countryside recreation centres, and the requirement of cereal 
production for them often becomes simply not to make a loss. These changing patterns 
of restructuring will provide a different context within which pesticides are used in 
individual farm businesses within the catchment. 
A second important element affecting pesticide usage is the way that farmers represent 
nature and understand environmental damage, and how these notions interplay with 
their values of good farming and farm improvement. The dominant mode of thinking is 
that weeds are 'dirty', 'rubbish' and representative of bad farming. This conviction is 
markedly stronger than the environmental threat that can arise from pesticides, which 
seems to farmers to be unclear, unseen and not proven. Moreover, there is strong 
belief that pesticides have been thoroughly tested before being approved for use and so 
must be safe. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that for most farmers dependence on the cheapest, most 
effective and easiest to use herbicides has increased during the 1980s. IPU and other 
residual herbicides used as blanket sprays in the autumn, have become of greater 
importance to cereal production in the Ouse catchment during the 1980s. They were 
often referred to in the survey as being "straight-forward" and "reliable". Blanket (or 
prophalactic) spraying in the autumn thus becomes a straight-forward, routine way of 
dealing with weed problems with the minimum risk of failure. Indeed, a greater 
emphasis on autumn residual spraying had been encouraged locally by ADAS and 
merchants' advisors as the 'safest' weed control strategy for preventing problems in the 
spring. This advice has still remained compatible with the strategy of cost cutting as 
margins have been squeezed. Only very recently (since 1990), and with a very limited 
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scope (3 farmers in the survey), has the possibility of a viable alternative to chemicals 
like IPU, which are less persistent but regarded as more expensive, even begun to 
attract attention. 
Given the widespread dismissal of cultural methods of weed control and organic 
farming, both of which would seem to contradict the 'chemically-cleaned', weed-free 
field philosophy of the farmers, the only remaining option left for those wishing to cut 
back on their herbicide usage has been to cut the dose rates to below those 
recommended by manufacturers. Here the role of technical advisors becomes crucial to 
the decision making process. In Chapter 6, the relations between farmers and advisors 
are considered in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
THE ROLE OF ADVISORS 
J Introduction: Restructuring of the Advisory System 
In understanding technological change in British agriculture and the conditions shaping 
farming practice, research directed at the role of technical advisors has been limited (but 
see Eldon, 1988; Fearne and Ritson, 1989; Hawkins, 1991). It has become 
increasingly apparent, however, that farmers have become much more dependent upon 
technical advice from off the farm in order to meet the production objectives implicit in 
public policy. The role of technology transfer is crucial and in Britain the dominant 
feature of the 1980s has been the growth of private sector sources of information, 
promoted in part by the curtailment of what was previously a largely free state advisory 
service (Munton et al., 1990). Most non-environmental advice from ADAS now has to 
be paid for by the farmer in one way or another, and this has helped to open up the 
'market' for advice on farming practice to competition from other sources. 
Private sector sources of advice for farmers include accountants, bank managers, vets 
and feed, seed and chemical salespeople and independent consultants. These sources 
have always been present, and often important in their own right, but Eldon (1988) has 
documented how some of these private sector sources have 'taken over from ADAS', 
particularly with regards to animal and crop husbandry advice, by offering farm walks, 
soil tests, new varieties and computerised farm planning assistance as 'free' features 
accompanying their agrochemicals or other inputs. He also cited evidence of a 'hard 
sell' approach of some private companies where representatives would walk farms 
before approaching the farmer in an effort to encourage a sale. 
The accusation from many commentators is that the commercial interests of the 
manufacturers and distributors of industrial inputs to agriculture cannot be separated 
from their advisory role (Clunies-Ross and Hildyard, 1992; Hawkins, 1991). Private 
sector advisory services are seen as a mechanism employed by companies to encourage 
farmers to buy their inputs. If this is the case, then we can expect that advice from 
companies will be of a form designed to increase the sales of their inputs. 
Eldon suggests from his survey, however, that many farmers considered private sector 
advice to be superior to that received from ADAS. The 1980s have been more generally 
characterised by a growing belief in the quality and efficiency of specialist and technical 
advice from the private sector, in comparison to what has been seen as a bureaucratic 
and outmoded public sector. The belief that those in business must be efficient because 
\t 
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they can function in the marketplace, and are customer-oriented and up to date as well, 
has been promoted by Government. A similar view is reflected in Government attitudes 
towards the orientation of agricultural research and development (Munton et al., 1990). 
At the same time, farming's greater reliance on those companies which manufacture and 
sell inputs for technical advice has also been cited as illustrative of the growing 
subsumption of the farm production process by industrial capitals and the increasing 
control they are able to wield over farming practice (Whatmore et al., 1987a; b; Clunies- 
Ross and Hildyard, 1992)1. 
The question of farmers' loss of autonomy through subsumption has been addressed by 
Hawkins (1991) in her research into technological change in milk and potato production 
in Cheshire. She found that uncertainty in agricultural markets and low returns on 
farms were increasing the financial pressures on the manufacturers and distributors of 
agricultural technologies. Three sets of responses could be identified. First, 
manufacturers were developing exclusive agency policies whereby the number of 
merchant outlets was limited through exclusive franchises. While this practice has had a 
longer history in relation to farm machinery, pesticide manufacturers have also been 
rationalising their distribution networks and concentrating their sales through chosen 
distributors (Hawkins, 1991, p. 134). Second, input suppliers have developed credit 
packages to tie farmers to individual companies. Again, this has been a longer-standing 
feature of the agricultural machinery sector where leasing deals are now common 
(Marsden et al., 1990b), but agrochemical merchants have also developed shorter-term 
credit deals as part of their pesticide sales strategies. Third, Hawkins identified the 
development of technical advice by companies as a strategy to maintain sales. As a 
fertilizer manufacturer explained to her 
"We have to keep farmer contacts to develop the market. This is done 
through a technical route to sell a higher volume" (Hawkins, 1991, 
p. 137 ). 
According to Hawkins the representatives of private sector companies can be seen as 
'agents of the technological treadmill' in these respects (see also Long et al., 1986; van 
der Ploeg, 1989). In the UK, the little empirical work that has been conducted 
emphasises the roles of technical advice and credit packages as examples of the 
subsumption of production relations. According to Munton et al., the offers of soft 
loans by some input suppliers, guaranteed by special deals made between them and the 
clearing banks, can help hard pressed farmers in the short run, but in the long run they 
1 In much of the European literature this process has been termed'externalisation' (van der Ploeg, 1990, 
pp. 18-21). 
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"only increase their dependence upon off-farm assistance and reduce 
their share of the value-added in the food chain. These links also 
reinforce the process of differentiation between farm businesses as those 
clients deemed worthy of such advantageous treatment are increasingly 
singled out from the remainder on the basis of strict cost-accounting and 
forward budgeting criteria" (1990, p. 110). 
The sales strategies of input suppliers are not necessarily designed to maximise the sales 
of their products in the short term, but to maintain market share. This is the argument 
employed by companies' representatives when questioned, in response to the charge 
that their commercial interests influence the nature of the advice they give. If they were 
to give advice to farmers that was not the most cost-effective, they say, farmers would 
transfer their custom to other companies. Instead, technical advice is used to foster 
customer loyalty through strengthening the links between company and farmer. As the 
director of a regional agrochemicals firm explained to Hawkins 
"In the main our reps. have a gang of loyal farmers and their business is 
to seek these farmers out at the beginning of the season. After that it's a 
bit routine and a bit emergency... It's done to keep the loyalty of our 
customers. It's better than if it depended on a market deal, discounts, 
salesmanship and that sort of thing" (Hawkins, 1991, p. 137). 
Links between farmer and company are becoming stronger for other reasons too. 
Concentration in the manufacturing sector has meant that a small number of large multi- 
national manufacturers dominate the markets for most inputs to agriculture, including 
agrochemicals. At the same time, the decline in the number of local merchants has 
tended to strengthen the links between the manufacturers and the merchants that remain, 
through franchising and exclusive agency policies, in particular. This has, in turn, led 
to more intense contact between the farmer and input suppliers, which 
"although still framed in technical terms, has extended for many farms 
from a purely 'trouble-shooting' technical level to a regular managerial 
one" (Hawkins, 1991, p. 139). 
The use of technology on farms becomes important, not only at the product level, but 
also by means of the advisory process. It is what Benvenuti et al. (1982) have called 
technology's 'techno-administrative' role which can also become important in eroding 
the farmer's control over commodity production on the farm. 
Hawkins also found that despite the fact that the underlying faith in technology remains 
strong among the potato and milk producers she studied, farmers were adopting a range 
of strategies to resist agribusiness pressures. In particular, some would develop a 
diversity of links with input suppliers to prevent the constraining power of 
agribusiness. While this might prove effective for fertilizers, animal feed and milking 
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machinery (the technologies Hawkins studied) it may not be so applicable in the case of 
pesticides, given the greater dependence upon technical expertise for chemical crop 
protection, and the more routinised nature of pesticide use. 
In this chapter, these issues will be examined in terms of the ways that farmers select 
and use pesticide advice. The variety of sources for such advice will be discussed, 
before going on to present evidence from the farm survey in the Ouse catchment. 
.2 Advising British Farmers on Pesticide Use 
In Britain one of the most detailed studies of farmers' advisory sources has been carried 
out by Fearne and Ritson (1989). The study, which consisted of a survey of over 900 
farmers coupled with a series of group discussions, supports the view that 
"Decision making on the farm is an iterative process, with information 
and advice from various sources being cross-referenced and verified, to 
varying degrees and often sub-consciously, before, during and after the 
adoption of a new idea" (Fearne and Ritson, 1989, p. 6). 
The survey found that the extent to which farmers paid for advice from ADAS or other 
independent consultants varied significantly according to age, farm size and education. 
Over half the surveyed farmers had never hired a consultant, and it was the younger and 
more educated farmers operating larger units, that were found to be most likely to seek 
external advice. It was also established that free newspapers and commercial 
representatives had an important role to play in influencing changes in farming practice. 
The sources of advice that farmers favoured depended upon the type of farm enterprise 
and the nature of the advice required. Freely available advice from newspapers, 
journals and other media was, inevitably, general in nature, whilst farmers were more 
prepared to pay consultants for specific advice and 'problem-solving'. Here, 
accountancy services were most heavily used by dairy farmers (45%), and advice on 
grants and subsidy applications were sought by over half the beef and sheep farmers 
surveyed. 
The study concluded that while farmers found it relatively easy to identify the most 
important sources of advice for different aspects of their work, two things remained 
much less clear. First, it was extremely difficult to discover how farmers valued the 
quality of the advice they receive, and second, it was unclear how advice and 
information were translated into action (Fearne and Ritson, 1989, p. 58). (These issues 
will be examined below in relation to pesticide advice). Besides the general advice and 
information that are available through the farming press, there are five main sources of 
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advice for British farmers when using pesticides. These are the agrochemical 
manufacturer, the agrochemical merchant, ADAS, crop consultants and arable farming 
research centres. Changes in each of these since the 1970s are now briefly reviewed. 
a1 The agrochemical mane acturer" The 'engine' for innovation in pesticides was the 
large research bases of the major agrochemical companies. However, as many of the 
more established and economically successful pesticide products came off patent during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, so manufacturers without the burden of large research 
and development programmes were able to produce off-patent pesticides. Increased 
competition in the manufacture of pesticides has led to a gradual withdrawal from 
advising farmers. According to Walker (1987), a representative of BASF United 
Kingdom Ltd, 
"Pressures on profit are resulting in the need to cut costs, which will 
mean it will be more difficult to justify and maintain advisory services to 
the farmer" (Walker, 1987, p. 322). 
Today most manufacturers' advice comes in the form of recommendations for applying 
agrochemicals on the product labels. 
b) The agrochemical merchant: One consequence of increasing competition amongst 
manufacturers has been the emerging role of merchants in providing specialist advice on 
pesticide use. Traditionally, corn merchants distributed agrochemicals as they became 
available, but since the late 1960s merchants have developed specialist expertise in crop 
protection. By the 1980s, agrochemical distribution was conducted either as a separate 
business or as a specialist division of the main merchant business. The more 
progressive merchants even carried out their own field trials to compare products and to 
develop crop husbandry recommendations which integrated fertilizer and pesticide 
applications (Walker, 1987). Today, merchants' salespeople usually offer pesticides 
for sale at two price rates, a lower and a higher rate. The higher rate will include 
technical advice from the merchant's own specialist spray advisor who regularly visits 
the farm and walks the fields to assess crop protection requirements and then advise on 
product choices and dose rates. 
" Responsibility for delivering 'official' advice to farmers on pesticide use lies 
with ADAS. ADAS is able to support field officers with information from a network of 
experimental farms and regional centres, but since 1987 ADAS has been obliged to 
charge farmers for all non-environmental advice, and this has had the effect of making 
advice from merchants' specialists more attractive to many farmers. Findings from in 
depth discussion groups conducted by Fearne and Ritson (1989) revealed how ADAS 
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advisors still tend to be regarded by farmers as 'the man from the Ministry', despite 
their new found commercial role. 
Farmers can obtain ADAS advice on a personal or group basis. Personal advice covers 
the calling out of an ADAS consultant to advise on any of a range of farm management 
issues. The farmer is then charged on a consultancy basis. In addition, farmers can 
subscribe to ADAS groups, and obtain more general advice which can be tailored to 
local or regional conditions. For example, weather reports and pest infestations are 
circulated and farmers are advised about the timing of spraying and so on. 
ADAS's new commercial role was the subject of a study by the National Audit Office in 
1991. The study focused on how ADAS combines its new role with the remnants of its 
statutory duties which involve providing free 'public good' advice covering 
conservation and pollution control. The report was critical of some ADAS regions 
where the provision of public good advice, including that covering pollution risks from 
farming practices, was found to be poorly structured (National Audit Office, 1991). 
d) Independent consultants: According to a study by the agrochemical company 
BASF, independent consultants gave advice on pesticide use affecting about half a 
million hectares of cereal production in 1982, and their influence is likely to have 
increased since then (Walker, 1987). By the late 1980s, there were over 200 practising 
consultants registered with the British Institute of Agricultural Consultants or the 
Association of Independent Crop Consultants, over half of which had specialist 
expertise in crop husbandry (Fearne and Ritson, 1989). They are independent of 
product sales and their livelihood thus depends directly on the farmers' perception of 
the quality of their advice in relation to business profitability. Whilst independent 
consultants can capitalise on specialist technical expertise in combination with detailed 
experience of the requirements of individual farms and fields (Read, 1985), one of their 
limitations, Walker argues, is their lack of research facilities and inability to keep up 
with new developments (1987, p. 324). 
e) Farming research groups: In 1991, as part of the state's gradual withdrawal from 
underwriting the productivist policy model, the Government stopped funding 'near 
market' research, research intended to provide farmers with a commercial benefit within 
five years, leaving farmers having to fund this area of R&D themselves. Commodity 
based R&D levies still remain, however. For example, the Home Grown Cereals 
Authority levy deducts 22.3p/tonne from cereal growers for cereal R&D and this was 
expected to raise £34.8 million in 1992/93 (Skinner, 1992, p. 63). 
173 
Farmers who tend to value up to date but general crop husbandry advice are now more 
prepared to pay for advice by joining together to fund arable crop research centres, 
where the emphasis is on providing local advice to farmer members. The number of 
centres has risen to more than 60 in England in recent years, and their strategy has been 
to encourage the most progressive and innovative farmers to join. According to 
Skinner (1992), more than 10% of farmers with more than 20 ha of cereals are now 
members of research centres. Walker (1987, p. 324) identifies three common facets of 
these organisations - they carry out extensive experimental programmes; they employ 
permanent scientific staff; and they are financed mainly by controlling farmers. Centres 
run on the philosophy of exclusivity, with access to research results and advice limited 
to members, and the notion of independent R&D and advice, free from the influence of 
commercial interests, is also very important to their functioning. Their growth is, in 
part, a response to the mistrust of advice from representatives of merchants and 
manufacturers among more progressive and innovative farmers2. 
These different sources of advice on pesticide practices do not provide farmers with 
clear choices between independent and commercial, or paid for and free, advice. 
Indeed, the distinctions are often quite blurred. While advice from commercial 
specialists, like those attached to merchants, is often cited as 'free' advice, (see, for 
example, Fearne and Ritson, 1989, pp. 48-49), the widespread use of commercial 
sources of advice cannot be explained solely on the basis of price advantage. Advice 
from merchants is not, in fact, free because those farmers who avail themselves of it 
usually have to buy their pesticides at higher prices. 
As part of Fearne and Ritson's study, farmers were asked what would be the most 
likely source of advice they would approach for crop husbandry problems. It was 
found that ADAS was more widely used for crop husbandry (30.4%) than for animal 
husbandry (15%), but that the most popular source was the commercial representative 
(64.9%). In addition, over a fifth of arable farmers also cited private consultants as a 
source of crop husbandry advice (Fearne and Ritson, 1989, p. 48). It is, therefore, 
surprising that past studies of farmers' pesticide decision making have not paid much 
attention to the role of external advice (such as those by Mumford, 1982; Tait, 1982). 
Pesticide use is an aspect of farming practice where farmers are particularly dependent 
upon external advice. This is, in part, because the chemistry of crop protection has 
become increasingly complex and beyond the level of knowledge that many farmers 
either have or feel comfortable with acquiring (Lever, 1990). A large survey by a 
2 Following this, farmers' perceptions and understandings of the differences between 'independent' and 
'commercial' advice will be examined in this chapter. 
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market research group found that over 50% of British farmers routinely turned to 
outside advisors for guidance on pesticide use, and 22% admitted to feeling out of 
touch with technical developments in agrochemicals, product suitability and choice 
(Produce Studies Group, 1990; Agricultural Supply Industry, 1990b). The complexity 
of the science is compounded by the large and increasing number of pesticide products 
from which farmers must choose. For example, in the period 1970 to 1981, the 
number of different active ingredients officially approved for use on wheat alone rose 
from 97 to 301 (Walker, 1987, p. 316). Moreover, while the 1960s and 1970s were 
years of innovation in the pesticide industry, the 1980s were the decade when many 
patents ran out. This led to the greater availability of mixtures of active ingredients and 
distributors' 'own label' products on the market (Metcalfe, 1982). 
In addition to the greater complexity and wider range of pesticides available, another 
factor explaining the greater use of external pesticide advice has been the rising cost of 
pest control. In the case of winter wheat, for example, the proportion of total variable 
costs attributable to pesticides almost trebled from 15.7% to 46.0% between 1971 and 
1991 (Murphy, 1989; 1992). This rising relative importance of pesticide costs has 
come at a time when the regulation of agriculture has increased and the number of farm- 
workers has steadily declined. Therefore, the demand for help with pesticide decisions 
from off the farm has correspondingly increased (Walker, 1987). 
While merchants' and manufacturers' advice may be driven by the need to maintain 
sales (and, according to some commentators, a desire to increase control over the 
production process), from the farmer's point of view, advice from merchants' 
representatives will often be easier to obtain. Merchants' representatives visit the farm 
as a matter of routine to discuss sales and crop husbandry problems. ADAS or 
independent consultants, on the other hand, have to be called out. 
6.3 Fanners and Pesticide Advice in the Ouse Catchment 
During the farm survey, farmers were asked about sources of advice, their 
understandings of bias in commercial advice, and the ways that advice and information 
were translated into action. First, they were asked what sources they used relating to 
fertilizers and land drainage (Table 6.1), two aspects of farming practice with an 
important bearing on water pollution risks, and then to rank their importance. The first 
column in Table 6.1 shows the sources that farmers have consulted at any time. All had 
consulted private sector sources, such as representatives of merchants and 
manufacturers, whilst four fifths of the farmers had at some time consulted ADAS. 
Sixty percent had used an independent consultant and almost fifty per cent had acquired 
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Table 6.1 - Sou 
------ 
rces of Advice for Fertilizers a nd Drainage 
------------ ----------------- 
Farmers that 
------------------- ------------------------------------------- Most important sources of advice 
------ 
used this (% of farmers) 
source for 
any advice Fertilizer use Drainage 
(%) (63 farms) (54 farms) 
-- 
Ist 2nd 3rd 1 st 2nd 3rd 
---------------- Own expertise 
----------------- 
100 ------------------- 51 -------- 13 ------------------- 6 ---------------- 24 7 
------ 2 
Merchant's 
representative 100 25 24 5 2- - 
Manufacturers 
representative 100 3 16 3 -- - 
Independent 
consultant 60 3 - 6 2- - 
Contractor 97 - - - 44 26 2 
Employee's 
expertise 97 - - 2 -2 - 
Neighbour 90 2 5 6 -2 - 
Family 92 2 5 6 -- - 
NRA 57 - - - -- 2 
HSE 94 - - - -- - 
ADAS 
(personal) 78 13 11 8 24 13 2 
ADAS (group) 52 3 8 3 -- - 
Farming 
research group 49 - - 5 -- - 
Farming press 97 - 3 5 -- 2 
Farming events 
& conferences 94 - - 2 -- - 
Other 
------------------ ------------------ 
3 
------------------ 
5 
-------- 
- 
------------------- 
4- 
---------------- 
- 
------ 
1 st = most important source of source of advice; 2nd = second most important source 
of advice; 3rd = third most important source of advice. Vertical columns do not total 
100% because some farmers gave joint first choice of advice and some farmers did not 
give a second or third preference. 
Source: Farm survey. 
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information from a farming research group. Over a third of the farmers surveyed also 
belonged to local farmer-funded arable research groups. 
The findings support those of Fearne and Ritson (1989) in suggesting that sources of 
advice differ according to the different aspects of farming practice. For example, when 
deciding what fertilizer products to buy and how to use them, over half the farmers 
relied mostly on their own expertise, with only a quarter of farmers citing the 
merchant's representative as the most important source of advice. Most commonly, 
farmers would perhaps consult the merchant's advisor but would be confident in taking 
the final decision themselves. 
When it came to decisions about land drainage, a different pattern emerged. While the 
vast majority of farmers said that it had been several years since they last carried out any 
drainage work, primarily because of the withdrawal of grants for such work, those that 
did answer affirmatively said that the drainage contractor would be the most important 
source (44%). A quarter relied mostly on their own expertise, but would probably 
consult the contractor, and another quarter felt that ADAS would be the most important 
source. 
These findings can be compared to those for pesticide use (Table 6.2). Farmers were 
asked about sources of advice relating to two aspects of pesticide use - the decision 
about what type of product to use, and the decision about how best to apply the 
pesticide. The results underline the importance of private sector sources, especially the 
merchant's representative. Over 50% of farmers claimed that the merchant's 
representative was their most important source of advice, both when deciding what type 
of pesticide to use and how best to use it, and no farmers said that they never took 
advice from this source. Only 19% insisted that it was on the basis of their own 
expertise that they decided which product to use, but all these consulted other advisors 
(either merchants' representatives or ADAS) at some stage, and then made up their own 
minds. 
Whilst 57% of farmers had received some advice from the National Rivers Authority 
(NRA), the Government agency responsible for protecting the water environment, no 
farmer found the NRA an important source of advice for selecting and using pesticides. 
This may be partly explained by the recent establishment (in 1989) of the NRA as a 
regulatory body responsible for enforcing environmental policies, with the result that it 
is viewed with caution or even suspicion by farmers. Also, their primary remit does 
not concern agricultural production or even (directly) pesticide use. In addition, 
although the vast majority of farmers had had some contact with the Health and Safety 
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Table 6.2 - Sources of Advice for Pesticide Use (63 farms 
Farmers that Most important sources of advice 
used this (% of farmers) 
source for 
any advice Which product How best to 
(%) to use. use it. 
-- 
1 st 2nd 3rd Ist 2nd 3rd 
---------------- Own expertise 
--------------------- 100 --------------- 19 --------- 16 ------------------ 6 -------- 16 -------- 10 ------ 2 
Merchant's 
representative 100 57 22 6 56 10 5 
Manufacturers 
representative 100 2 3 3 8 6 - 
Independent 
consultant 60 6 2 - 5 - 2 
Contractor 97 - 2 - 5 5 - 
Employee's 
expertise 97 - - - - 2 - 
Neighbour 90 - 2 6 - - - 
Family 92 - - 2 - - - 
NRA 57 - - - - - - 
HSE 94 - - - - - - 
ADAS 
(personal) 78 14 8 - 13 8 2 
ADAS (group) 52 5 11 2 5 2 1 
Farming 
research group 49 2 - 2 - - - 
Farming press 97 - 5 5 - 2 2 
Farming events 
& conferences 94 - 2 3 - - - 
Other 
------------------- -------------------- 
2 
--------------- 
2 
--------- 
- 
------------------ 
3 
--------- 
2 
-------- 
- 
----- 
1 st = most important source of source of advice; 2nd = second most important source 
of advice; 3rd = third most important source of advice. Vertical columns do not total 
100% because some farmers gave joint first choice of advice and some farmers did not 
give a second or third preference. 
Source: Farm survey. 
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Executive's (HSE) Agricultural Inspectorate, no farmer found them an important source 
of advice on pesticides, despite the fact that the HSE, as a body, has the main statutory 
responsibility for regulating and advising farmers on safety in pesticide use. 
In their survey of over 900 farmers, Fearne and Ritson found that almost half their 
respondents were undecided over whether advice which is paid for is more important 
than free advice3. Amongst the remainder, the majority (32.8%) agreed that advice 
which is paid for is more important than free advice, and only a fifth disagreed. 
Farmers seemed similarly undecided about whether advice that is paid for is more 
reliable than free advice, and almost half the farmers, especially the more experienced, 
felt that farmers would tend to pay for advice only as a last resort. 
The survey sheds some extra light on this issue in the context of pesticide practices. 
When farmers were asked if they felt there were differences in the nature of the 
information between the various sources, 65% acknowledged that commercial advice 
could be biased (Table 6.3). In the words of one of these farmers, "Commercial sales 
people usually recommend the product they get most profit from". As one farmer who 
chose to pay an independent advisor for his pesticide advice put it, 
"Independent advice is independent. There's no financial incentive or 
benefit to the man to advise you to use more. You've already paid for 
what he's selling. He's selling his expertise" [Farmer interview no. 28]. 
Another farmer explained in more detail what he saw as the main reason for bias. He 
said 
"Of course there is bias. An independent consultant has nothing to sell 
except his reputation. A commercial rep. has a product to sell. This 
must put them under pressure at times. There are some excellent chaps 
in the business but there must be pressure to sell sometimes" [Farmer 
interview no. 5]. 
The view that there are some 'excellent chaps' in the business of advising farmers on 
pesticide usage was shared by many of the farmers interviewed. This seemed to make 
it difficult for some farmers to even acknowledge the possibility of bias, when they had 
in their minds the experience of their personal relationships with their own advisors. 
Many respondents who acknowledged the risk of bias then qualified their answers by 
3A note of caution must be sounded here because it is unclear from Fearne and Ritson's report exactly 
what is meant by 'free' advice. It is most likely that they are referring to the advisory services linked to 
the commercial sales of products. With pesticides, the farmer usually pays for these services through 
higher prices. It is also unclear what exactly is meant by the relative 'importance' of advice. This 
confusion may help to explain the level of indecision amongst the farmers Fearne and Ritson surveyed. 
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Table 6 .3- Fa rmers' Responses to the Question 
Do y ou think there is any difference 
betwe en indep endent and commercial advice T(57 res ponses) 
Response 
Yes, commercial advice 
can be biased 
No, no difference 
Yes, different quality 
but not bias 
Source: Farm survey. 
No of farmers % of sample 
37 65% 
15 26% 
5 9% 
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arguing that the information they received from their own merchant's representative was 
not biased. As one farmer explained 
"There can be bias but you have to choose your advisor. The general 
opinion on [my commercial advisor] is if he leaves, how on earth could 
we carry on. He's very well respected and works very hard. It's not 
the same with all of them. Some are set terrible [sales] targets by their 
firms" [Farmer interview no. 7]. 
One farmer running a 70 ha mixed beef and arable farm quantified what he saw as the 
difference between commercial and independent advice. In 1988 he had become 
suspicious about the amount of agrochemicals he was being advised to apply by the 
merchant's representative, and their high cost. After changing merchants several times, 
he decided to switch to ADAS and by consulting their specialist found that he was able 
to cut his total agrochemicals bill by two-thirds and yet maintain the same level of pest 
control. He has stayed with ADAS ever since and remarked "merchants' reps are not 
welcome here". There was also a feeling that economic pressures in the agricultural 
supply industries were placing greater pressures on commercial advisors to maximise 
sales. One young farmer in his 30s running a 240 ha arable farm put it like this 
"As there's less and less money in the job of selling chemicals, I think 
you can trust [commercial advisors] less and less. There's more 
pressure on them to sell" [Farmer interview no. 58]. 
A quarter of the farmers surveyed felt that there was no difference between independent 
and commercial advice. Most were familiar with the accusations of bias in advice, 
however. A closer examination of some of their responses sheds further light on the 
issue. For example, one farmer on a 150 ha mixed sheep and arable farm felt that while 
accusations of bias might have once held some truth, this was now less so. He 
explained 
"I think there has been bias in the past but the merchant's reps are very 
aware of it now. For example, a merchant did advise my neighbour that 
he didn't need to spray. It's because independent consultants have set 
up in competition. Merchants are more aware of this" [Farmer interview 
no. 32]. 
It is worth noting that this farmer, like almost all the group who dismissed the idea of 
bias in commercial advice, relied on the merchant's representative as his most important 
advisor. It is, therefore, perhaps less likely that he would acknowledge the potential 
bias in the advice he was receiving, especially if he had a good working relationship 
with his advisor. Several farmers seemed to suggest that their own advisor was quite 
exceptional and was even giving them special treatment. For example, one farmer 
running a 120 ha mixed sheep and arable farm said 
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"I can see the argument that commercial advice is biased, but I know my 
chap very well and trust him. He advises lower dose rates and I give 
him a turkey for Xmas" [Farmer interview no. 54]. 
The trust displayed by these farmers could also be interpreted as a measure of the 
success of companies' strategies for developing farmer loyalty (see pp. 169-170). 
Hawkins (1991) found that a great deal of effort was spent by technical advisors trying 
to convince farmers of the coincidence of interests between farmer and company. Many 
farmers see their spray advisor as someone who is 'on their side' in the fight against 
pests. 
Other farmers who felt that there was no difference between independent and 
commercial advice did acknowledge the potential for bias in commercial advice. One 
farmer who felt that on the whole there was little risk of bias, did go on to say that 
"Providing the merchant has a range of manufacturers to draw on, then 
there's no problem. There are problems when certain merchants can't 
obtain certain products... Then they will recommend the product they 
can supply, while another product might be more suitable" [Farmer 
interview no. 39]. 
One farmer argued that there were discernable differences in the quality of independent 
and commercial advice, although it was not necessarily true to say that commercial 
advice was more biased. The farmer, who ran a relatively large 300 ha mixed beef and 
arable farm, explained that 
"Since ADAS have gone commercial, they are just as biased as 
commercial reps. It's just that the bias will be different. Some 
commercial reps. will be influenced by commercial factors such as 
higher margins or bonuses on certain chemicals. But ADAS have to 
justify' their cost so they have to bias their advice to show that they're 
worth their salt. It would be difficult for them to visit a farm, charge for 
advice and then advise to do nothing. Most farmers are aware of the 
bias. It's like sailing a boat. You tend to steer to compensate for the 
bias" [Farmer interview no. 2]. 
The 'sailing a boat' metaphor is a powerful one, and reveals how even those farmers 
who suggested that commercial advice was not biased also often acknowledged the 
potential for bias. Moreover, the farmers' responses to these questions suggested 
implicitly that for each pest problem there was an optimal solution which needed to be 
identified and recommended. However, every occasion that a pesticide is applied is, in 
a sense, an experiment and a farmer can never know for sure whether an optimal 
solution has been found or not. The fanner will be able to see whether the weeds have 
been effectively controlled, but will have no way of knowing whether such control 
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could have been achieved had the pesticide been applied at a lower dose rate. In these 
circumstances, the importance of the social relationships surrounding pesticide 
decisions become even more important. Crucially, and following Hawkins (1991), the 
responses from the Ouse catchment farmers about 'compensating' for bias show how, 
in some cases, pesticide practices can be seen as a negotiated outcome of the advisory 
process, with more confident and experienced farmers 'steering to compensate' when it 
comes to deciding what to do. This ability to assess critically the advice received was 
variable. At one extreme, some farmers simply chose the advisor that they found most 
amenable. For example, one respondent running a 110 ha County Council 
smallholding said 
"I favour the merchant's advice rather than ARAS, but I couldn't really 
say why. I just get on with the bloke really" [Farmer interview no. 30]. 
At the other extreme, a manager employed by a large agribusiness company to farm 420 
ha of arable land had developed a strategy to strengthen his position in relation to 
pesticide advisors. He explained, 
"If you rely on purely one company, they have their own product to sell. 
We use more than one company to minimise the risk of bias. Merchants 
are getting very conscious of this criticism though, and if you use a 
reputable firm you get much less risk of bias now" [Farmer interview 
no. 30]. 
The translation of advice into action was one of the issues highlighted by Fearne and 
Ritson's study (1989, p. 58) as an area worthy of more research, and was also 
examined here. Given the farmers' acknowledgement of the potential for commercial 
advisors to give advice on pesticide use which suited their economic interests, the 
survey examined the extent to which farmers might consider applying pesticides at dose 
rates lower than those recommended by advisors. The responses to the question were 
detailed in Table 5.4 in Chapter 5 (p. 165). 
Almost 90% of farmers said that they already undercut dose rates recommended on the 
product labels, but usually did so only on the advice of their advisor. When asked if 
they ever undercut the dose rates recommended by their advisor, less than 40% of 
farmers said they did so. They acknowledged that merchants had an interest in selling 
as much pesticide as possible, or as much of the most profitable pesticides in their 
portfolios as possible, but felt that their own advisor, with whom they had often struck 
up a close working relationship, was not biased. Farmers also justified their reluctance 
to over-ride the advice of their advisors by arguing that they did not have the necessary 
technical expertise themselves to take such risks. They suggested that if the pesticide 
failed, their negotiating position with the merchant would be undermined and their 
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opportunity to claim compensation for failure would be jeopardised. However, one 
farmer explained, 
"Labels encourage you to put on enough to make sure that it does the 
job, but in good conditions I think there is scope for cutting dose rates" 
[Farmer interview no. 45]. 
Such a strategy would involve farmers taking an economic risk. They would be trading 
off the savings on the amount of pesticide applied against the risk of the chemical not 
giving sufficient pest control. The minority of farmers who were prepared to apply 
pesticides at dose rates lower than those recommended by their advisors stressed the 
preconditions for such action. It was not something that they would do as a matter of 
course, but 'occasionally', or after 'some convincing', or 'under ideal weather 
conditions', they may decide to take a chance. As one put it 
"If you pick and choose the conditions carefully you can cut dose rates. 
I would only undercut my advisor if weather conditions are ideal. They 
give their advice to make sure you're covered, but with practice and 
experience, you can identify the weather conditions whereby you can go 
lower than they say" [Farmer interview no. 35]. 
This farmer acknowledged that there was 'room for manoeuvre' but 'going it alone' 
was seen as a risky experiment. One farmer explained 
"I don't like experimenting myself. It's very difficult to get the advisor 
to stand by a recommendation to cut the dose rate. He might say "I 
know people who get away with half rate", but he wouldn't put himself 
on the line. You then cut it at your own risk" [Farmer interview no. 30]. 
Much stronger convictions were expressed about why the dose rates recommended by 
advisors should not be undercut. Five typical responses are illustrated below: 
"I would never go lower than the advisor says. If I think he's going too 
high, I'd get another advisor" [Farmer interview no. 14]; 
"I trust his judgement and [if I undercut] I wouldn't be able to complain 
if the spray didn't work" [Farmer interview no. 17]; 
"I don't agree with cutting dose rates really because if a weed recovers 
from a lower dose, its more likely to become resistant to the chemical" 
[Farmer interview no. 43]; 
"I usually put on what he says. It's good then for compensation if 
anything goes wrong" [Farmer interview no. 50]; 
"Nobody gets rich doing half a job. I'd cut dose rates if my advisor 
recommends it but I'd never go lower than that. I wouldn't have any 
comeback on the firm if it failed" [Farmer interview no. 52]. 
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The risk of taking action independent of the advisor was too great for most farmers. If 
the treatment failed, then they would not be able to make a claim against the company. 
In issuing advice on dose rates, merchants and manufacturers share some of the 
responsibility for chemical crop protection. This sharing of responsibility is reassuring 
for many farmers who do not feel confident about their own expertise. One farmer, for 
example, said, "I figure the advisor knows his job and I know mine" [Farmer interview 
no. 54]. Such deference to the specialist expertise of advisors was widespread among 
the farmers interviewed, and appeared to differ little between farmers who favoured 
commercial or independent advice. For example, one young farm manager, running a 
300 ha arable farm, cited the merchant's representative as the most important source of 
advice on pesticides. When asked if he would consider using lower dose rates than 
those advised, he said 
"My advisor gives good advice. He's a trained agronomist. How can 
you argue with him ?" [Farmer interview no. 57]. 
The evidence from the survey demonstrates how the role of external advisors in 
pesticide decision-making is crucial in determining how much pesticide is used. Not 
only is the merchant's representative by far the most important source of advice, but the 
extent to which farmers in general are prepared to modify advice from external advisors 
is limited. In particular, farmers constantly assess the risk of pesticide failure, and the 
prospect of compensation from the manufacturers or merchants, against the possible 
savings from applying pesticides at lower dose rates. Most farmers (89%) feel there is 
scope to make savings on pesticide costs in spite of the risk, and feel that dose rates on 
product labels are set too high. Recommended dose rates on product labels are set 
within statutory limits yet 'high enough' to be sure of killing pests under a range of 
weather conditions. Just how high these rates are set is unclear because the information 
is deemed commercially sensitive and is not supplied by manufacturers. The 
willingness of farmers to exploit this potential area of savings depends on their 
confidence, knowledge and ability to withstand financial losses. Those in the survey 
most confident about experimenting with dose rates tended to be younger and more 
highly educated and were often the larger specialist cereal producers who employed a 
wider range of sources of advice. The more conservative farmers, on average, were 
older, farmed smaller units and had mixed farms where cereal production formed only a 
part of the business. 
The analysis also highlights the dominance of economic risk assessment over 
environmental risk. The greatest risk in cutting dose rates, as perceived by the farmer, 
is that of the pesticide failing and the supplier not being liable to pay compensation for 
crop failure or yield reductions. Environmental risk seems not to bear directly on the 
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farmers' decisions or the advisor's advice. This can be explained by two factors. 
First, as was shown in Chapter 3, the pollution of surface and groundwaters by 
pesticides is a new issue. During the survey farmers were asked what they thought 
were agriculture's main detrimental effects on the environment, before specific issues 
about pesticide usage were raised. Water pollution by pesticides was hardly mentioned. 
Second, there is an assumption among both farmers and advisors alike that once a 
pesticide has been scientifically tested and approved by the authorities it must be safe to 
use, provided they keep to the instructions on the product label or from the 
manufacturers' advisors. 
64 Conclusions: Externalisation and Negotiated Action 
It has been argued elsewhere that a new perspective on agrarian change in advanced 
economies is required which incorporates the reduced concern for production, the 
greater commitment to environmental protection, and the greater economic uncertainties 
farmers now face (Ward and Munton, 1992). Together, these changes demand models 
which pay more attention to farm-level considerations and the abilities of individual 
farmers and their households to negotiate their own futures than are allowed for in most 
political economy perspectives or neo-classical economic models. Thus, aspects of a 
'knowledge systems' approach to individual farmer decision-making need to be 
incorporated. Particular attention has been drawn to the concepts of negotiation and 
strategy which, when combined, emphasise the local construction of action which can 
be either constrained or liberated in particular cases by structural tendencies. 
The analysis here shows that it is the personal relations between farmers and their 
advisors that are often crucial in determining pesticide use. This is equally so whether 
advisors are independent, from ADAS, or linked to a commercial firm (Ward et al., 
1993). It is in the process of negotiation between farmers and their advisors that the 
fate of the local water environment is often sealed, although the environmental risks of 
herbicide use seem to have little impact on the outcomes of their negotiations. Indeed, 
the assumption that only 'safe' pesticides are permitted for use prevails and as a result, 
water pollution risks rarely enter the equation when decisions about which pesticides 
are to be used and in what quantities are taken. 
The importance of advice to decisions that farmers take has major implications for the 
regulation of agricultural production and underlines the need for research into the 
strategies of the agrochemical manufacturers and their merchants as well as farmers. 
There is a need to investigate the constraints the advisors themselves are under, and 
thus to 'trace the origins of action' back up the system. It is not at all clear whether 
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farmers, in general, can develop the necessary expertise in crop protection to enable 
them to modify to their advantage the pesticide advice they receive. In any case, the 
concern with protecting themselves in the event of a chemical failing suggests that many 
farmers would not modify the advice they receive even if they had the wherewithal. It 
seems more likely that with the rapidity of technological change and product 
development farmers are becoming more rather than less dependent on the technical 
expertise of external sources of advice. 
It is ironic that farmers are finding themselves increasingly reliant on advice from 
representatives with commercial interests in selling pesticides at a time when there are 
increasing economic and environmental pressures to increase the efficiency with which 
pesticides are used. During the early 1990s, articles have begun to appear in the 
farming press advising on how best to cut back on pesticide use (Proven, 1991; 
McKirdy, 1991; Abel. 1992). Abel, in discussing the new economics' of arable crop 
protection, has argued that 
"a totally new philosophy could develop whereby weed control is 
concentrated, at least in part, on traditional methods of overwinter 
cultivation. That could result in some spring crops replacing winter 
ones... The traditional cost: benefit values for agrochemicals and other 
inputs are in the melting j2ot" (Abel, 1992, p. 3, emphasis added). 
Two strategies espoused by Proven (1991) are the threshold system and the low rate 
route. Thresholds operate under the principle of 'don't spray if you don't need to' 
which tolerates a level of weed infestation in the crop up to an economic threshold 
before spraying is required. In order to be adopted, however, farmers' intolerance of 
any weeds will have to become overcome (Chapter 5). Proven's second strategy is to 
cut dose rates. Using the two strategies in combination, average improvements in 
margins at five ADAS experimental farms have been up to £23 per hectare. However, 
the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the widespread dependence on 
commercially linked pesticide advice, and a strong reluctance to contradict the 
recommendations of external advisors will provide a major barrier to the adoption of 
such measures. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
FARM STRATEGIES. PESTICIDE POLLUTION AND REGULATION 
7.1 Introduction 
From the empirical evidence from the Ouse catchment, a number of points are clear. 
First, agricultural restructuring during the 1980s has prompted a wide range of farm 
responses placing farming practices like pesticide usage in markedly different 
production contexts. Second, farmers still find their increasing dependence on chemical 
technologies unproblematic in environmental terms, and are confident that all pesticides 
will have been thoroughly tested before being approved for use. Third, herbicides, in 
particular, have been crucial in enabling cereal production to take place in the area, and 
the farmers' strong convictions about the threat to their crops from weeds stands in 
contrast to their perception of water pollution risks from pesticides as being long term, 
unclear and unproven. Fourth, in determining which pesticides get used, and how, the 
role of technical advisors is usually critical, with the majority of farmers unwilling or 
incapable of modifying the advice they receive. 
In this chapter, these themes are examined in more detail, drawing some links between 
farmers' practices, types of farm enterprises, and farm development trajectories. The 
chapter will go on to further explore how farmers understand the seriousness of 
pollution problems and their roles in creating them, how they perceive the nature of the 
pollution problem from pesticides, and their relations with the regulatory authorities. 
The Ouse catchment farmers' attitudes and experiences will then be contrasted with 
findings from the PATCH Programme's study of dairy farmers in Devon. 
Finally, farmers' possible responses to a series of regulatory measures aimed at tackling 
water pollution from agricultural pesticides are analysed. Given that the greatest threats 
to water quality from agriculture in the Ouse catchment come from the use of cereal 
herbicides, and the autumn use of Isoproturon (IPU) in particular, the impact of three 
different regulatory scenarios are assessed. These scenarios are: a ban on the use of 
IPU in the catchment during the autumn months; a total ban on the use of IPU; and a 
ban on the use of all herbicides in the autumn. 
7.2 Farm Types and Pesticide Practices 
Over half the farmers said that they would not consider applying herbicides at dose rates 
lower than those recommended by technical advisors, while under 40% said they 
sometimes went lower (Table 5.4, p. 165). Those who admitted to undercutting the 
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rates recommended by advisors usually went on to say that they did so only when 
conditions were strictly suitable (when weather conditions were ideal) and not as a 
matter of course. Specialist arable producers were more likely to undercut dose rates 
than their counterparts with significant livestock enterprises. Seventeen of the 37 arable 
and mainly arable producers (45.9%) said that they already undercut the dose rates 
recommended by their advisors or would consider doing so, compared to 7 of the 23 
mainly livestock farmers (30.4%). There was also a relationship between a belief in the 
potential for bias in commercial advice and the propensity to modify advice. The vast 
majority of farmers (19 out of 22) who were prepared to undercut dose rates believed 
that commercial advice could be biased. 
Those that did undercut dose rates recommended by advisors were, on average, a group 
of larger farms with a greater proportion of household income derived from agriculture. 
The mean farm size of the 'undercutters' was 293 ha compared with just 205 ha for 
those not prepared to modify advice (and 218 ha for the whole sample)1. Also, on 
average, the 'undercutters' derived 85% of total household income from agriculture 
compared to only 72% for those unwilling to modify advice (and 73% for the whole 
sample). There was, however, very little difference between the mean ages of the two 
groups of farmers. 
Those farmers seeking to survive through diversification or land development were 
more likely to undercut dose rates than the disengagers, in particular (see Table 7.1). 
Indeed, only one of the 11 disengagers ever applied cereal herbicides at dose rates 
lower than those recommended, compared with two-thirds of the developers and 
diversifiers. Those following the most 'agricultural' strategies - the adjusters and 
expanders - fell between these two extremes, although half the expanders said they did 
sometimes undercut advised dose rates. Often those farmers who had sought new 
sources of income did so because of severe financial pressures and squeezed margins 
for cereal production. Attempts to reduce the herbicide bill by as much as possible 
could, therefore, be seen as compatible with such a strategy. However, willingness to 
undercut advised dose rates is not strongly associated with profitability, although those 
who were making a profit were, on average, more willing to undercut than those 
making a loss or breaking even (see Table 7.2) . 
1 However, a difference of means test revealed that the differences in mean farm size were not 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
189 
Table 7.1 - Willingness to Undercut Dose Rates Recommended by Advisors and Farm Development Trajectories (Number of farmers) 
--------------------- -------------------- 
Already 
------------------ 
Would 
------------------------ 
Would not 
--------------- 
Don't 
undercut consider consider know 
--------------------- Adjusters -------------------- 8 ------------------ 0 
------------------------ 12 
--------------- 3 
(23 farms) 
Expanders 5 1 5 1 
(12 farms) 
Diversifiers 4 1 1 1 
(7 farms) 
Developers 4 2 3 1 
(10 farms) 
Disengagers 1 0 9 1 
(11 farms) 
--------------------- 
Whole -------------------- ------------------ ------------------------ --------------- 
sample 
--------------------- 
22 
-------------------- 
4 
------------------ 
30 
------------------------ 
7 
--------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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Willinanpcc to TTnrerrilt fnce Ritt RPrnmmenrdM. M by Advi 
--------------------- -------------------- 
Already 
------------------ 
Would 
------------------------ 
Would not 
--------------- 
Don't 
--------------------- 
undercut 
-------------------- 
consider 
------------------ 
consider 
------------------------ 
know 
--------------- 
Made a profit 11 2 15 3 
(31 farms) 
Made a loss 5 2 9 4 
(20 farms) 
Broke even 6 0 6 0 
(12 farms) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Whole 
sample 22 4 30 7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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In summary, the analysis here suggests that there are noticeable differences between the 
ways farmers in different social and economic circumstances use herbicides and modify 
the advice they receive. Certainly, all are not acting in the same way simply in response 
to price differentials and market conditions. The type of farm business, the mix of 
enterprises and the direction of its development all help to form the context within 
which decisions about what types of herbicides to use and how to use them are taken. 
1.3 Farmers' Understandings of Pollution and Regulation 
Because agricultural pollution is a relatively recent issue of public and political concern, 
little is known about how farmers' understand the nature of the pollution problem. This 
section addresses this gap in our knowledge with particular reference to pesticide 
pollution. In doing so, it is possible for the analysis to parallel other work carried out 
under the PATCH research programme3. As part of the programme, sixty dairy farms 
in Devon were surveyed by the author in 1991 using a similar questionnaire to that for 
the Ouse catchment survey, but the Devon survey concentrated on the pollution of 
rivers by livestock effluents (see Lowe et al., 1992a; Ward and Lowe, 1994; Ward et 
al., 1994). During the survey in the Ouse catchment, farmers were asked the same 
types of question about agricultural pollution. It must also be stressed that in their 
immediate responses to questions about agricultural pollution and its regulation, the 
farmers mostly talked about pollution from livestock effluents and occasionally about 
nitrates. Over two thirds of the sample carried some livestock on their farms, and it 
tended to be the associated effluents that most farmers first thought of when discussing 
pollution risks. Moreover, those specialist arable producers who had no livestock often 
had some difficulty in thinking about pollution risks from their own farming practices at 
all, and were much more likely to consider water pollution and its regulation as, in the 
main, a problem for 'other' types of farmer. Water pollution from pesticides was not 
something which the Ouse catchment farmers had a clear understanding of, or detailed 
views about, in contrast to Devon's dairy farmers where the issue of pollution from 
livestock effluents had a much higher profile. 
From the responses to the questions about pollution two divergent views were 
apparent, as had been the case in Devon. In both surveys there were farmers at each 
extreme arguing that pollution regulations were either an unfair attack on an already 
beleaguered industry or that pollution regulations were a necessary step towards putting 
agriculture's house in order. For example, farmers were asked what they thought 
3 Footnote No. 3 on p. 16 explained how the research for this thesis was conducted alongside other 
contract research work. Most closely related was the PATCH (Pollution, Agriculture and Technology 
Change) Programme's study of water pollution from livestock effluents on Devon dairy farms. 
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would be the effects of a strict prosecution policy for pollution incidents. Of the 63 
farmers, 37 (or 59%) felt that it would help to reduce pollution. However, 14 farmers 
(22%) argued that a strict prosecution policy would be detrimental to the industry and 
would drive some farmers out of business (see Table 7.3). 
There was a similar split between positive and negative views when farmers were asked 
their opinion about current incentives to prevent pollution. Half of them thought that 
these were adequate (Table 7.4). Amongst this group there was generally praise for the 
high level of grant for pollution control equipment (to store effluents and pesticides, for 
example), although there was also an undercurrent of concern that, while farmers might 
have done all that was expected of them in improving their facilities, accidents could 
still happen and they would still be liable. Twenty-five farmers (40%) felt that the 
incentives were not adequate. There was a sense that it was unfair for farmers to 
contribute much at all in a situation where they were being obliged to comply with 
policy and where the money spent would bring them no financial return, especially at a 
time of recession in the farming industry. 
Farmers were also asked how they felt about agricultural pollution compared to 
pollution from industry, and how its regulation was affecting agriculture in general, and 
their own farms in particular (Tables 7.5 - 7.7). Around two thirds of farmers 
interviewed felt that pollution from agriculture was not as significant as that from 
industry, a similar proportion to that in Devon. Under a fifth of the farmers in the Ouse 
catchment felt that agricultural pollution was significant in comparison, and this 
proportion is noticeably lower than that found in Devon. Farm pollution of rivers has 
been an issue of great public concern locally in Devon, and farmers have become more 
sensitized to the issue, and to pollution risks, through regulatory, advisory and media 
campaigns (see Ward et al., 1994). This could explain the greater willingness to accept 
farm pollution as a significant issue there. The higher profile regulatory stance adopted 
in Devon involving Britain's first advisory campaign aimed specifically at farm 
pollution was also reflected in the fact that only a third of Ouse catchment farmers felt 
that agricultural pollution was being more strictly dealt with than industry, compared 
with almost a half of the Devon dairy farmers interviewed (Table 7.6). The farmers of 
the Ouse catchment were much more confident that industry and agriculture were being 
treated the same, perhaps reflecting the fact that they were, in effect, being subjected to 
less forceful regulation than the dairy farmers in Devon. 
Evidence supporting this view can be found in the farmers' perceptions of the impact of 
pollution regulation (Table 7.7). A quarter of the Ouse farmers felt that pollution 
regulation was something that only really affected livestock farmers, and seven farmers 
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Table 7.3 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'What do you think would be the 
effect s on farmers of a strict prosecution policy for pollution incidents ?' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No* % No % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
It would reduce pollution 34 57% 37 59% 
It would drive some farmers 
out of business 21 35% 14 22% 
It would cause resentment in 
the farming community 6 10% 8 13% 
Don't Know 
------------------------------------- 
3 
-------------- 
5% 
--------------- 
4 
------------ 
6% 
---------------- 
Note: Some Devon farmers gave responses to this question that fell into more than one 
category. 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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Table 7 .4- Farmers' Responses to the Question Do you think that there are adequate incentives to prevent pollution on farms generally ?' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Yes 35 58% 31 49% 
No 24 40% 25 40% 
Don't Know 
------------------------------ 
1 
--------------------- 
2% 
--------------- 
7 
------------ 
11% 
---------------- 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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Table 7.5 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'Do you think that pollution from 
agriculture is significant compared to pollution from industry? ' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Yes 16 27% 12 19% 
No 39 65% 43 68% 
Don't Know 5 8% 8 13% 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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Table 6- Farmers' Responses to the Question 'Do you think that pollution by 
agriculture is being dealt with in the same way as pollution by industry ?' 
------------------------------------- ----------------------------- 
Devon (60) 
---------------------------- 
Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
------------------------------------- 
Industry and agriculture 
-------------- --------------- ------------ ---------------- 
treated the same 15 25% 29 46% 
Tougher on agriculture 29 48% 20 32% 
Tougher on industry 1 2% 1 2% 
Don't Know 
------------------------------------- 
5 
-------------- 
8% 
--------------- 
12 
------------ 
19% 
---------------- 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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Table-7.7 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'What impact do you think pollution 
rre 
_l 
tions have had on farming practices gen y? ' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Pollution has been reduced 
Costs/ difficulties have 
increased 
Farmers are much more aware 
No effect 
Improved handling of 
agrochemicals 
Regulations have only 
affected livestock farmers 
Don't Know 
19 32% - - 
25 42% 7 11% 
16 27% 25 40% 
1 2% 5 8% 
- - 4 6% 
-- 15 24% 
--7 11% 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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felt unable to respond at all. While 40% of the Ouse farmers felt that farmers had been 
made more aware of pollution risks, none claimed that pollution had been reduced. 
This compares with a third of Devon dairy farmers who could see (and had paid for) 
widespread investment in pollution control equipment and were confident that river 
quality was improving as a result. 
When it came to pollution risks from pesticides, farmers in the Ouse catchment saw 
storage and handling as the main areas where improvements had been made and 
pollution risks had been reduced (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). This is where most regulation, 
technical innovation and inspection by the HSE, had been concentrated, leaving the 
timing and rates of application as the least regulated aspects of pesticide use. 
From the responses to this series of open-ended questions about pollution from 
farming, it became clear that the problem of agricultural pollution is viewed by different 
farmers in different ways, but with some consistent patterns. Like the analysis of the 
60 Devon dairy farms for the PATCH Programme, (see Ward, 1994; Ward and Lowe, 
1994; Ward et al., 1994) three categories were established for the Ouse catchment 
farmers, including two contrasting positions and a large, middle-ground group4. 
The Sceptical Farmers: A group of 8 farmers in the Ouse sample (13%) was inclined 
to adopt the stance of "what pollution problem ?". Farmers in this (minority) group felt 
that the pollution issue had been "blown up out of all proportion" and that regulation 
had "gone too far" in restricting what farmers could do. They were most likely to feel 
embattled by pollution regulation and tended to be the most vocal complainants of the 
farmers' treatment. All in the group felt that agricultural pollution was far less of a 
problem than industrial pollution, and suspected that farmers were being more strictly 
regulated because they were "easy targets". Some farmers in the group also questioned 
whether agricultural pollutants, such as livestock effluents, were 'serious' pollutants at 
all. 
Farmers: A larger group of 33 farmers (52% of the sample) tended 
to see causing pollution as what might be characterised as a form of rule breaking. 
They readily acknowledged that farm pollution was a problem and that measures had to 
be taken to solve it. Critically, however, they saw pollution as a problem for farming, 
rather than as a problem of farming5. The sense, among this majority group of 
4 Responses to questions no. 126,127,128,129,133 and 134 were the main source of information 
used to place farmers in one of the three categories (see Appendix B). 
5A similar distinction has been identified by Susan Carr's research on farmers' attitudes to conservation 
(see Carr, 1988; Carr and Tait, 1990). 
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Table 7.8 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'What impact do you think pollution 
regulations have had on this farm in particular ?' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No effect 22 37% 25 40% 
Pollution control equipment 
has been installed 34 57% 14 22% 
More care taken generally 16 27% 6 10% 
Stopped dairying 1 2% 3 5% 
Improved handling of 
agrochemicals -- 13 21% 
Cut nitrogen use --1 2% 
Reduced straw burning 
-------------------------------------- 
--1 
---------------------------------------- 
2% 
---------------- 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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farmers, was one of pollution regulations coming from changes in policy that were 
beyond their control, but had to be adhered to if only because it was unacceptable to 
break laws and regulations. In other words, pollution is a problem chiefly in the sense 
that it "can get you into trouble". The main difficulty, as perceived by this group of 
farmers, was how to meet new regulations and the restrictions they implied. These 
farmers tended not to question the need for action to curb pollution and generally 
accepted that livestock effluents, in particular, caused pollution problems. However, 
there was a feeling of ambivalence. For example, whilst the farmers acknowledged the 
environmental threat, they found the notion of water pollution being caused by 'normal' 
pesticide practices particularly problematic, and generally treated the issue as an 
administrative one. Their actions appear to be motivated by a need to 'keep the 
authorities happy' rather than by their own moral imperative. However, several 
farmers in this group argued that much pollution, particularly that from farm effluents, 
is "accidental" in that it often results from heavy rain causing yard run-off, or from the 
failure of effluent storage facilities. They felt, on the whole, that farmers who had been 
the "victims" of such "accidents" should be treated leniently and encouraged to make 
improvements to pollution control facilities. They were keen to distinguish between 
these "accidents" and the "much more serious" pollution incidents which involved the 
deliberate disposal of effluents or pesticides into watercourses, where, they stressed, 
the full force of the law should be brought to bear. 
c) The Radical Farmers: A third group of 22 farmers (35% of the sample) tended to see 
pollution as something reprehensible. Farmers in this (minority) group accepted the 
need for regulation to address farm pollution problems. They expressed approval of the 
regulations, describing them, for example, as "a good thing" that would help to "put 
agriculture's house in order". Most were quite emphatic that regulations must be 
adhered to and that the adoption of improved environmental practices was for the good 
of the industry as a whole. It is, these farmers tended to agree, the responsibility of the 
individual farmer to ensure that pollution is adequately prevented. One of the defining 
characteristics of this group was their unwillingness to differentiate between accidental 
and deliberate pollution incidents. 
These findings from the Ouse catchment can be compared with those from the survey of 
dairy farmers in Devon (Table 7.9). In the Ouse sample, a smaller proportion of 
farmers were classed as 'sceptics' and a larger proportion as 'radicals'. This would 
seem to support conclusions from the PATCH Programme research in Devon which 
suggested that it has been social change in the countryside which has helped begin to 
transform values in agriculture (Ward et al., 1994). It is those farmers who remain 
most strongly committed to the notion of agriculture as a special case for public support 
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Table 7.9 - Pollution Perception Groups 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Devon (60) Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sceptical farmers 10 17% 8 13% 
Ambivalent farmers 37% 62% 33 52% 
Radical farmers 13 22% 22 35% 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
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who find it most difficult to accept the seriousness of farm pollution problems or to 
incorporate measures to reduce pollution risk into their routine farming practices. 
However, as farm families become more closely linked to non-agricultural social 
networks in the countryside, so their view of agriculture as a special case weakens. 
Increasing social and economic contacts with new, middle-class ruralites provides a 
route by which new environmental values can flow into the farm household. 
In this case, it might be expected that there would be a greater proportion of radicals and 
fewer sceptics in the Ouse catchment compared to Devon for several reasons. Firstly, 
agriculture is more closely integrated with the wider rural economy and society in the 
Ouse catchment. In Devon a larger proportion of people work in agriculture and related 
industries and strong family farming values can still be found6. In conducting the two 
farm surveys, there was a greater feeling that the Devon sample comprised a farming 
'community', with farm families knowing each other within a district. Farmers also 
had regular opportunities to meet with each other at local livestock markets. This sense 
of a community was much less apparent in the Ouse catchment. Sampled farms in 
Devon also tended to be more geographically isolated, and were often clustered in small 
farming hamlets and villages. In the Ouse catchment, agriculture's retreat from its 
dominant position in the rural economy and rural land use has had a longer history. 
The catchment serves as a commuter zone for London, and experienced a land 
development boom in the 1980s. Moreover, the Devon farmers were all dairy farmers, 
and the incessant, day to day demands of running a dairy unit are a major barrier to 
farm diversification for dairy farm families, even in a tourist area like Devon. By 
comparison, farmers in the Ouse catchment were much more likely to have diversified, 
and as a result, were welcoming people from the nearby towns of Bedford and Milton 
Keynes regularly onto their farms. (For example, two-thirds of the Devon farm 
households studied relied entirely upon agriculture for their income compared with less 
than one third of those in the Ouse catchment). 
The characteristics of the farmers in each of the three groups provides more support for 
the findings from the Devon analysis (Table 7.10). The average age of the farmers falls 
as 'sensitivity' to pollution increases. The average age of the sceptics was 51.5 years, 
6 According to figures from the Agricultural and Population Censuses, 1.2% of the economically active 
population in Buckinghamshire worked in agriculture in 1991 compared to 4.2% in Devon. Data from 
earlier studies have also documented the distribution of farms from a 'pure' family farm type to 
'corporate farming businesses' in different farming regions in Britain (Whatmore et al., 1987a; b; 
Marsden et al., 1992b; see also Gasson and Errington, 1993, pp. 73-77). Although similar analyses 
have not been conducted for the Devon and Ouse catchment samples, immediately neighbouring 
districts in Dorset and Bedfordshire have been studied. It was found that 81.8% of Dorset farms fell into 
the least subsumed, more 'pure' family farm type compared to only 55.7% in Bedfordshire (Marsden et 
al., 1992b). 
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Table 7.10 - Farm Characteristics by Pollution Perception Groups 
---------------- 
Category 
---------------- 
Average 
------------------ 
Average 
------------------ 
Average 
----------------- 
Average 
-------------- 
% 
size % under farmer % planning 
(ha) cereals age farming for 
income succession 
---------------- Sceptics ---------------- 358.3 ------------------ 50.0 ------------------ 51.5 ------------------ 79.0 -------------- 50.0 
(8 farms) 
Ambivalent 
farmers 194.0 47.6 49.0 79.2 57.6 
(33 farms) 
radicals 201.5 49.1 46.3 61.6 50.0 
(22 farms) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Whole 
sample 217.5 48.6 48.4 73.0 54.0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Fann survey. 
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compared to 49 years for the ambivalent farmers and 46.3 for the radicals. Also, 
agricultural income was relatively less important for the radicals. Only 62% of total 
household income, on average, was derived from agricultural production among the 
radicals, compared to 79% among the sceptics and the ambivalent farmers7. 
However, evidence that would link commitment to succession with perceptions of 
pollution is not as strong as in the Devon dairying sample. In Devon, commitment to 
succession declined as farmers' 'sensitivity' to the pollution issue increased. In the 
Ouse catchment, half of the radicals and half of the sceptics were planning for 
succession, while the proportion among the ambivalent farmers was 57%. This 
compares with 80% of Devon sceptics, under two-thirds of ambivalent farmers and 
under half the radicals (see Ward and Lowe, 1994). In the Ouse catchment, there are 
no strong patterns in tenure, enterprise type or farm strategy that can be linked to the 
pollution perception categories, although it is notable that there are no dairy farmers 
among the sceptics, suggesting perhaps that they have become more sensitized to farm 
pollution issues than their arable counterparts because of the specific risks arising from 
dairy farm effluents. 
7.4 Farmers and the Regulatory Authorities 
Farmers were also asked about their relations with the two main regulatory bodies 
responsible for pesticide use and protection of the water environment. Fifty-five 
farmers (87.3% of the sample) had been visited by the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) in recent years. Of these, 8 had received visits that were other than routine (i. e. 
in relation to specific safety issues or incidents), and four of these had been visited 
specifically in relation to the new COSHH (Control of Substances Hazardous to Health) 
Regulations8. When asked 'what sort of things do the HSE pick up on when visiting 
your farm ?' 38 farmers mentioned machinery and fixed equipment, 14 pesticide 
storage facilities, and only 8 safety precautions for spraying practices. Three farmers 
had had spot checks in relation to spraying practice. 
The findings reveal the relative weakness of the relations between farmers and the 
regulatory agency responsible for pesticide spraying practices. Most contact was 
through routine visits and it was machinery and fixed equipment that was inspected 
most often. This would seem to support the concerns of the Institution of Professional 
7 However, two sample difference of means tests revealed that these differences in mean farmer age and 
agricultural income were not statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
8 COSHH regulations had been introduced in 1988 and required that farmers assess the risks to workers 
and the environment posed by the use of chemicals on their farms and record these on paper as a 
'COSHH assessment'. 
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Civil Servants who estimated that, nationally, the average farm is visited only once in 
every 9.8 years, and a self-employed farmer might not see an inspector for 29 years 
(see British Medical Association, 1992, p. 66). While most farmers had had some 
contact with HSE agricultural inspectors, their role in regulating how pesticides are 
applied seems, from the survey evidence, limited and aimed more at worker safety than 
protection of the water environment. Moreover, the majority of farmers were not 
particularly favourably disposed towards the HSE (Table 7.11). For example, one 
farmer, categorised as 'ambivalent' about pollution who ran a 150 ha dairy and arable 
farm saw HSE's role as interference. He explained 
"They're a pain in the neck and have the wrong approach and are 
arrogant. They pick up on little safety bits and pieces. It's not like 
pollution where other people get affected. It's just your own safety 
that's at risk. It should be my choice, like whether to wear a seatbelt" 
[Farmer interview no. 4]. 
Other farmers saw HSE's role as indicative of a bureaucratic onslaught on agriculture, 
and were suspicious of the motives of regulators. One such farmer with a 100 ha dairy 
and arable farm complained that 
"They are too pernickety. There is a whole new bureaucratic world 
building up there, another strata of people riding on our backs, finding 
problems just to justify their jobs" [Fanner interview no. 62]. 
The majority of farmers remained indifferent towards the HSE. As one farmer 
explained, "I can't say I'm pleased to see them but they're few and far between" 
[Farmer interview no. 49]. 
Only nine farmers described their dealings with the HSE in a positive light. One such 
farmer on a large 500 ha arable farm was concerned, however, that agricultural 
specialists within the HSE would be replaced by people more used to dealing with other 
types of industry. Of those HSE officials who had visited his farm, he said 
"So far so good. They've always had an agricultural specialist and so 
have understood agriculture. They are very helpful and gently point out 
if something's amiss. They haven't come in with guns firing. The're 
very constructive. But my fear is that the next HSE chap spends most 
of his time in factories and doesn't understand agriculture. You used to 
feel you were talking to a colleague. I'm not so sure about the new 
breed who seem to be more geared to industry's experiences" [Farmer 
interview no. 5]. 
Farmers were also asked about their views on the new National Rivers Authority 
(NRA). In this case, questions differentiated between the farmers' views about the 
organisation as a whole, and their dealings with its officials in the field. Although the 
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Table 7.11 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'How do you find HSE officials ?' 
Response No. of Farmers °Io 
Favourable 9 16 
Indifferent 36 65 
Unfavourable 10 18 
Source: Farm survey. 
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NRA are the main regulatory body responsible for protecting the water environment, 
they have little to do with pesticide spraying practices (NRA, 1992; RCEP, 1992). 
Instead, their contact with farmers usually involves inspections of effluent and storage 
facilities. It was, therefore, the livestock farmers in the sample that had had more 
contact with the NRA. Farmers' overall impressions of the NRA as an organisation are 
shown in Table 7.12. Nineteen farmers (30%) expressed unfavourable views about the 
NRA (compared with 14 (23%) from the PATCH survey in Devon). Many of the Ouse 
farmers, especially the specialist arable producers, had had no contact at all. Of those 
who were unfavourably disposed, a common complaint was that the NRA had begun 
charging for abstraction and discharge consents. As one farmer on a 140 ha arable and 
sheep farm explained 
"I don't think they are in touch with the farmer in the field. There's a lot 
of ground between us and them. The way they raise their money is 
unfair and gets the farmers' backs up" [Farmer interview no. 32]. 
Other complaints were that the NRA were too 'bureaucratic', 'confrontational' and 
'officious'. It was often argued that the NRA did not understand farming, resulting in 
an 'us and them' feeling amongst farmers. One farmer running a 315 ha mixed farm 
was more specific, saying that 
"They are an appointed body and are out to be dictatory. They are not 
representative enough. They are a new body with new powers and are 
flexing their muscles a bit. The big stick approach would be better if 
there was more liaison first" [Farmer interview no. 35]. 
Farmers were asked what experience they had had of the new NRA and how this 
compared with the old water authorities before privatisation. The results are shown in 
Tables 7.13 and 7.14. Over half the farmers had not had any personal contact with the 
NRA. Of those who had, most were indifferent. The most common complaint was the 
lack of detailed knowledge of farming practices amongst NRA fieldstaff. 
More farmers could recall having been in contact with the old regional water authorities 
before water privatisation, and a third of the sample had noticed differences in 
regulatory style between the old authorities and the new NRA, with the NRA pursuing 
stricter enforcement strategies which did not bode well for farming. One farmer 
explained "The old water authorities' policy favoured agriculture more", and another 
complained that the regulators "have gone from being practically-oriented to 
bureaucratic and bungling. " However, one farmer who ran a 200 ha mixed dairy and 
arable farm had a more specific complaint about the change of regime. He explained 
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Table 7.12 - Farmers' Responses to the Question 'What is your impression of the 
National Rivers Authority ?' 
---------------------- -------------------------- 
Devon (60) 
---------------------- 
Ouse (63) 
No % No % 
---------------------- 
Indifferent 
----------- 
27 
--------------- 
45% 
------------ 
15 
---------- 
24% 
Favourable 9 15% 10 16% 
Don't know 10 17% 19 30% 
Unfavourable 14 23% 19 30% 
Source: Farm survey and PATCH Programme farm survey in Devon. 
209 
Table 7 . 13 - Farmers' Responses to the Question How 
did you find the new NRA/ old 
water authority officials ?' 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Re spon se National Rivers Old 
Authority Water 
Authority 
No contact 38 (60.3%) 25 (39.7%) 
Favourable 5 (7.9%) 6 (9.5%) 
Indifferent 14 (22.2%) 25 (39.7%) 
Unfavourable 6 (9.5%) 7(11.1%) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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Table 7 . 14 - Farmers' Responses to the 
Question 'Have you noticed any differences 
between the old water authority and the new NRA ?' 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Response No of Farmers % 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
No Difference 40 63.5 
Higher fees now 7 11.1 
Stricter enforcement 12 19.0 
Other 4 6.3 
Source: Farm survey. 
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"The old pollution people were more attached to the river while the NRA 
are expected by the public to go and get results. We used to feel we 
belonged to our catchment. It's like local government rather than 
national. You are concerned about what happens in your own backyard. 
But now the NRA is a national body and it's less personal" [Farmer 
interview no. 18]. 
L5 Regulating Farmers and Protecting Water 
The specific nature of the pollution risk in the Ouse catchment was outlined in Chapter 
5, but two further developments demand comment. First, because of the increasing 
recognition of Isoproturon as a problematic pesticide pollutant of water (Harvey, 1990; 
Fielding, 1992; NRA, 1992, p. 138; RCEP, 1992, p. 231), its use has come under 
closer scrutiny. In 1990, MAFF announced that, in line with commitments given in the 
DoE's White Paper, 'This Common Inheritance', 38 active pesticide ingredients 
including Isoproturon would be reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Pesticides 
(MAFF, 1990). Results of the review are not yet available, although one possibility is 
the introduction of restrictions on the use of Isoproturon, or even its complete ban from 
the market. 
At the same time, the NRA has been emphasising the value of catchment management 
planning as a strategy for controlling pollution (NRA, 1990; 1991; 1992, p. 79; RCEP, 
1992, pp. 164-165). This would allow the identification of vulnerable surface and 
groundwaters leading to the designation of water protection zones under the 1991 Water 
Resources Act. Restrictions on farming practices, including the use of particular 
pesticides, could then be imposed in specified catchments. Similar schemes, common 
in continental Europe, are already being piloted under MAFF's Nitrate Sensitive Areas 
schemes, although restrictions on farming practice have so far been voluntary, 
accompanied by compensation payments and, crucially, administered by MAFF rather 
than the NRA (Seymour et al., 1992). 
In the light of these two developments, three possible regulatory scenarios and their 
possible impacts on agriculture in the Ouse catchment are considered here. The 
scenarios are: a ban on the autumn use of IPU in the catchment; a total ban on the use of 
IPU; and a ban on the use of all herbicides in the autumn. 
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7 . 5.1 Responses to an Autumn Ban on IPU Use 
Farmers were asked what they might do if Isoproturon (IPU) was banned from autumn 
use9. Responses are shown in Table 7.15. The most common response to an autumn 
ban would be to switch to another chemical such as Chlortoluron (Dicurane) or 
Fenoxapropethyl (Cheetah). The former is also a pre-emergent herbicide whilst the 
latter is a contact herbicidei0. Twenty-six farmers (44%) said that this would be their 
most likely response. It was clear that IPU plays a very important role in their arable 
cropping, and a ban on its use in the autumn would cause major problems for most of 
the farmers because of the increased threat to cereal crops from blackgrass weeds in 
particular that would result. As one elderly farmer on a small 30 ha holding explained 
"I'd have to seriously think about not growing wheat. You can't grow 
wheat and blackgrass. The blackgrass will kill the wheat. You could 
try killing it in the spring using Cheetah. It's one of the new ones. . . 
but 
it's much dearer" [Farmer interview no. 21]. 
Another farmer in his 30s running a large 600 ha arable farm explained; 
"We wouldn't have a crop. IPU is very important. The blackgrass is 
unbelievable. It's very serious. Once after oilseed rape we didn't spray 
for blackgrass, but the next year it cost us twice as much to spray. We 
couldn't really farm without IPU" [Farmer interview no. 41]. 
The idea of leaving blackgrass weeds in the crop until the spring and dealing with them 
then did not seem a viable option, particularly for those farmers who placed great value 
on 'clean', weed-free fields. One farmer with about a third of his 140 ha sown with 
winter cereals said 
"It would look bloody dirty. You'd get weed infestation and it would 
affect yields.... maybe by up to 60%. I don't know what I'd do. I'd 
have to see what other alternative chemicals were available" [Farmer 
interview no. 32]. 
The most commonly cited alternative to using IPU in the autumn was to use the new 
contact herbicide, Cheetah. However, the main problem, as the farmers saw it, was the 
relatively higher cost of contact herbicides in general, and Cheetah in particular. This is 
because Cheetah is a new product which is still under patent. The company, Hoescht, 
have a monopoly on its production. Its cost is about £22 per acre (£54 per hectare), 
compared with £ 10-£ 14 per acre (£25-£35 per hectare) for IPU. One farmer, growing 
9 All the farmers surveyed in the Ouse catchment used IPU at some stage for weed control in cereals. 
(For further details about IPU and its herbicidal action see pp. 107-110). 
10 Contact herbicides kill weed foilage on contact, and so are less likely to need to be persistent in the 
environment (see Hassan, 1990). 
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Table 7.15 - Farmers' Responses to an Autumn Ban on IPU Use 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Response No. of % 
farmers 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Don't know (I 
would have to 6 10.2 
ask my advisor) 
Use IPU in the 
spring and drill 14 23.7 
later 
Switch to another 
chemical (Cheetah 26 44.1 
or Chlortoluron) 
Spring cropping 5 8.5 
Change cropping 
pattern / rotation 2 3.4 
Use cultural methods 
of weed control 2 3.4 
No effect 8 13.6 
Consider stopping 
cereal production 4 6.8 
or set aside 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 59 100% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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110 ha of winter cereals in 1991, estimated that using a contact herbicide in the spring 
would increase herbicide costs by about 50%. He explained, 
"It would increase the cost of the chemical bill as we'd have to use a 
more expensive contact herbicide in the spring. Cheetah would work 
out 50% dearer to get the same level of weed control. It would put a 
strain on viability and would make my blood boil. The chemical 
companies are ripping us off. IPU is competitively priced, but we'd 
have to use patent chemicals" [Farmer interview no. 36]. 
The option of switching to Dicurane rather than Cheetah seemed to be the least 
disruptive. However, Dicurane's main active ingredient, Chlortoluron, is persistent 
and has also been detected in surface and groundwaters at levels above the EC's MAC 
(Croll, 1991; RCEP, 1992) and so future restrictions on IPU could also be applied to 
Chlortoluron. The chemical can only be used in conjunction with particular cereal 
varieties, and so a switch from IPU to Dicurane could also mean a change of varieties 
grown. As one farm manager responsible for 356 ha of arable land owned by a large 
farming company explained 
"I'd use a different chemical. We use Dicurane where we can and then 
IPU on the non-Dicurane varieties .... We could switch to more Dicurane varieties but a chemical switch is easier than a cropping switch. 
Anyway, non-Dicurane varieties tend to be the best yielding.... Last year 
was the first year that Cheetah was available. People are still sussing 
out dose rates" [Farmer interview no. 60]. 
Cheetah would involve a chemical switch rather than a cropping switch but, as the 
farmer above pointed out, farmers are still not clear how best to maximise the efficiency 
of Cheetah whilst not compromising its efficacy. Some farmers considered how 
Cheetah might prove economic to use if IPU were banned from autumn use. One 
young farmer in his early 30s thought that a combination of chemical and cultural 
methods of weed control might be workable on his large, 700 ha farm. He said 
"Firstly we'd pick the next best chemical, and secondly we'd culturally 
attempt to alleviate the problem. We could use either Cheetah or 
Hoegrass sequentially, but they're at least double the cost of IPU. 
Cheetah would require two doses. That's maybe £75 a hectare, against 
£25 for IPU. You might be able to get Cheetah down to £50"[Farmer 
interview no. 55] 11 
In the economics of crop husbandry the ability to cut dose rates by half can become 
critical. The costs of IPU vary from farmer to farmer according to the suppliers used, 
11 Different farmers cite different prices for agrochemicals. This is because while prices tend to be set 
by the agrochemical companies at the highest rate that the market can bear, there is scope for 
renegotiating lower prices if chemicals are bought in bulk. Usually, larger farmers can buy their sprays 
at lower prices. In addition, the costs of sprays vary according to whether the farmer chooses the 
accompanying advisory services or not. 
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but its markedly lower cost and its widely recognised reliability mean that a switch to 
Cheetah without an increase in costs is unlikely for most farmers. Moreover, switching 
to using fewer residual herbicides like IPU in the autumn would go against the strategy 
that many farmers in the sample were following, which was to concentrate more on pre- 
emergent weed control in the autumn. One farmer told how ADAS had been 
recommending that he use more IPU in the autumn as the most cost-effective method of 
weed control in cereals. This was also the current advice from the local merchants' 
representatives. Some farmers, however, had been cutting down on pre-emergent 
herbicides, although an autumn ban on IPU would still cause problems for them. One 
farmer running a 550 ha mixed farm over half of which was down to cereals explained 
"It would have a drastic effect. We rely quite a lot on IPU. We'd have 
a lot of blackgrass. I'm probably using less IPU. It's getting to the 
stage now where we can hit the weeds at a later stage and it's more 
effective" [Farmer interview no. 48]. 
Leaving weeds until a later stage in their growth can be a risky strategy, particularly 
given the competitiveness of blackgrass. The size of the weed is important, because 
with older plants the flesh has a chance to harden and consolidate. Fresh, newly 
emergent weeds are easier to kill with Cheetah, although higher dose rates will be 
required if weeds are left to strengthen. 
The second most common response to an autumn ban on IPU was to drill cereals later 
and then use IPU in the spring. Just under a quarter of the farmers said this would be 
their response. Again, this option seemed to be much less attractive than carrying on 
with IPU in the autumn. As one farmer in his late 50s on a 400 ha arable and sheep 
farm explained 
"No IPU in the autumn would be disastrous because of the blackgrass. 
Maybe not in the first year but in the second and third it would be 
dramatic. We tried it three years ago, using no IPU, and the [yield] loss 
was 30% by the second year. It's taken us three years to get back to 
where we were" [Farmer interview no. 43]. 
Spraying in the spring would involve greater dose rates because weeds would be that 
much more established. Moreover, crop yields would suffer because of the competition 
from the weeds for water and nutrients. By drilling later, these risks would be reduced, 
but also the spring workload would be increased at a time of year when weather 
conditions are variable and heavy land is often still too wet to cultivate with farm 
machinery. There could also be problems in finding suitable times to spray. But even 
given good weather conditions and appropriate soil conditions, the perception was that 
spring spraying would be less effective in controlling blackgrass. One farmer on a 180 
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ha arable farm growing 130 ha of cereals attempted to quantify the difference. He 
claimed that 
"Blackgrass has to be controlled. I'd have to go in the spring. You get 
90% odd control in autumn but only 70% in spring" [Farmer interview 
no. 63]. 
7ý. 2 Farm Responses to a Total Ban on IPU Use 
The second scenario put to the farmers was a total withdrawal of IPU (Table 7.16). 
This would eliminate the option of continuing to use IPU outside the autumn restriction 
period. The responses shed more light on the nature of the farmers' dependence on 
IPU. Thirty-three farmers said that they would switch to Dicurane (Chlortoluron) or 
Cheetah. Again, the greater costs of adequately controlling the threat from blackgrass 
posed the biggest problem under this scenario. One farmer running a 500 ha arable 
business explained 
"We use large quantities of IPU to control blackgrass. It's pernicious, 
particularly here. If we couldn't control blackgrass we couldn't farm. 
There's only one good non-IPU product that can control blackgrass and 
that's Cheetah. It can only be used on wheat but is very safe with no 
restrictions. If IPU was banned it would have very significant effects. 
We would probably have to stop growing winter barley and of course 
Cheetah is much more expensive" [Farmer interview no. 5]. 
The farmers were more willing to consider changing chemicals than altering their 
cropping practices. As one farmers put it, "Given the market conditions at the moment, 
a change of chemicals would be the solution". One solution that was considered but 
rejected by most farmers as uneconomic was a return to spring cropping. Only two 
farmers thought this might be feasible. One suggested the 'old methods' of rotations 
and cultivations but feared their high relative cost. He said 
"We'd be going back to the old traditional method. Wait for the weeds 
to grow then harrow then drill. That would break the farm. We 
couldn't grow corn in those conditions. It would be completely 
unviable. Cereals rely on [IPU] to control the blackgrass" [Farmer 
interview no. 31]. 
Cropping changes could follow under this scenario. It would be likely that there would 
be less emphasis on cereal production and a greater emphasis on arable break crops 
such as oilseed rape, beans and linseed, a continuation of a trend already apparent in the 
catchment (see p. 151). As one farmer explained 
217 
Table-7,16 - Farmers' Responses to a Total Ban on IPU Use 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Response No. of % 
farmers 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Don't know (I 
would have to 14 24.1 
ask my advisor) 
Use IPU in the 
spring and drill - 0.0 later 
Switch to another 
chemical (Cheetah 33 56.9 
or Chlortoluron) 
Spring cropping 2 3.4 
Change cropping 
pattern / rotation 2 3.4 
Use cultural methods 
of weed control 3 5.2 
No effect 2 3.4 
Consider stopping 
cereal production 8 13.8 
or set aside 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 58 100% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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"If IPU were withdrawn it would lead to problems. I'd have to move to 
all first wheats or spring cropping, but even in first wheats you can get 
blackgrass. I don't know what I'd do. I wouldn't spring crop cereals, 
but linseed and spring rapes maybe. Half the farm would have to go to 
break crops" [Farmer interview no. 63]. 
The responses clearly show what problems such a restriction would cause the farmers. 
Their eventual action following an IPU ban would most probably be taken after 
consultation with their advisors. Indeed, almost a quarter of the farmers were unsure 
what to do. One in his late 30s running a 75 ha fairy and arable farm said 
"It would be catastrophic if we couldn't use them at all. I don't think 
there would be any other products. I don't really know, I'd have to ask 
my spray man. I rely on him" [Farmer interview no. 19]. 
For some farmers, the current economic margins for to cereal production were so tight 
that any further restrictions would lead to a re-evaluation of the whole farm strategy. 
One such farmer, when asked how a total ban on IPU would affect him, responded, "I 
don't know. It would be a headache. We would be bordering on having to go into set 
aside". Eight farmers said that a total ban on IPU would force them to consider 
stopping cereal production, possibly by entering into set-aside. This is double the 
number of farmers who gave such a response to the autumn ban. 
7,3 Responses to a Total Ban on Autumn Herbicide Spraying 
The final scenario put to the farmers was an autumn ban on the application of all 
herbicides. Responses were more evenly spread (Table 7.17), and again underline the 
fundamental importance of pre-emergent herbicides to cereal production in the 
catchment. The most common response (15 farmers) would be to switch to Cheetah, 
followed by the spring use of IPU in combination with later drilling (14 farmers). 
Eleven farmers said they might have to revert to spring cropping and withstand lower 
yields. 
A number of interesting issues emerged in the discussions with farmers. First, the 
central importance to cereal production of the autumn use of pre-emergent herbicides in 
the Ouse catchment. As one farmer who grew cereals on a third of his 140 ha 
explained, 
"It would make growing grain in North Bucks very difficult. It was 
mainly grass here and the grass weeds and seeds are deep seated. 
Marginal grain land would go out.... I'd have to think again about grain" 
[Farmer intervew no. 32]. 
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Table 7 17 - Farmers' Responses to an Autumn Ban on All Herbicides 
--------------------------------- 
Response 
---------------------------------- 
No. of 
-------------------------- 
% 
farmers 
--------------------------------- 
Don't know (I ---------------------------------- -------------------------- 
would have to 10 16.9 
ask my advisor) 
Use IPU in the 
spring and drill 14 23.4 
later 
Switch to another 
chemical 15 25.4 
Spring cropping 11 18.6 
Change cropping 
pattern / rotation 6 10.2 
Use cultural methods 
of weed control 8 13.6 
No effect 6 10.2 
Consider stopping 
cereal production 9 15.3 
or set aside 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total 59 100% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Farm survey. 
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Moreover, spraying in the spring would increase the pressures on the spring workload, 
and there were fears about weather conditions making spraying difficult in the spring 
months. One farmer who was interviewed in mid-April highlighted the problems of 
being forced to concentrate spraying in the spring. He said 
"It would make it very difficult.... Weather conditions would make it just 
about impossible. There have only been 2 decent spraying days in the 
last 6 weeks due to the wind and frost" [Farmer interview no. 19]. 
Some farmers wondered about what steps could be taken to minimise the threat to the 
crops from weeds. Four broad strategies were identified, although much of the 
discussions were tentative and theoretical. Rotational fallows may be one option. By 
leaving fields fallow, the build up of weed pests could be reduced. However, this 
would mean a proportion of each farm would lie unproductive each year. Since the 
survey was conducted, a rotational set-aside scheme has been agreed under the 
Common Agricultural Policy reforms, and it is possible that rotational set aside could 
contribute to weed control under future autumn herbicide spraying restrictions. A 
second strategy could be to drill crops later in the autumn so that weeds do not become 
a problem until the spring. However, the later the drilling, the greater the risks to the 
crop and to future spraying programmes from the weather. Smaller crop plants are less 
able to withstand harsh winters, and there is also a potential for poorer yields. 
Switching to spring-sown crops could be another option, but yields tend to be lower. 
Most farmers thought that wheat and barley yields would fall by about 30%. One final 
option could be to rely more on cultural and mechanical methods of weed control like 
direct drilling, scratch cultivation and mechanical weeding. Farmers were suspicious of 
these methods (see Chapter 5). One farmer running a 300 ha mixed farm highlighted 
the problem, when asked what the effect of restrictions would be. He claimed that 
"[They would have] a massive effect. But for residual herbicides we 
couldn't continue to farm in the same way. We could maybe carry on 
for 3 years but than have to go back to spring cropping and change the 
rotation. We could use cultural methods of weed control but the yield 
penalty would be £100 per acre. Chemicals cost £10 per acre, so you 
can see why we use chemicals" [Farmer interview no. 2]. 
Again, the scenario prompted farmers to consider set-aside as an alternative. Nine 
farmers thought that an autumn ban on herbicide spraying would leave them unable to 
carry on producing cereals. However, a small minority of farmers felt that, although 
costs would inevitably increase, they would still be able to continue. It depended on 
their current spraying systems and the amount of cereal land they had. One farmer said 
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"As long as we could use the same stuff in the spring it wouldn't make 
too much difference. It's just that it eases the workload if you do it in the 
autumn. Also, with pre-emergents, you want it to rain afterwards to 
wash it in. When we used to spray just in the spring, it was hard to find 
the time with the right conditions" [Farmer interview no. 31]. 
Another who managed a large, 650 ha arable business suggested that a total ban on 
autumn spraying would not be as bad as the total withdrawal of IPU from the market. 
He said 
"IPU could be put on in the spring. You would get satisfactory control 
but would have to put on higher doses in the spring to get the same 
control. You'd need a 50% increase in dose rate to get a result with 
blackgrass in spring compared to autumn" [Farmer interview no. 56]. 
Thus, such regulatory measures aimed at reducing pollution risks in the autumn could 
result in greater risks at other times of the year. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The survey findings presented in the first part of this chapter highlight the variability of 
pesticide practices at the farm level, particularly concerning farmers' willingness and 
ability to modify the advice received from technical specialists by undercutting dose 
rates. This is, in part, explained by the different contexts within which individual farm 
businesses are managed. For example, larger, specialist cereal producers are more 
likely to develop the technical expertise and wherewithal to be able to cut pesticide dose 
rates below those recommended. On the other hand, mixed farmers who have to 
acquire technical skills across a broader range of farming practices including livestock 
husbandry perhaps do not have the time to develop specialist expertise in pesticides and 
so find themselves more dependent on the recommendations of their advisors. 
Secondly, the survey evidence underlines the marginality of the pesticide threat to 
watercourses in the minds of the Ouse farmers. Although the majority of farmers were 
concerned that water pollution from farming practices should be tackled, either because 
it was morally reprehensible or was breaking environmental regulations, most saw 
pollution as primarily a problem of the mishandling of livestock effluents. Farmers 
were generaaly not aware of the pollution risks from the 'normal' and routine use of 
cereal herbicides, for example. This led to a feeling that water pollution from farming 
was a problem going on somewhere else' (such as in Devon, for example) and perhaps 
explains the greater level of moral opprobrium attached to pollution amongst the Ouse 
farmers, who were not currently in the forefront of pollution regulation compared to 
those interviewed in Devon (Table 7.9). 
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The low profile of the pesticides in water issue among the Ouse farmers may also be 
explained by the relatively low exposure to the regulatory authorities (compared, for 
example, with Devon farmers). The NRA has been more concerned nationally and 
locally with pollution from livestock effluents. This is easier and cheaper to detect in 
the field, first requiring only a visual examination of streams, followed by a simple test 
for biochemical oxygen demand. Pesticide pollution, on the other hand, is more likely 
to be diffuse rather than point source, and so is more difficult to attribute to the activities 
of any one farmer. Detecting pesticides in water also requires more complex (and 
expensive) chemical testing of water samples. Furthermore, the NRA have been more 
vigorously pursuing livestock effluent pollution incidents as a means of demonstrating 
the need for a strong, prosectution-oriented regulatory agency (Lowe and Ward, 1993). 
Finally, the discussions about the impacts of possible future restrictions on the use of 
IPU, the most frequently detected agricultural pesticide in breach of the EC MACs, 
illustrates the continued dominance of the chemical paradigm in tackling pest problems. 
The most widespread response amongst the farmers to the three regulatory scenarios 
was to look to alternative chemicals rather than consider non-chemical weed control 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The thesis has sought to address a set of four questions which surround the issue of 
pesticides in water. These are: i) why since the Second World War have pesticides 
become such an important element of farming practice in Britain ? ii) how has pesticide 
pollution of water emerged as a 'problem' ? iii) how do farmers decide which chemicals 
to use and precisely how to use them ? and iv) what are the implications for farming 
practices of regulations to tackle pesticide pollution ? The methodological approach 
employed can be characterised as 'action in context'. It treats the fundamental object of 
analysis as action in its social context, rather than analysing either isolated, individual 
actors or 'macro-processes'. As a 'sensitizing device', the approach enables the 
reciprocity of action and context to be established. Each is shaped by and co-evolves 
with the other. 
In this final chapter the conclusions of the study are presented and discussed. First, the 
evolving context for the use of pesticides in Britain is explained. Particular attention is 
paid to the early post-war period, the growing importance of pesticides for crop 
protection and the subsequent emergence of a pollution 'problem'. Second, the 
empirical findings from the research into farmers' roles within the pesticide 'pollution 
production process' (Figure II, p. 19) are summarised and conclusions drawn. Third, 
action and context are drawn together to produce a new conception of pesticide use and 
pesticide pollution, and finally, some of the implications of the study's findings for 
future policy are discussed. 
8.2 The Evolving Context for Pesticide Use 
Part II of the thesis explains the causes of, and influences upon, the emergence of a 
pesticides in water 'problem' in Britain from the perspective of the changing political, 
economic and social context within which technologies (including pesticides) are 
produced and used in agriculture. Concepts from the regulationist school are used as an 
ordering device to highlight the ways in which agricultural development, the role of 
state policy, and the diffusion of new technologies in agriculture since the 1940s can be 
linked to the context of capitalist development. Farming change has not occurred in a 
socio-political vacuum. The concerns of the British state to sustain capitalist 
accumulation through the pursuit of a mass production-mass consumption development 
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model required the provision of cheap food to the urban working class and this, 
combined with the concerns for national food security evoked during the war and a 
balance of payments crisis, prompted the expansion of British agriculture by means of 
what Goodman and Redclift (1991) call a 'technology/policy model'. This model was 
characterised by guaranteed prices and markets and incentives to adopt new agricultural 
technologies that saved labour and raised yields. 
The institutional networks and arrangements required to foster this model were largely 
in place by the end of the 1940s and coincided with important developments in pesticide 
science. Synthetic herbicides were first marketed in Britain during 1945 and the system 
of public research institutes and a free state advisory service facilitated the flow of new 
chemical innovations from the laboratory to the farm. At the same time, price support 
provided farmers with the prospect of stability and even greater economic returns 
through adopting new chemical practices. The notion of pest (including weed) control 
as intrinsic to good farming practice was not only embodied in the 1947 Agriculture 
Act, but was also shared throughout agricultural science and among the agricultural 
supply industries. Thus the 'problem' of weed control was constructed. It required a 
solution and a network of actors was able to join in an alliance to promote a chemical 
solution. Each actor had different interests, but in representing chemical use as the 
optimal technical solution to farming's pest problems, each was able to pursue its own 
strategy to the greater good of the whole. Through such means, agricultural scientists 
and advisors saw their roles in society become more highly valued; for advisors, 
success was achieved through increasing the adoption of the new techniques; for 
scientists, the task became to increase the agricultural efficacy of new chemical 
innovations. Farmers saw their yields and productivity rise and were able to shed 
labour and increase profitability. The state had successfully implemented its policy of 
increasing food production, and the instigation of a cost-price squeeze during the 1950s 
helped to control the rising costs to the Exchequer of agricultural support, while at the 
same time making any cost-reducing technologies that did not require major capital 
outlays even more attractive. 
Chemical crop protection can be viewed as a technological paradigm, an "entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members of a given 
community" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). From this perspective, once the problem had been 
defined and the optimal technical solutions to it agreed, then development became 
channelled along a particular technological trajectory (i. e. the chemical route). This is 
not to say that the technological trajectory is indicative of 'natural' technological 
progress created by 'objective' scientists who produced 'improved' technologies. 
Scientists do not work only in the realm of the technical and the natural, outside of 
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society and social influences. Rather, the notion of a trajectory points to how past 
technological arrangements set the preconditions under which new products and 
practices may be introduced. Once pesticides had been invented and the systems for 
manufacturing, distributing and applying them were in place, it became impossible to 
'uninvent' them, more costly to switch to other methods, and easier to introduce more 
of the same. Within technological trajectories, socio-technical network become self- 
reinforcing. In this case, to advance new pesticide technologies it was important to put 
in place an advisory service that would continually promote successive technological 
developments, and farmers' links with technical advisors continue to be of great 
importance to this day in maintaining the trajectory. 
The account presented in Chapters 2 and 3 negates any notion of technological 
determinism. Instead, it highlights how a set of socially-determined objectives were 
pursued. The account also shows how the environmental problems associated with 
pesticide use, like all environmental problems, are more than technical issues requiring 
technical solutions. The underlying causes of problems, as Newby puts it, "lie in 
human societies and their systems of economic development" (1991, p. 2, original 
emphasis). It is thus through the interplay between the social and the technical that 
systems evolve, problems arise and solutions are promoted. 
It was to meet social and political objectives that pesticide use was encouraged and the 
development of new pesticides was stimulated. In particular, pre-emergent herbicides 
helped revolutionise cereal production and made the switch to winter cereals and 
continuous cropping technically feasible and economically viable. At the same time, 
their use meant that persistent chemicals were lingering in the soil at the time of year 
when bare ground is most susceptible to erosion and run-off (Evans, 1990). 
In Part II of the thesis it is shown how increasing pesticide use is best explained in 
terms which combine the technical and the social. The section also accounts for the 
way in which the issue of pesticides in water emerged as a source of public and political 
concern and how this concern has been subject to social shaping. Here too, the 
technological and the social are combined in a 'seamless web' (Hughes, 1988). 
By the mid-1980s, the context within which British farmers manage their land and 
make decisions about pesticide use was dramatically different from that prevalent in the 
late 1940s. The success in bringing science and technology to bear on agricultural 
production processes had led to major improvements in productivity for four decades 
over much of the Western world. This 'success' contributed to the breakdown of the 
post-war system of regulating world agricultural trade under US hegemony. It was 
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integral to the market instability of the 1970s and spawned the international farm crisis 
of the 1980s. It exaggerated concerns in Britain and across Western Europe about the 
rising budgetary costs of agricultural support, the costs of storing and disposing of 
surplus produce and a succession of environmental problems. Indeed, the role of 
technology in economic development more generally had become subject to greater 
critical questioning by the public. For example, we can contrast Dunlap's description 
of the immediate post-war period when "technical marvels were part of daily life" 
(1981, p. 3) with Norgaard's description of the 'fall of progress', characterised by the 
notion "that the products of new technologies do not necessarily increase happiness" 
(1988, p. 610). 
The economic implications of the farm crisis, and the promotion of a deregulatory, free- 
market philosophy by successive British governments in the 1980s led to important 
shifts in the relations surrounding pesticide use in agriculture. First, the state gradually 
withdrew from financing agricultural R&D, leaving an increased role for private 
capitals. Second, farmers were required to pay for all non-environmental advice from 
ADAS. Third, an economic squeeze meant greater levels of financial risk, increased 
uncertainty over future developments and higher levels of borrowing. More generally, 
by the late 1980s, the economic pressures upon agriculture in Britain had prompted a 
search for new sources of income for farming households. Finally, greater 
commitment to consumption concerns in the countryside among policy-makers, 
pressure groups and the public led to the closer scrutiny of environmental practices on 
farms. This 'horizontal' squeeze on farmers' actions in rural spaces occurred alongside 
farming's diminishing economic influence within the food system. However, despite 
this shifting context, the goals of production in all but the dairy sector remained much 
the same in the late 1980s as those of the 1950s - to maximise margins through the 
achievement of as high yields as possible at minimum cost. While the productivist 
philosophy was experiencing a crisis of legitimacy in the public and political spheres, 
the medium term objectives of many farmers remained little altered. 
It was in these circumstances that environmental policy began to have a much greater 
bearing on the way that the use of pesticides in Britain was viewed. The mid-1980s 
saw the EC Drinking Water Directive become law and the passing of the Food and 
Environment Protection Act 1985 which placed the pesticide approval system on a 
statutory basis for the first time. As was shown in Chapter 3, the monitoring 
requirements laid down in the Drinking Water Directive have been critical in bringing 
the spread and levels of pesticide contamination of water supplies to light. The 
requirement that suppliers monitor water from consumers' taps enabled Friends of the 
Earth to produce compilations of data on pesticide pollution whose legitimacy was 
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difficult to question (FoE, 1988). Moreover, FoE could point to each individual breach 
of the EC's standard as a breach of European and thus British law. 
Pesticide pollution came to public attention not because pesticides suddenly began to 
enter watercourses, but because standardised, numerical information on the spread and 
levels of contamination became available for the first time. It remains impossible to be 
sure of the extent of pesticide pollution or the length of time over which contamination 
has been occurring. Any pollution that does enter the public and political arena must 
first be detected. Therefore, the extent of pesticide pollution cannot be divorced from 
the extent of monitoring for it, and decisions about how and where to monitor remain in 
the realm of public policy actors. 
The EC standard (or MAC) of 0.1 µg/1 has become the very definition of what counts as 
pollution, a definition whose origins lie in political decisions rather than 'objective' 
science or 'natural' laws. This standard has not only been instrumental in bringing the 
pesticides in water issue to light, but it has also helped shape the nature of the 
subsequent debate. Because the Directive addresses the quality of the water that passes 
through consumers' taps, the debate has been framed in public health terms focusing on 
the health risks to humans. There is no equivalent requirement that 'raw water' in 
rivers and groundwaters should be monitored at the point of abstraction and prior to 
treatment at waterworks. Monitoring raw water remains at the discretion of individual 
water companies and NRA regions. With only very limited information in the public 
domain on 'raw water' quality it is not surprising that very little public and political 
attention has been focused on the spread and levels of contamination in the wider water 
environment. As yet, very little is known about the impacts of pesticide pollution on 
aquatic ecosystems, for example. 
The emphasis on drinking water has also meant that the debate in Britain and in Europe 
has polarised around the question of whether the EC standards are set at the most 
appropriate level to protect public health given current scientific knowledge. The 
British government, agrochemical manufacturers and the British water companies all 
argue that EC standards for most pesticides in water could be relaxed at no greater risk 
to public health. Environmental groups, other EC Member States and the Commission, 
on the other hand, argue that pesticides have no place in water at all and the very low 
standards are an example of the precautionary principle in environmental protection. 
There is no question that regular and widespread breaches of the EC's legal standard in 
Britain have brought embarrassment to the Government and have resulted in increasing 
pressure to tackle pesticide contamination of water. The withdrawal of two polluting 
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herbicides - Atrazine and Simazine - from non-agricultural uses and the instigation of a 
review of older pesticides are two steps which have already been taken. Since 1990, 
current policy is to reduce the use of pesticides to a minimum consistent with efficient 
food production, the protection of human health and the environment. This subtle yet 
important shift in policy has come at a time when other countries have already translated 
similar general objectives into quantified, achievable targets for the reduction of 
pesticide use. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands are pursuing pesticide 
reduction policies with targets and objectives clearly laid down, and are progressing 
towards meeting them (Wossink et al., 1992; Hoyer, 1993). In addition, the Clinton 
administration has recently announced its intention to establish goals for the reduction 
of pesticide use in the US by year 2000 (Griffith, 1993), and there have been calls for 
the adoption of similar policies in Britain (Pesticides Trust, 1992; Beaumont, 1993). 
This shifting policy context leaves British farmers facing the possibility of future 
measures either to reduce or to more effectively control the use of pesticides. 
The network of actors involved in the early post-war period (including the state, 
agricultural scientists, advisors and farmers) sought to put agriculture on a new footing 
within a technological paradigm based on chemical crop protection. In the 1990s it is a 
different group of actors (involving the National Rivers Authority, the European 
Commission, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, the British Medical 
Association and environmental pressure groups such as Friends of the Earth and the 
Pesticides Trust) that is seeking to promote a new approach to pesticide use and 
regulation. It was the publication of the FoE report that allowed other actors to point to 
the scale of the pollution problem and to call for a British policy which actively 
encourages a reduction in pesticide use (FoE, 1988; British Medical Association, 1992; 
NRA, 1992; Pesticides Trust, 1992; RCEP, 1992). However, these actors have not 
been able to undermine or replace the network which helped establish the chemical 
paradigm in the 1940s. As the next section will argue, strong farmer-pesticide advisor 
relations highlight the resilience of elements of the 'old' network and its impermeability 
to these new groups. 
8.3 Farmers' Use of Pesticides 
Part III of the thesis examined farmers' understandings of pesticides in water, the 
influence of technical advisors upon their decisions as to how pesticides should be 
used, and the continued dominance of the chemical paradigm in crop protection. The 
farm survey revealed that even within one river catchment, among a group of farmers 
who were either growing or had recently stopped growing cereal crops, a diversity of 
actions and understandings could be identified. Not only did characteristics such as 
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farm size and the mix of enterprises vary (Chapter 4), but also quite different 
development trajectories were being pursued (Chapter 5). While some businesses were 
taking on more land, other farmers were seeking to maintain incomes by increasing 
productivity, either through the adoption of new technologies, changes to cropping 
patterns, the search for cost reductions, or the acquisition of new sources of farm 
household income. A significant group of families were seeking to disengage from 
agricultural production altogether. 
The degree of differentiation of farm circumstances has important implications for how 
the adoption of agricultural technologies and the relationships between technological 
change and environmental change are understood. For those farm households where 
food production had been replaced by the management of industrial units as the main 
income generating activity, for example, the strategy for managing arable crops became 
one of minimising financial losses and seeking simply to break even. This provides a 
quite different context from those farms where cereal production remained the main 
source of household income. The diversity of goals within which businesses are 
currently managed also calls into question some of the assumptions of the models often 
used to explain the spread of new technologies in agriculture, such as the classical 
diffusion model and the theory of the treadmill, which usually assume farmers to be 
rational actors managing a full-time, wholly agricultural business. 
Among the farmers interviewed there was little understanding of the nature of the 
pollution threat to ground and surface waters posed by pesticides. This has its roots in 
a number of factors. First, the pollution of watercourses with pesticides had not 
attracted public attention locally. Levels of contamination had only been publicised 
nationally for the first time in November 1988, following the publication of the FoE's 
report (FoE, 1988). In the two years between the report and the survey of Ouse 
catchment farmers in early 1991, this 'national scandal' had not been translated into 
local public and political concern. When asked to specify what types of harmful effects 
farming practices could have on the environment, the contamination of water by 
pesticides was hardly mentioned by farmers. Pollution from farm livestock effluents 
attracted much more attention. This can be explained, in part, by the greater emphasis 
placed on farm 'waste' pollution by the NRA. Pollution from cattle slurry, silage 
effluent and dirty water from yards is easier and cheaper to detect than pesticide 
pollution, because such pollution often takes the form of point source 'incidents'. 
The NRA, in its regulation of agricultural pollution and its publicity campaigns aimed at 
raising awareness on farms of pollution risks, had effectively represented the 'farm 
pollution problem' as being one of pollution from farm livestock effluents. Moreover, 
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while the NRA's concerns centred on farm wastes, the HSE - the other regulatory 
authority with responsibilities for pesticide use - is only infrequently seen on farms and, 
in any case, tends to concentrate its efforts on protecting the health and safety of 
farmworkers rather than addressing potential risks to the environment. This leaves 
farmers with only occasional and weak links with regulators regarding pesticide use and 
pollution risk, especially by comparison with the regulation of farm wastes. At the 
same time, as Chapter 7 revealed, farmers in the Ouse catchment tend to view the 
regulatory authorities with suspicion and are sceptical not only about their regulatory 
capabilities, but also their understanding of the day to day practicalities of farming. 
Second, the lack of understanding of pesticide pollution among farmers can, in part, be 
explained by their faith in the prior approval system for screening pesticides before they 
are licensed for sale on the market. There was a widespread and deeply-felt belief 
amongst the farmers that pesticides were well-tested before being officially approved 
and so, therefore, must be safe to use. The approval system was seen as the point at 
which any detrimental effects from pesticides were dealt with, removing any 
responsibility from the farmer for environmental problems associated with pesticide 
use. If problems arose, it was a failure of the approval system and not the fault of the 
farmers, who buy pesticides 'in good faith'. 
Under one-fifth of the farmers interviewed considered pollution from farms to be at all 
significant by comparison with that from industryi. This 'context of complacency' 
meant that risks to the environment, and particularly risks to the water environment, did 
not enter into their decisions about what types of pesticide to use or how best to use 
them. These concerns, it was felt, had been addressed at the approval stage and with 
the setting of statutory maximum dose rates. This having been said, however, a level 
of moral opprobrium attached to pollution was discernible among the Ouse catchment 
farmers, a proportion of whom saw pollution as morally reprehensible. 
The farmer interviews also revealed the central importance of the technical advisors 
from off the farm in influencing how pesticides were used. All farmers sought advice 
about pesticide use from technical advisors at some stage and for most farmers the 
spray advisor was routinely the most important influence in deciding exactly what to 
do. The most frequently consulted sources of advice were the representatives from the 
merchants who sold the pesticides. Despite these advisors having an interest in selling 
pesticides, farmers were extremely reluctant to do other than what they were told 
1 This complacency existed despite the recognition amongst many farmers that the use of insecticides, 
in particular, could pose problems because of their harmful effects on friendly predator species such as 
ladybirds. 
231 
(Chapter 6). A minority were prepared to apply chemicals at lower dose rates than 
those recommended by advisors, but these tended to be specialist cereal producers 
running larger farm businesses and with higher levels of technical expertise themselves. 
Even among these farmers, however, there was a general reluctance to undercut advised 
dose rates except in 'ideal' conditions when the risk of pesticide failure was deemed to 
be lower. 
The crucial importance of technical advisors has implications for how we understand 
the pollution issue. Traditionally, increasing pesticide use has been explained either in 
terms of diffusion-adoption models or the theory of the treadmill. However, there is a 
need to go beyond the question of whether technologies are adopted or not. Although 
the simple distinction between adoption or non-adoption makes for easier questionnaire 
survey research, the nature of the environmental risks associated with the use of some 
agricultural technologies requires an understanding of adaption as well as adoption. It 
is more a question of how pesticides are used, what types are applied and in what 
quantities that influence environmental risk. 
It is in the interaction and negotiation between two groups of actors - farmers and 
advisors - that decisions about which pesticides to use and how to use them are taken. 
The process of negotiation is uneven, and this is reflected in the differential willingness 
and ability to modify the advice that is given. The ability to cut dose rates beyond those 
recommended by advisors depends on the skills and wherewithal of individual farmers. 
More generally, the influence of advisors has been crucial, not only in establishing the 
chemical paradigm for crop protection, but also in maintaining it. Whether spray 
advisors are employed by merchants or ADAS, once they are called onto a farm non- 
chemical pest control options are, in effect, closed off. Crop protection decisions are 
informed primarily by agronomic concerns, environmental risk hardly enters the 
equation. 
The chemical paradigm (and, as a result, the 'momentum' of the corresponding 
chemical 'technological system') is also reinforced through the ways that environmental 
management, and especially weed control, are represented within farming culture. The 
'environment' or 'nature' is generally seen by farmers as something that can be 
managed (or even 'created') on unproductive corners of their farms. Nature equates 
primarily with wildlife and its habitats and so being an 'environmentally-friendly' 
farmer consists of allowing shrubs and trees to grow in specified places, while the 
business of producing food is allowed to proceed unhindered on what one farmer called 
'our factory floor'. This notion of nature is poorly adapted to more holistic views of 
agriculture's environmental impacts which see nature and ecology as a complex system 
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of energy flows, flows of pollutants and so on. The notion of 'creatable, zoned nature' 
is, however, a recognisable trait in those agro-environmental policies which either 
encourage the planting of woodland and the maintenance of landscape features, or 
designate sensitive zones in which intensification is tempered and farmers are 
encouraged to enter environmentally sensitive schemes voluntarily. These all help to 
maintain the idea that environmental concerns are best accommodated in particular zones 
but should not be allowed to interfere generally with agricultural practices. 
Crucial, insofar as the use of pesticides is concerned, are farmers' ways of seeing 
weeds. Because herbicides are the most widespread and problematic pollutant of water, 
an understanding of the philosophy behind weed control is essential to any discussion 
of herbicide use and the causes of pollution. Farmers clearly understand the short-term 
economic risks that weeds pose to profitable cereal cropping. This understanding can 
be contrasted, however, with their perception of the environmental risks that herbicide 
usage poses. These risks are considered vague, long term and unproven. Moreover, 
the control of weeds is a key element in what constitutes 'good' arable farming practice, 
to the point that farmers are reluctant to tolerate any weeds in their crops. They 
compare their performance as farmers with those of their neighbours on this basis. 
Chemical control continues to be viewed as the 'common sense' method of eliminating 
of weeds, and so good farming is equated with optimal chemical use. Even so, an 
important distinction can be made between 'optimal' use in economic terms and in terms 
of weed control. The former involves the use of herbicides to maximise economic 
margins; the latter is based on the elimination of as many weeds as possible and reflects 
the ethic of 'clean', weed-free fields. The interviews reveal how the latter perspective 
prevails, adding to the momentum of the chemical paradigm in crop protection. 
The continued dominance of the chemical paradigm is also highlighted by the farmers' 
responses to the alternative regulatory scenarios put to them. Under each scenario, 
most farmers indicated they would use the nearest alternative chemical for weed control, 
rather than switching to alternative technological systems, such as mechanical weeding 
or new rotations. Many also felt unable to say how they might respond to herbicide 
restrictions without first consulting their advisors, further underlining the extent to 
which farmers are dependent upon their advisors. 
8.4 A New Conception of Pesticide Use and Pollution 
There has been a tendency in the literature on the environmental problems of 
contemporary capitalist agriculture to see farmers in one of two ways. One is as 
rational actors, responding to price signals and market conditions in order to maximise 
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the profitability of their operations. The other is as 'policy dopes' operating in highly 
regulated economic conditions, 'forced' to adopt ever more intensive practices in order 
to stay in business. In these terms, responsibility for the environmental effects brought 
about by technological change in agriculture lay with either agricultural policy or the 
capitalist system, which has enabled the penetration of farm production by industrial 
capitals through, inter alia, the promotion of manufactured agricultural inputs. 
In both cases the dynamics of technological change are usually regarded as exogenous. 
New technologies are treated as emerging from what Clark and Lowe call the 
"autonomous and alien realm of science" (1992, p. 15), and are mechanistically 'taken 
up' by farmers. The analysis in this thesis has sought to bring the issue of agriculture's 
environmental impacts onto a new plain by opening the black box of science and 
technology and placing technology in a more central position. In the context of the 
pesticide pollution of water supplies, this has required, first, that pesticide practices on 
farms be seen in the wider context of the network of relations surrounding the farmer, 
and, second, that science and technology be seen not as autonomous and separate from 
society, but as continually combing technical and social elements. 
The historical analysis in Part II and the local work in Part III both demonstrate that the 
causes of pesticide pollution of water are best understood in terms of the workings of a 
socio-technical system, labelled here as the pesticide 'pollution production process' 
(Figure II, p. 19). This process involves a range of actors beyond the farmer, extending 
to the agricultural R&D sectors, the crop protection advisory system and the system of 
regulating pollution. These relations not only provide the context within which farmers 
make choices about pesticide use, but also have an historical dimension with a dynamic 
of its own. 
Conceptualising pesticide pollution as the outcome of a 'pollution production process' 
allows the role of pesticides in agriculture to be problematised. Rather than see their 
widespread diffusion and adoption as a given, resulting from the outputs of the black 
box of science and prevailing market conditions, pesticide use can be examined as an 
outcome of social and political choices. The technological paradigm in agriculture 
centred on the chemical control of pests was well established by the 1950s and showed 
every sign of conforming to Freeman's definition of a technological paradigm; "a new 
set of guiding principles which become the managerial and engineering 'common sense' 
for each major phase of development" (1984, p. 499). This thesis has demonstrated 
how forty years from the construction of the technological system and its development 
along a trajectory, 'momentum' is a key feature of the system. 
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The 'action in context' perspective has helped illustrate how technological momentum is 
maintained. The explanation derives from the reciprocity of action and context. The 
chemical paradigm has, for over four decades, meant that the 'common sense' solution 
to crop pest problems involves the application of pesticides. A range of actors in the 
network attempt to tie individual farmers into the technological system so that farmers 
find their pest problems 'translated' in such a way that they can be best solved by 
pesticides. The role of advisors is as carriers of the paradigmatic view. Farmers 
become enrolled by their advisors. They take on a set of attitudes promoted by 
pesticide protagonists which are also advanced in farming journals, agricultural 
colleges, agricultural shows and so on. If farmers in the Ouse catchment are to come to 
see pesticides in a different light, they must be enrolled by different networks carrying 
different representations; pesticides as pollutants threatening the health of the nation and 
the water environment, for example. 
In these terms, what is often called 'structure' becomes an outcome rather than a cause 
of action. The context for current pesticide use has emerged out of past rounds of 
actions and technological choices, some of which took place fifty years ago. Current 
rounds of action are shaped by and yet also help shape this context. Thus, for example, 
the policy, economic and technical conditions of the 1940s and 1950s provided a 
'technological frame' (Bijker and Law, 1992) which facilitated the use of chemicals 
while constraining non-chemical crop protection strategies. It was through the use of 
pesticides that the context became reshaped. The politics surrounding pesticides have 
been redefined, in part, by the technologies themselves. Again the social and the 
technical combine in a seamless web. Pesticides achieved the productivity increases 
promised by their protagonists, and in doing so helped, ultimately, to undermine the 
stability of the productivist framework of which they were a central part. However, by 
entering watercourses they helped bring about increased pressures for greater controls 
over their use. In such an analysis, it is not only that the social and technical overlap or 
interplay, but that they can never be wholly separated. Momentum in technological 
systems is derived from both. 
The use of concepts such as technological systems, paradigms and momentum leaves 
us with an explanation of pesticide use and pollution that is neither socially nor 
technologically reductionist. The use of pesticides becomes an outcome of the 
interactions between sets of heterogeneous actors (farmers and advisors) but also an 
input to the next round of decisions. Farmers are neither wholly free agents nor 
impotent in the face of capitalist (or policy) processes. Instead, change and action are 
negotiated between actors. The thesis helps push forward our empirical understanding 
by demonstrating how it is through these negotiations that the technological (chemical) 
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system acquires momentum, and how these negotiations can vary from farmer to 
farmer, depending upon the skills, resources, experience, values and objectives of the 
farm family. 
$5 Implications for Future Policy 
In adopting an action in context perspective, and by examining pesticide pollution as a 
'pollution production process' the study has identified some of the dynamics of 
pesticide use and the consequences for the pollution of water. Pesticide pollution is 
more than a simple technical problem. It is indicative of a complex set of processes 
with important historical dimensions. This has implications for future policy, as well as 
for the questions that future research might address. The tendency in much of the 
policy debate has been to see the issue as a simple technical problem and take without 
question current technical arrangements as a pre-given. This has resulted in the 
promotion of technical fix solutions including, for example, the search for less 
persistent and mobile pesticide compounds. For several years now the trend in Europe 
and North America has been towards greater control over the use of pesticides 
(Pimentel and Lehman, 1993) and an increasing number of countries (especially in the 
most developed world) have introduced specific policies to reduce the quantity of 
pesticides used in agriculture. For any such proposals to be effective in Britain would 
require a greater sensitivity to the processes by which pesticide use has been 
encouraged in the past including the structure of the agricultural R&D system and the 
current reductionist paradigm in science. 
Despite public opposition in Britain to the relaxation of standards2, the British 
Government has persuaded the European Commission to review its MACs for 
pesticides in water. Even if the standards were to be relaxed, and this outcome is 
currently being strongly contested by other powerful actors, it would take several years 
for any changes to the Drinking Water Directive to come into effect (ENDS, 1993b). 
The government, therefore, will continue to be compelled by EC law to work towards 
meeting the pesticide standards. 
The current strategy of treating drinking water supplies to remove pesticides also 
contradicts the stated objectives of UK pollution control policy (DoE, 1990) by 
overturning the polluter pays principle. Water consumers, rather than farmers or 
pesticide manufacturers, are left to pay the clean up costs through higher water bills. At 
2A Gallup opinion poll in September 1993 asked members of the public if they would accept more 
pesticides in their drinking water if told that the levels were not dangerous and water bills would be 
lower as a result. Seventy-seven per cent of respondents said No' (Clover, 1993). 
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the same time the current strategy neglects the causes of pollution (pesticide use) by 
merely addressing its symptoms (the contamination of drinking water supplies). 
Public pressure groups currently demand of farmers that they not only produce food, 
but that they also act with responsibility in three different respects: as producers of 
wholesome food, as environmental managers, and as responsible rural business- 
people. The model of farmer as environmental manager requires, over and above 
which technologies are adopted, the responsible adaption of agricultural technologies. 
This means that whatever technologies are employed, they should be adjusted to meet 
local environmental circumstances. The productivist period saw standardised 
agricultural technologies diffused across the countryside over-riding local 
environmental conditions. The result in the Ouse catchment, for example, where once 
mainly grass was grown, is large-scale cereal production only made viable through the 
routine use of pre-emergent herbicides. 
A concern for how technologies are adapted rather than just adopted does not 
necessarily mean that technological change has to be brought to a halt or that the clock 
has to be turned back. Instead it requires a recognition that agriculture-environment 
relations are not aspatial. Local uniqueness is of especial environmental importance and 
value, and the use of industrial technologies in agriculture should respect it. A 
recontextualisation of agriculture is therefore called for as people demand from farming 
a responsiveness to local conditions. This change in emphasis does not imply 'all 
power to the farmer', although this romanticised view has been espoused elsewhere 
(Kloppenburg, 1991), but is also a question of responsibilities among farmers to local 
environments. 
Several recent environmental policy documents either contain statements about reducing 
pesticide use or have implications for the ways that pesticides are to be used in the 
future (DoE, 1990; UK Government, 1994). There is, however, little strategic 
direction in British policy or the British interpretation of European policy. The EC's 
Fifth Environmental Programme, announced in 1992, aims to reduce 'significantly' 
pesticide use per unit of land under production, but did not make clear how this was to 
be achieved. Also, the CAP reform package agreed in 1992 seeks to reduce over- 
production and to reflect a greater concern for the environment through a series of agri- 
environmental measures. It is too soon to predict the impact of CAP reform on 
pesticide pollution in Britain, although it is clear that the accompanying agri- 
environment measures to promote 'environmentally-friendly' farming only make up a 
tiny proportion of the entire agricultural budget. The requirement that 15% of arable 
land be entered into a rotational set-aside system will mean that a smaller land area is 
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sprayed on each farm each year. Moreover, the implications of the recent GATT 
agreement may require that the proportion of land in set-aside increases to 25-30%. 
However, leaving part of arable farmland fallow on a rotational basis could require that 
more herbicides be used in the following years to combat the build up of weeds. The 
planting of a cover crop, it is suggested, could help reduce the risk of post-set aside 
weed problems (Lechner et al., 1992), but it will take several years for the full 
implications of these new agreements on pesticide use to become apparent. Of more 
immediate effect is the implementation of a straw burning ban which took effect at the 
end of 1993 under the 1990 Environmental Protection Act. Studies have demonstrated 
how most cereal farmers plan to cope with the ban by mechanically incorporating straw 
into the soil and then increasing their applications of Isoproturon and Chlortoluron to 
combat weed growth. Thus, in addressing an air pollution nuisance, one consequence 
may be a greater risk of water pollution (ENDS, 1992b). 
Recent policy statements repeatedly make the commitment to 'minimise' pesticide use, 
the most recent being the Government's strategy for sustainable development (UK 
Government, 1994, pp. 9,12 & 100-111), but biotechnological R&D is geared to 
improving the efficacy with which pesticides are applied within the chemical paradigm. 
Currently 27 companies are conducting genetic engineering research to produce crop 
varieties tolerant or resistant to increased doses of herbicide (Beaumont, 1993, p. 185), 
and this is likely to reinforce the chemical crop protection trajectory3. There is also a 
concern that herbicide resistant volunteer plants could be carried over to the next crop 
rotation, and so become problematic weeds themselves. 
In this rapidly changing context, it is difficult to point to a single policy which would 
'solve' the water pollution problems associated with pesticides. Because throughout 
the thesis the focus of analysis has been the issue of pesticides in water, there is a 
danger of offering solutions which alter the way pesticides are used just in the light of 
this particular pollution problem. However, although it is the use of pesticides that, in 
the first instance, is the cause of pollution, any strategy for tackling pollution is likely to 
be confused or hampered by the vague and often conflicting objectives of wider 
agricultural and rural policy in Britain (and, for that matter, Europe). The agricultural 
productivism of the decades following the Second World War provided an overall 
strategy for rural policy in general. Its recent breakdown and the onset of contradictory 
3 Recent evidence is also provided by Beck and Ulrich (1993) who have analysed the awarding of 
environmental release permits for genetically modified crop varieties and found that herbicide tolerance 
is by far the most commonly researched trait. Of 794 permits approved up to November 1992,462 
(58%) were for trials to develop herbicide tolerance in crop varieties. 
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tendencies in policies which at the same time promote continued agricultural efficiency, 
environmental protection, farm diversification and land development, have created a 
policy vacuum at the strategic level. Current policy objectives for agriculture and the 
countryside remain ambiguous, and it is still not clear what the primary objectives of 
British agriculture are to be in the 'post-productivist' era. Until the objectives of an 
agricultural (and a rural) strategic policy are made more explicit, the practical questions 
about how changes to agricultural practices can best be brought about are more difficult 
to address. It is, perhaps, only once this is achieved that any policy addressing the role 
of pesticides in agriculture and the reduction of pollution can be effectively devised. 
Until such time, arable farmers in Britain will continue to make decisions about pest 
control within a dominant chemical paradigm that has been the long-term cause of the 
pesticide pollution problem. With differing degrees of freedom of action, they remain 
not so much trapped on the pesticide treadmill as caught up in the momentum of the 
chemical, technological system. 
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APPENDIX A: 
An interview transcript from the pilot survey 
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PATCH Programme: Ex ty Interviews with Farmers 
Farmer K, Bedfordshire. Early 60s. Massive farmhouse, almost a mansion. Nephew 
arrived during the interview. He's a partner in the business, studied agronomy at 
Nottingham University, and was very aware/articulate. The were both staunch in their 
opinions. In 1985 the farm was 1600a. Since then, two neighbouring farms have been 
added, making the total size now almost 2000a, farmed in 6 units which are farmed as 
one unit as far as management, machinery and livestock are concerned. The main 
enterprises are cereals, sheep, beans and oil seed rape. Vegetables are declining. [R- 
respondent, N-nephew] 
The Farmer's Philosophy and Outlook 
1. "In general terms how would you describe the way you farm ? And why? " 
[Objective: to see if farmer has an overall approach to fanning (ie farm "philosophy"), 
how he/she characterises it. To identify attitudes towards fanning as a business, way 
of life, family continuity, sustainability, stewardship, etc. ] 
We farm it as a business. We wouldn't be in it if we didn't consider it also slightly as a 
way of life, but it wouln't be a way of life on our land (mostly grade 3) if we didn't 
consider it in business terms and use normal commercial methods. 
2. "Has your approach changed in the last ten years ?" 
The same objectives. We got elm disease a few years ago and it made us realise that 
perhaps we hadn't given the trees enough attention and because of that they were 
vulnerable. Clearing up and replanting are more difficult with the greater financial 
pressures on farmers. We get a little bit irritated by the general public blaming us for 
the environment when we have planted thousands of trees [I cut him off at the 
beginnings of a full scale rant with the next question.. ] 
3. "What are the major problems that farmers like you face today. Are there any 
more ?" 
[Objective: to find out farmers' perceptions of the key pressures on them. ] 
Maintaining profitability really. In order to maintain one's labour force, equipment and 
so on. If this can be done then you can maintain good husbandry practices and in that 
one includes the environmentalist. We always have political pressures. We're not in 
beef at the moment, but one can only quote whats happening to the beef industry which 
is all political. It's been blown out of all proportion. It's quite categorical that there's 
no threat to humans. Our foreign prtners have jumped on it to make a bob or 2 for 
themselves. I think the Ministry and the vets were well aware of the problem and the 
cause was banned 2 years ago. It's just that the effects are still coming through. 
4. "What is your response to these problems ?" 
[Objective: to explore farmers' personal outlook and strategies. ] 
Increase farm size in order to make the maximum use of modern machinary and keep 
our unit costs down to the minimum. We have been able to maintain a reasonable level 
of profitability doing that. With the political pressures, we've always been aware of the 
need to keep the public aware of the problems we face. Some of the pressures we face 
come from a fair degree of ignorance from the general public and its the media as well 
of course. We see part of our job as educating people by entertaining as many people 
on the farm. We have schools round at lambing time. The teachers also find it 
interesting. 
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Sources of Advice and Information 
1. "Which sources of advice do you use for what categories of information" 
b' : to find out how farmer categorises technical advice and to obtain as full as 
possible specification of sources (down to names and addresses) in order to get a 
preliminary idea of actors in local technology transfer systems. ] 
Prompts by type of advice: 
crop nutrition/fertlisers 
varieties/seeds/crops 
grassland management 
livestock health 
waste management/slurry containment/silage 
nature conservation 
crop protection/agrochemicals/pesticides 
We do use ADAS but my nephew will give you more information on that. He's a sort 
of agronomist and goes to seminars and so on. The specialist agronomist comes about 
once a week. We belong to a cereal group connected to Chattleworth College and the 
agronomist is linked to this. Its the same for seed varieties and everything. 
With grassland, it comes under the sheep enterprise. Again theres a sort of league in 
Beds of which there are 12 members and the MLC act as adjudicators in going through 
our methods and financial results. Last year our herd came top of the league in terms of 
gross margins per ewe. For nature conservation, we belong to FWAG in Beds. 
2. "Do you find it easy to follow the advice to the letter or do you tend to adapt 
it? " 
Prompts; why or why not? 
which type of advice? 
how do you adapt it? 
We use our own experience, particularly the younger partners. We do consider advice 
but we're not driven by it. 
Attitudes towards Technology 
1. "Over the next decade or so, how do you expect farming practices to change, 
and what new types of products do you expect to see on the market? " 
[Objective: to discover expectations of future technological trends and what farmers 
believe will influence those trends. ] 
So much is dependent on the political scene and consumer attitudes. It could be 
worrying if the trend towards vegetarianism continues. Young people dont seem to like 
the idea of killing animals. 
2. "What benefits has technological change brought to your farming operations? " 
Reduced labour costs. The hours haven't shortened but there are fewer people 
employed. 
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3. "What problems has technological change created for your farming operations? " 
It's making it more difficult for young people with limited capital to get into farming. 
Bigger units all the time. They have to be bigger to keep viable. We've kept viable 
through specialisation and a larger area enabling bigger machines. 
4. "Who are the main beneficiaries of technological change in agriculture? " 
to explore farmer's understanding of the distributional consequences of 
technological change. ] 
It's been possible for the consumer to continue to buy cheap food. [NEPHEW 
ARRIVES and I sum up where we've got to] 
N-I don't think the agrochemical companies have suffered much either. Agricultural 
merchants aren't making any money out of technological change at the moment, but the 
chemical manufacturers seem to be returning good profits. It's worrying that the 
chemical companies are now in charge of a very large part of the breeding programs for 
new varieties, so although they might be producing new varieties with high potential, it 
is linked in with their own chemicals to realise that potential. 
6. "Are current research efforts relevant to your farming practices? " 
N- We are turning to independent resaerch organisations. The arable resaerch centres at 
Cambridge, which does gear its research to our needs at the near farm level. The 
problem is that there are other aspects of research that we cant possibly get engaged in 
such as safety. That has to be done by an independent Govt source. When it comes to 
research into getting over problems with the straw burning ban and changes in rotation, 
we look more towards independently financed organisations rather than ADAS. 
Attitudes towards Environmental Problems 
1. "Are there any major environmental consequences of modem agriculture? " 
[Objective: to explore farmer's perception and evaluation of types of problem; types of 
risk - occupational, public health, ecological, conservationist. ] 
N-I think when you ask a direct question, are we damaging the environment, I would 
say to anybody who doubts the farmer, that I have to sit in a sprayer regularly. I 
wouldn't do that if I thought there was too great a risk. These products are tested 
independently by Govt. I'm handling them in massive cencentrates compared to what 
might be found in a river in a years time. That concentration is minute. To query our 
interest in the environment.. [beginning to rant].. People spread chemicals in their 
gardens. Our land is like our garden. We want it to be beautiful. We want it to be 
productive but we care for it more passionately that anybody else. 
2. "What do you see as the main environmental consequences of your own 
farming activities? " 
Pause... N - Difficult to say really. I think there must be environmental consequences. 
A percentage of our nitrogen must reach the water. An absolute minute % of pesticides 
must get from the soil to the water in the long term. So there is an environmental 
consequence. What needs to be evaluated is the cost in relation to producing food for 
the country. 
R-I think with wildlife we are tree-planting, rather than replanting hedges because 
there's a necessity for larger fields with the bigger machines. The planting is a positive 
environmental consequence. Planting trees depends on profits though. 
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3. "Have environmental concerns affected the way you farm? If so, how? " 
[Objective to guage the salience of environmental concerns/ restrictions for the farmer. ] 
N- Yes, definitely. As the public's attitude changes, our awareness is increasing. We 
are taking more precautions. We are now probably taking more visible precautions to 
allay the public's fears but which aren't necessarily changing anything. 
4. "Do you think that there is a water pollution problem from farming in this area? If 
so, what is it and what are its causes 7' 
R- Farmers are more aware of things like silage effluent. Every effort is made to do it. 
N- Leaching on these heavy soils is minimal. It's the most superb filter system. It 
holds nitrogen. 
5. "What should be done to solve farming's environmental problems? " 
N-I think there are problems. With nitrates, purley telling farmers to reduce inputs 
won't solve the problem. It needs direct aid to the water boards to put in water 
pyrifying units. With livestock farmers, they must receive grants to help them treat the 
problem. 
R-A lot of nitrogen has been traced back to the ploughing up of grassland 40 years 
ago. 
N- If the Govt requires direct action, it must encourage people to do it. 
6. "Do you think new technology (eg safer pesticides, improved spraying 
technology, new crop varieties) will be developed to cope with these problems ? 
Or will farming practices have to change (or both)? " 
N- Hoescht launched a new herbicide [Cheetah] which is a contact spray and breaks 
down in the soil after about 4 weeks. In the past chemicals have layed on the soil and 
acted residually over a long period. I'm convinced that its no good bankrupting farmers 
to get there. It's technology and the way we're treated and the way we're encouraged. 
Also there are more organically based nitrogen compaounds available. Again it's 
making these things economically viable that will encourage us to use them. it must be 
remembered that farming isn't a very productive time. 
Q- What about farming practices ? 
N- Where there are high nitrate levels in water courses, I assume that cropping patterns 
will have to change. I don't see it as a problem here. And yes, where sprayers are 
filled will have to change. They should be filled carefully. I think farmers should have 
to fill sprayers out of the public eye, so as not to worry the public. 
R- The govt is cutting back on R&D. While there was some waste a few years ago. 
Its important to keep the EHFs. They can really carry out independent research into 
these practices. 
N- Up until fairly recently, there's been advice to put the first nitrogen applications on 
to the oilseed rape very early. They have tempered that off a bit now but it needs to be 
constantly practiced and researched. Before we were following govt advice but in 
doing so, were increasing the environmental risk. 
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Farmer's Behaviour 
1. "How do you decide what herbicides to use, at what stages, and how much? " 
[Objectives: to discover factors influencing choice of product, choice of dose rate, and 
choice between insurance or firebrigade use and farmer's perception of what choice 
he/she has regarding herbicide use and rate of application] 
N- Experience, advice, history of the fields. We know where we have problems and 
where to put on a lot of black grass spray before the problem arises. We know it will 
come because of previous experience. One new herbicide I've mentioned is probably 
leading us now to tend to wait to see the weeds and then spray, which is a helpful 
development. The chemical is more expensive but it probably does a more thorough 
job. We've experimented quite a lot this year with it and I think in the long run it might 
be a big benefit to us. Historically we have had to use residual chemicals. With heavy 
soils, you have a particularly long dormancy period with grass weeds and black grass 
seeds. So once you've got a black grass problem it tends to remain. 
4. "In what form do you apply nitrogen, and how do you decide how much to apply 
and when to apply it? " 
[Objectives: to discover factors influencing level and timing of application and farmer's 
perception of what choice he/she has regarding level/timing. ] 
N- Predominantly liquid nitrogen and we follow advice from the arable research 
centres which will be by dissecting the plant to tell when its at its most demanding stage 
for nitrogen. We'll also consider the weather, temperature, the calender. 
5. "Do you keep records of the nutrients and crop protection chemicals which 
you put on your crops ? In what form do you keep them ? How far back do 
they go ? May I see an example ?" 
Yes. Very closely indeed. It's absloutely essential. 
Attitudes to Pollution Regulation 
1. "Do you think pollution by agriculture is significant compared to industrial pollution 
R- The answer is no 
N- Insignificant I would suggest. 
2. "Do you think that pollution by agriculture is being dealt with in the same 
way as pollution by industry ?" 
N- The public is being led to belive that its agriculture-led where I think the local 
companies, coupled with the sewage companies are probably enormously more 
responsible. I wouldn't like to compare agriculture with industry because I don't know 
the pressure that industry's under. My perception from the way the media reports it is 
that we are getting a rough deal. 
3. "What do you think are the best ways of tackling agricultural pollution? " 
Prompt: legal with advice but under ultimate threat of prosecution? 
Pollution guidelines with advice. 
Change of government support to de intensify agriculture? 
Higher prices for potentially polluting substances 
(pesticides and nitrogen) ? 
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N- The first one would be my favourite as long as its based on sound research, a 
correct measurement of pollution, and to make sure that its not someone else's 
pollution. I think if a farmer spills chemicals into the river, he ought to be caught. If he 
is slopping nitrogen about carelessly in large volumes, he should be responsible for his 
actions. To make the cost of nitrogen higher through a tax when somebody is using it 
responsibly and is using their inputs carefully is damaging the efficient and the dilligent. 
With de-intensification, I'm wondering if the nation could afford it. 
R- We've got a big balance of payments problem.. I don't know that the govt or the 
country can afford it. 
N-I think organic farming is for people who are middle class and affluent. Expensive 
food to the working man is very distressing. I think the person who has spent what has 
decreased from 18% to 13% of his income is very appreciative of cheap food. You tell 
him that because some chap is worried about a bit of nitrate in a river that his food 
prices are going up. [This all sounded like a well-rehearsed argument] To say that 
organic farming cuts output by 30% is ridiculous. You can only grow an organic crop 
of wheat every third or fourth year, so it would significantly cut production. We would 
have to import large volumes of food. 
4. "What impact do you think pollution regulations have had on farming 
practices generally ?" 
N- Its definitely sharpened peoples recording of inputs. It's upgraded peoples storage 
and handling of chemicals. There's more awareness and understanding. 
5. "What about on this farm in particular ?" 
N- All of those things I've just said 
6. "Have you noticed any changes in pollution regulation since water 
privatization and the establishment of the NRA ? Do you think it will ?" 
R- It's still early days. There hasn't been time for any changes 
I can't see how changes are going to affect agriculture. If it's necessary to get the water 
up to a certain standard, then privatisation means that funds will be available, more so 
that the govt who restrict expenditure each year. 
7. "Have you had any contact with NRA officials? 
"How do you find NRA officials? " 
R- Yes I've had contact because I'm on the local river board. I don't see any change. 
I think staff appear to be more enthusiastic now on being able to cope with the problems 
which they know are there than they were before. But that's just an opinion. 
N-I think we'll see that through the use of contractors, we'll see a more efficient 
service on maintaining rivers and through the staff they used to employ in very large 
numbers and have a complex management structure 
8. "What do you think would be the effects on farmers of a strict prosecution 
policy for pollution incidents? " 
R grunts "We've already answered that" 
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N- As long as its done on the basis of sound information and people knowing the 
facts. Its important that if someone is doing something thats completely negligent, and 
they're aware of the problems thay are causing, then I agree whole-heartedly that 
prosecution is by far the best way of dealing with it. With the nitrogen 50mg/l limit, its 
a nonsense. Where is the research to prove it ? 
R- Its been set in France where they have problems with organic matter in water. We 
are having to suffer on a regulation that is not important here. 
N- One of the weaknesses of the EC is trying to set rules for differnt areas. 
9. 'Do you think that there are adequate incentives to prevent pollution on 
farms generally" (What is your own experience) 
[Objective: to reveal knowledge and reactions to current grants for pollution control. 
Do they cover the measures necessary to reduce the pollution risk. ] 
N-I think that as the govt demands higher levels of storage for chemicals and filling 
points, then grants should be made available for putting in new installations etc. They 
should be aid assisted. We want to comply with evrything. We're getting there slowly. 
We're putting in a new tank filling point this year. You can't do everything. We're 
getting there slowly. It takes time. If there were grants available, the industry as a 
whole would get there quicker. While I like to think that we're a progressive farm in 
that we still are fortunate enough to be making profits, a lot of farms aren't making 
money at all and to tell them to spend £2000 to put in new installations is impossible 
General Discussion 
Q- "What did you think of the questions ? ". 
R- There's some repetition 
N- OK. 
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APPENDIX B: 
The farm survey questionnaire 
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FARM ADJUSTMENT, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
BUCKS QUESTIONNAIRE 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
Interviewer: 
Interview Number (PATCH): 
Interview Number (Arkleton): 
Date and Time of Interview: 
Thank you very much for agreeing to talk to me today. The objectives of the survey are 
to find out how farmers are responding to the economic and environmental pressures 
they face. Before we start, I would like to stress that anything you tell me will be 
treated as strictly confidential. No individual farmers can be identified from any of our 
written work. If you feel unhappy about answering any of the questions, please say so 
and we'll move on to the next one. 
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SECTION A: CHANGE ON THE FARM 
1. [*] Are you the principal manager/ decision-maker of the business (Y / N) 
2. [*] Who else is involved ? 
3. [*] When did you take on this f rm ? 
4. [*] What were you doing before taking on this farm ? 
5. [*] Was your family, or your spouse's family, involved with this farm before 
you started running it ? (Y / N) 
6. How are the business assets of this farm owned ? 
a- Sole Operator 
b- Family Partnership 
c- Non-family Partnership 
d- Limited Company 
e- Other (please specify) 
7. Have you made any major changes to the structure of the farm business since 
1980 ? (eg setting up partnership or limited company) (Y / N) 
8. IF 'YES', what are the details ? 
Change in structure Date of 
of farm business change 
9. What were the main reasons for these changes ? 
10. [*] What is the total acreage of this farm today...... Acres 
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11. [*] How was this land acquired ? (We have a number of possible ways recorded 
on this questionnaire, would you please read them through before answering) 
Acres 
(a) purchased freehold on the open market 
(b) purchase from former landlord 
(c) purchase from another farmer/landowner 
(d) succeeded to freehold from parents 
(e) inherited freehold from other relative (specify) 
(f) open tender tenancy agreement 
(g) succeeded to tenancy from parents 
(h) inherited tenancy from other relative 
(i) marriage 
(j) other (specify) 
TOTAL 
12. [*] Has the total acreage of this farm changed since 1981 (Y / N) 
ACRES DATE REASON FOR CHANGE 
[*] [*] 
Bought land 
Sold land 
Renting land 
Stopped Renting 
Other (specify) 
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13. Could we just check the tenure of this farm using the table which is shown on 
CARD A? 
Owner-occupied Tenanted Total acres 
Sole Joint Other 
Ownership Family 
Ow'ship 
Secure Insecure 
Lease Lease 
14. If we take land which has been within the holding since 1981, has there been 
any change in tenure ? For example, buying land that was previously rented, or 
changing from secure to insecure leasing arrangements) (Y / N) 
15. If YES, what were the changes and when did they occur ? 
16. Why were the changes made ? 
17. Do any other relatives of your family or your spouse's family farm in this area ? 
(Y/N) 
18. How many ? 
? 19. Where 
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20. Please could you look at this list of farming and non-farming organisations and 
tell me which ones you or your spouse belong to (or have belonged to) and in what 
capacity (CARD B) ? 
M'ship Position 
NFU 
LA 
Young Farmers Club 
FWAG 
Small Farmers' Association 
Other Farming Organisation 
(Specify) 
Game Conservancy 
RSPB 
National Trust 
Beds & Hunts Wildlife Trust 
Berks, Bucks & Oxon Naturalists' Trust 
Friends of the Earth 
Ramblers' Association 
CPRE 
B. Ass for Shooting and Conservation 
British Field Sports Society 
Local Fishing Club 
Local Shooting Club 
Other 'Rural' Groups (Specify) 
Farm Business Survey 
Arable Research Institutes Association 
(formally Long Ashton Members Association 
& Friends of Rothamstead) 
Breed Group 
Local Arable Farming Group 
Soil Association 
Other Farming/Research Groups (Specify) 
Parish Council 
District Council 
County Council 
21. Do you pursue any country sports such as fishing or shooting 
(Specify) 
22. Are there any commercial rights to such sports on your farm 
Y/N (Specify) 
23 
24. 
[*] What are your agricultural enterprises on this farm ? 
[*] Which is the most important ? 
Dates 
YIN 
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25. [*] Since 1981 have you set up or closed down any enterprises ? 
Details: 
SHEEP 
26. [*] How many sheep do you have ? 
27. [*] Has the size of your flock changed since 1981 ?Y/N 
Change By how much 
Increased 
Decreased 
28. What were the main reasons for these changes ? 
BEEF CATTLE 
29. [*] How many beef cattle do you have ? 
30. [*] Has the size of your herd changed since 1981 ?Y/N 
Change By how much 
Increased 
Decreased 
31. What were the main reasons for these changes ? 
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DAIRY CATILE 
3 2. [*] How many dairy cattle do you have ? 
33. [*] Has the size of your herd changed since 1981 ?Y/N 
Change By how much 
Increased 
Decreased 
34. What were the main reasons for these changes 
ARABLE 
B35. [*] What arable crops do you grow ? 
B36. [*] What is the approximate acreage of each crop ? 
CROP 
ACREAGE 
B37. How has this general pattern changed since 1981 ? 
B38. What were the main reasons for these changes? 
40. [*] How many family members live on this farm ? 
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41. [*] How much labour do members of your family put into the farm business, 
and what sort of work do they do, starting with yourself ? 
Family Member Hours/week Type of agricultural work 
Respondent 
42. [*] In broad terms, how much of the total labour requirements are met by your 
family's work on the farm (including your own) would you think ? 
Less than a quarter 
Quarter to a half 
Half to three-quarters 
More than three quarters 
All of it 
43. [*] How many hired workers do you employ ? 
(a) on a full-time basis Hrs/week 
(b) on a part-time basis Hrs/week 
(c) on a casual/seasonal basis Weeks/yr 
(d) on a contracting basis Weeks/yr 
44. Since 1981, what have been the broad changes on the farm in your use of: 
family labour ? 
hired labour ? 
contractors ? 
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45. What were the dates and the reasons for these changes ? 
46. [*] Do members of your family undertake work on the farm, other than strictly 
agricultural labour ? (Eg farm shop, farm tourism, B&B etc) 
Family Member Non-agricultural Work Undertaken 
Respondent 
47. [*] How has this changed since 1981 ? 
48. [*] Do you rely entirely on farming for your income ? 
Y/N 
49. [*] If not, in broad terms what proportion of your total HOUSEHOLD income 
is derived from the following sources: 
Proportion Type of work 
On-farm 
Off-farm 
"Unearned" 
(Shares, 
pensions, etc) 
TOTAL 100% 
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50. 
Y/N 
51. 
[*] Has the balance between these sources of income changed since 1981 ? 
[*] IF 'YES', how has it changed ? 
52. Referring to CARD C, please could you indicate what is the approximate size of 
your annual farm business turnover (by which I mean your agricultural enterprises 
only), say for the last financial year? 
Less than £10 000 
£ 11000 to £30 000 
£31 000 to £60 000 
£61 000 to £ 100 000 
£ 101 000 to £200 000 
£200 000 to £500 000 
£500 000 to £ 1000 000 
Over £ 1000 000 
53. Has the viability of the farm business changed since 1981 ?Y/N 
54. If so, how ? 
55. Why do you think these changes have occurred ? 
56. Now if we concentrate on just the last three years, has your farm business on its 
own, 
(a) made a profit 
(b) made a loss 
(c) broken even 
57. 
58. 
Do you have any specific plans to improve the viability of the farm business ? 
If so, what are they? 
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59. [*] Have you any plans to diversify the farm business at all? Y/N 
60. [*] IF 'YES', what do you plan to do, and why ? 
61. [*] Are you presently repaying any loans or mortgages for the purchase of land 
on this farm holding ? 
Y/N 
62. [*] Who was the lender ? 
a- Bank 
b- Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (AMC) 
c- Family member 
d- Private individual 
e- Other (specify) 
63. [*] Is the farm business currently servicing any loans for working capital or 
fixed assets other than land ? (Y / N) 
64. [*] What are they for ? 
65. [*] Who is the lender ? 
66. [*] How long does the loan run ? 
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The Ministry of Agriculture and the Farm Income Report from Exeter University have 
both suggested that one of the main problems facing farmers in recent years has been 
their level of borrowing. If you don't mind, I would like to ask you a couple of general 
questions relating to this. 
67. Referring to CARD D, could you tell me in very broad terms, what proportion 
of your annual farm income do mortgage, loan repayments and interest represent, say 
for the last financial year ? 
None 
Less than a quarter 
Quarter to a half 
Half to three quarters 
More than three-quarters 
Dont Know 
68. What are the effects of this on your fanning operations ? 
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SECTION B: FARMERS' PHILOSOPHY AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS 
69. In general terms how would you describe the way you farm ? And why ? 
[Prompt (if necessary): I mean, for example, what is your overall approach to farming, 
your philosophy] 
70. How important are the following beliefs to your approach to farming ? (CARD 
E) 
Not Fairly Very 
Important Important Important 
Making a reasonable living 
Maximising profitability 
Carrying on the family tradition 
Enjoying the farming way of life 
Looking after the countryside 
Being a progressive, up-to-date farmer 
Keeping the land in 'good heart' 
71. Has your general approach to the way you farm changed in the last ten years ? 
(How ?) 
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7 2. How would you describe good farming ? 
7 3. Do you ever find that you draw comparisons between yourself and surrounding 
farmers ? 
Y/N 
74. If yes, on what basis ? 
75. Farmers often say that they would like to pass on their farm to the next 
generation in a better condition than when they took it on themselves. What does the 
phrase "in a better condition" mean to you ? 
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76. What are the major difficulties that farmers like you face today ? 
77. Are there any others ? 
7 8. How would you sum up your response to these difficulties ? 
(briefly recap on the difficulties) 
79. Do you feel that things are more difficult now than 10 years ago? 
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80. [*] Do you plan to stay in farming until you retire ?Y/N 
81. IF'NO', Whynot? 
82. Do you hope for another member of your family to succeed to this farm 
business ? 
Y/N 
83. If yes, who ? 
Comments: 
84. What do you think are the chances of this happening ? 
Unlikely / Fairly likely / Likely / Very Likely 
85. Can we now talk briefly about your aims and objectives in the near future, and 
then in the longer term. 
First, lets take the next two years. 
How would you sum up your aims for the farm business ? 
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8 6. What plans do you have to achieve these aims ? 
87. Now taking a longer perspective, how would you sum up your aims for the 
longer term, say over the next 5 to 10 years? 
88. Have you made any plans yet ? YIN 
89. If so what are they ? 
90. What sorts of things do you think could spoil your future plans ? 
290 
SECTION C: New Products and Practices on the Farm 
I now want to turn to a set of questions about new products and practices on the farm. 
91. What benefits have changes in technology brought to your farming operations ? 
92. What difficulties have changes in technology created for your farming 
operations ? 
93. Who are the main beneficiaries of technological change in agriculture ? 
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94. Over the next decade or so, how do you expect farming practices to change, and 
what new types of products do you expect to see on the market ? 
95. How do you hear about new agricultural products and practices ? 
96. Some people say that modem agricultural practices have an adverse effect on the 
environment. Do you agree ? 
Y/N 
Comments: 
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97. If YES, could you expand. What sorts of adverse effects do you think modem 
agricultural practices have on the environment ? 
98. Have these environmental concerns affected the way that you farm at all, and if 
so, how ? 
99. Have you experienced any direct pressure to alter your farming practices, for 
example from neighbours, local people or officials ? 
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100. Modern farming uses powerful machinery and chemicals and inevitably certain 
risks are involved in their use. Referring to CARD F, could you tell me how great or 
small you feel the following types of risk to be from modern farming ? (CARD F) 
Negligible Small Moderate Large 
Risk to wildlife, plant 
life and river life 
Risk to public health through 
water contamination 
Risk to public health through 
food contamination 
Risk to farmers and their 
workers from using chemicals 
Risk to farmers and their 
workers from using machinery 
101. Now could you go through the same list and tell me if you think the levels of risk are 
increasing, decreasing or are staying the same ? 
Increasing Decreasing Staying the Same 
Risk to wildlife, plant 
life and river life 
Risk to public health through 
water contamination 
Risk to public health through 
food contamination 
Risk to farmers and their 
workers from using chemicals 
Risk to farmers and their 
workers from using machinery 
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Advice and Information 
102. On CARD G is a list of possible sources of advice available to farmers. Looking down 
the list, could you read out if there are any from which you have never had advice ? (MARK 
WITH AN 'N') 
Now could you tell me which are your main sources of advice regarding each of the following 
aspects of your farming operations ? 
Crop Drainage Agrochemicals 
nutrition/ What product How to 
fertlisers to use apply it 
B103 B104 B105 B106 
Merchant's 
representative 
Manufacturer's 
representative 
Independent 
Consultant 
Contractor 
Own expertise 
Employee's 
expertise 
Neigbours 
Family 
NRA 
HSE 
ADAS (Personal) 
ADAS (Group) 
Farming Research group 
Farming press/ 
freebies/media 
Farming events, 
meetings, conferences 
FWAG 
Other-specify 
Could you say which are the 1 st, 2nd and 3rd most important sources of advice for each 
activity ? 
Do you think that there is any difference between 'independent' and 'commercial' advice ? 
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B 107. Over the last 10 years, in what ways, if any, would you say that your usage of 
cereal herbicides has changed ? 
(Prompt: frequency of application; switch to new products) 
B 108. In the case of products which you have tended to use year in year out, has your 
usage increased, decreased or stayed the same ? 
B 109. What were the main reasons for these changes ? 
B 110. In deciding when precisely to apply cereal herbicides, what sorts of things do 
you bear in mind 
B 111. What changes, if any, would you like to see in the marketing or labelling of 
herbicides ? 
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B 112. Do you already use, or would you consider using any of the following ? 
Already Would Would Not 
Use Consider Consider 
a) Cultural methods 
of weed control * 
b) Using herbicide dose 
rates lower than those 
on the product label or 
given in off-label 
approvals (specify) 
c) Mechanical weeding 
d) "Organic farming" 
(* eg. nil cultivation, scratch cultivation, direct drilling) 
B 113. Could you explain your reasons ? 
a) 
b) 
C) 
d) 
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B 114. Has your use of nitrogen changed since 1981 ? 
Increase Decrease No Don't 
Change Use 
Quantity (manufactured) 
applied per hectare 
on average 
Quantity of bulky 
organices applied per 
hectare on average 
Timing of application Same Changed 
Manufactured 
Organic 
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Attitudes to Pollution Regulation 
125. There has been a great deal of discussion in the media about the issue of 
pollution. What does the term pollution mean to you ? 
126. Do you think pollution by agriculture is significant compared to industrial 
pollution ? 
127. Do you think that pollution by agriculture is being dealt with in the same way as 
pollution by industry ? 
128. What do you think would be the effects on farmers of a strict prosecution policy 
for pollution incidents ? 
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129. Do you think that there are adequate incentives to prevent pollution on farms 
generally. 
B 130. Here is a list of measures that have been suggested to tackle agricultural 
pollution (CARD H). 
a) Voluntary changes in farming practice based on Government advice 
b) Statutory controls on the use of any chemicals causing a problem 
c) Change in Government support to deintensify agriculture 
d) A tax on chemical inputs 
e) Across-the-board statutory restrictions on the volume of chemicals that farmers 
could use 
f) Encouragement to the chemical companies to develop 'greener' technologies 
g) Other (Please specify) 
Firstly, are there any that you would oppose in principle ? 
131. Would you suggest any other possible measures ? 
132. Now could you rank those which you do not oppose in order of your own 
preference (ie. Which would be your first, second, third preference etc) ? 
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133. What impact do you think pollution regulations have had on farming practices 
generally ? 
134. What about on this farm in particular ? 
B 135. Looking at CARD I, do you use any of the products on the list ? 
ARELON WDG 
ASTIXFARMON CMPP 
AUTUMN KITE 
CAMPBELL'S FIELD-MARSHALL, 
CAMPBELL'S CAMPPEX 
CLEANACRES CMPP 60 
CLIFTON CMPP AMINE 60 
DUPLOSAN CMPP 
HEADLAND CHARGE 
HYPRONE 
IPSO 
JAVELIN 
MSS MIRCAM 
MUSKETEER 
PADDOX 
PORTMAN ISOTOP 
POWER ISOPROTURON 
QUIVER 
SPRINGCORN EXTRA 
TERSET 
TOLKAN LIQUID 
ARELON 
ASTROL 
BANLENE PLUS 
BELLCLO 
CHAFER CMPP SUPER 
CLEAVAL 
COMPITOX EXTRA 
FANFARE 496 FW 
HERRISOL 
HYTANE 500 FW 
ISO-CORNEX 57 
METHOXONE 
MSS CMPP 
ORACLE 
PANTHER 
POST-KITE 
QUAD CMPP 60 
SABRE 
STAR CMPP 
TETRALEX PLUS 
TRUMP 
ASSASSIN 
ATLAS CMPP 
CAMPBELL'S MPP 
HERRIFEX DS 
CHILTERN IPU 
CLENECORN 
DI-FARMON 
FOXSTAR 
HYMEC 
INVICTA 
JAGUAR 
MSS MIRCAM 
MSS CMPP AMINE 
OXYCORN EXTRA 
PINNACLE 
POWER SWING 
QUADBAN 
SELEXONE 
SWIPE 500 EC 
TOLKAN 500 
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The sprays contain chemicals which have been found in surface and groundwater. If 
they were to be banned from use, how would your farming activities be affected ? 
Autumn ban: 
Total ban: 
B 136. Let us say that legislation was introduced which banned autumn applications of 
all herbicides. How do you think this would affect your farming activities? 
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137. Let us say that new legislation was introduced to cut nitrogen inputs by 20% (in 
terms of active ingredient). How do you think this would affect your farming activities 7 
Water Privatisation 
13 8. What is your impression of the NRA ? 
139. Have you had any contact with NRA officials ? (Prompt: attended talks, farm 
visits, shows) Y/N 
140. If 'Yes' How do you personally find NRA officials ? 
141. Did you have any contact with the old water authority officials ?Y/N 
142. If 'Yes' How did you find them ? 
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143. Have you noticed any differences between the old water authority and the NRA? 
B 146. Have you had any contact with Health and Safety Executive Agricultural 
Inspectors ? 
Y/N 
B 147. If 'Yes', for what reason ? 
B 148. How do you personally find HSE officials ? 
144. Thank you again for your help. Would you like to be sent any summary 
findings from our research sometime in the next few months ? 
Y/N 
145. This survey has been of about 80 farmers in this area. We hope to revisit a few 
farmers again to discuss some of these issues in greater detail. If we should need to, 
would you mind if we contacted you again in the future ?Y/N 
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APPENDIX C: 
Interviews with Scientific and Policy Actors 
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List of names has been removed to protect privacy
Errata 
p. 5 "4.5 General Characertistsics" should read "4.5 General Characteristics" 
p. 13 Footnote no. 2, line 1, " pesticide' " should read 11 'pesticide' " 
p. 17 Third paragraph, line 7" accidental'" should read 11 accidental" 
p. 21 First paragraph, line 2, "have" should read "has" 
p. 21 First paragraph, line 4, "(ADAS)" should read "(ADAS, which is now 
sometimes known as ADAS - Food, Farming, Land and Leisure)" 
p. 26 Fourth paragraph, line 2, "is explored" should read "are explored" 
p. 31 Second paragraph, line 5, "benefit" should read "benefits" 
p. 32 Fourth paragraph, line 5, "prevent" should read "prevents" 
p. 34 Last paragraph, "they argue" should read "Clunies-Ross and Hildyard 
argue" 
p. 35 Second paragraph, line 8, "yields, and" should read "yields and" 
p. 39 Fourth paragraph, line 6, "Europe, that" should read "Europe that" 
p. 43 First paragraph, line 5, "1930s, and" should read "1930s and" 
p. 43 Last paragraph, line 3, "structures, to" should read "structures, and to" 
p. 47 First paragraph, line 5 "configurations, all" should read 
"configurations all" 
p. 48 Last paragraph, "present and future actions" should read "present and 
future actions (1993, p. 152)" 
p. 55 Title, "BRITIAN" should read "BRITAIN" 
p. 55 First paragraph, "social control processes" should read "social 
processes" 
p. 55 Fourth paragraph, line 4, "schools' " should read "school's" 
p. 57 First paragraph, line 4, "war, and" should read "war and" 
p. 79 First quotation, "Kloppenburg]" should read "Kloppenburg])" 
p. 86 Second paragraph, line 9, "producers, were" should read "producers 
were" 
p. 94 First paragraph, line 2, "has grwon" should read "have grown" 
p. 101 Second paragraph, line 2, "is now" should read "are now" 
p. 115 Title, "STUDY ARE" should read "STUDY AREA" 
p. 116 Third paragraph, line 13, "contribute" should read "contributes" 
p. 131 Third paragraph, line 11, "levels have regularly" should read "levels 
regularly" 
p. 132 Third paragraph, line 14, "over fift times" should read "over fifty times" 
p. 135 Foot note no. 3, "which straddle" should read "which straddles" 
p. 136 Second paragraph, line 5, "removal redundant" should read "removal of 
redundant" 
p. 142 Second paragraph, line 6, "was owner-occupied" and "was securely 
rented" should read "were owner-occupied" and "were securely rented" 
p. 142 Second paragraph, line 7, "was rented" should read "were rented" 
p. 147 Third paragraph, line 6, "Uraguay" should read "Uruguay" 
p. 147 Fourth paragraph, line 6, "encyclopedia" should read "encyclopaedia" 
p. 156 Fourth paragraph, line 1, "busnesses" should read "businesses" 
p. 156 Sixth paragraph, line 1, "charcterised" should read "characterised" 
p. 156 Sixth paragraph, line 2, "withdrawel" should read "withdrawal" 
p. 166 Last sentence, "making the negotiative process... as crucial to practice" 
should read "showing the negotiative process... to be crucial to practice" 
p. 167 First paragraph, line 11, "landords" should read "landlords" 
p. 168 Fourth paragraph, line 2, "have been" should read "were" 
p. 172 Third paragraph, "recommendations for applying agrochemicals on 
product labels" should read "recommendations on product labels for 
applying agrochemicals" 
p. 176 Footnote to Table 6.1, "most important source of source of advice" 
should read "most important source of advice" 
p. 178 Footnote to Table 6.2, "most important source of source of advice" 
should read "most important source of advice" 
p. 182 Third paragraph, line 1, "descernable" should read "discernible" 
p. 219 First paragraph, line 4, "fairy and arable" should read "dairy and arable" 
p. 219 Second paragraph, line 1, "for to cereal" should read "for cereal" 
p. 222 Last paragraph, line 6, "were generaaly" should read "were generally" 
p. 222 Last paragraph, line 8, " somewhere else'" should read " 'somewhere 
else' " 
p. 223 Second paragraph, line 3, "illustrates" should read "illustrate" 
p. 226 First paragraph, "socio-technical network" should read " socio- technical 
networks" 
Bibliography Errata 
p. 251 Kjolholt (1990), "distribution" should read "Distribution" 
p. 252 Kneale et al. (1992) "Univerity" should read "University" 
p. 252 Knorr-Cetina (1981), "Towrads" should read "Towards" 
p. 254 Marco et al. (1991) "in Their Regulation" should read "in Their 
Evolution" 
p. 307 Bottom note, "attented" should read "attended" 
